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Abstract 
A Coordination-Based Approach to Subnational Variations in Split-Ticket Voting: The 
Case of Ghana 1996-2016 
 
Samuel K. Darkwa 
 
This dissertation seeks to explain the causes of split-ticket voting (skirt and blouse voting) 
in emerging democracies like Ghana. The analysis carried out here has been approached at three 
levels. This is because voters’ decisions in the voting booth are affected by factors within the larger 
political environment which are often beyond the individual voter. Thus, the three approaches 
employed here consider individual-level, constituency-level, and elite-level factors that affect the 
phenomenon. In each case different datasets were used to examine split-ticket voting. The analysis 
reveals that the individual-level factors (demographic characteristics and political information 
variables) are weak in explaining ticket splitting. Aside from their statistically weak relationship 
with ticket splitting, they are inconsistent in explaining the phenomenon. The most important 
factors shaping split-ticket voting, however, operate at the elite-level, and are coordination based. 
Using the Afrobarometer survey, constituency level electoral data, and a fieldwork survey, the 
analysis finds elite-level factors which are based on coordination successes and failures within and 
between parties as the best predictors of ticket splitting. The reason for this is that elite coordination 
successes and failures affect the available choice sets at any given election and these largely affect 
ticket splitting. I argue that differences in ticket splitting are better explained by variation in the 
degree of coordination among elite actors than by variation in characteristics of individual voters 
such as political sophistication.
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
“… the larger point is that the particular mix of mechanisms underlying ticket splitting will evolve 
as democracies mature.” (Helmke 2009, 77). 
“Taking ticket splitting in a comparative direction will necessarily expand the definition of ticket 
splitting commonly used in the American politics literature” (Burden and Helmke 2009, 2) 
Split-ticket voting continues to attract research attention in developed as well as emerging 
democracies due to its effects on democratic representation and accountability (Burden and 
Helmke 2009; Helmke 2009). This is because the underlying mechanisms of the phenomenon 
continue to evolve as democracies evolve and this is overwhelmingly prevalent in emerging 
democracies like Ghana. Aside from the evolution of the underlying mechanisms of the 
phenomenon, there are discrete nuances in factors that underpin split-ticket voting in different 
settings though the fundamental cause may be uniform in most settings. As such, the study of ticket 
splitting needs to expand beyond how it is viewed from the lenses of American and Western 
European scholars though their work can form the basis of the study. One place where ticket 
splitting is remarkably pronounced and has fascinated both the electorate and party elites is Ghana.     
Political parties usually have strong incentive to encourage straight ticket voting so that 
voters support all their candidates on the ballot. In Ghana, split-ticket voting is so common that it 
has a special name, “skirt and blouse voting1” denoting a two-piece dress instead of one straight 
dress (Daddieh 2011). It is associated with voting for a presidential candidate from one political 
party and for a parliamentary candidate from a different political party in a concurrent election. 
Not only do we see evidence of split-ticket voting in some constituencies in Ghana, but we also 
see some evidence that party supporters and elites strategically encourage split-ticket voting under 
certain conditions2. Further, civil society may encourage split-ticket voting to achieve certain 
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goals. My dissertation will explore the reasons for this phenomenon and contribute to our 
understanding of split-ticket voting, elite behavior, and Ghanaian electoral politics.  
Given that we see some evidence that party supporters and elites strategically encourage 
split-ticket voting under certain conditions, it is important to consider different questions when 
split-ticket voting is studied in Ghana alongside the conventional questions such as: “why will 
some voters split their tickets, but others will not?” Thus, the following questions become relevant 
when we study split-ticket voting in Ghana. Why would party elites, or supporters of a political 
party want either the party’s presidential or parliamentary candidate lose the election in a particular 
constituency? Why would a presidential and or parliamentary candidate of a political party 
advocate either overtly or covertly for split-ticket voting? Again, why would a supporter, a 
member, or an official of a political party vote to split the ballot, roll-off the ballot, or abstain? 
What are the effects of ticket splitting on democratic representation and accountability; is the 
phenomenon promoting or hurting Ghana’s democracy? This dissertation argues that skirt and 
blouse voting is helping the country’s young democracy in two important ways. First, it creates 
cross-party cohesion especially through strategic moves of party elites from different political 
parties to form electoral coalition with diverse arrangements to boost their performance which 
inadvertently further induce ticket splitting. It has been argued that successful democracy is largely 
the acts of consensually united elites who see politics as bargaining based on the principle of give 
to get (Best and Higley 2010; Higley and Burton 1989, 2006; Higley et al. 1991). Thus, the 
strategic moves of political elites through bargaining often create ticket splitting and reduce the 
incidence of winner-takes-all that often sows the seeds of disaffection among disunited elites 
which has a potential to cause political instability (Best and Higley 2010; Higley and Burton 1989, 
2006; Higley et al. 1991). Second, ticket splitting has direct effect on democratic representation 
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and accountability. Here, a voter who is candidate oriented could vote for the most viable 
candidates irrespective of their party affiliation and in so doing vote based on competence instead 
of on party identification. This also ensures political accountability in the sense that political actors 
are challenged to perform or face the wrath of the electorates.  
This is not to say that ticket splitting has no adverse consequences on government 
policies/performance and political accountability. It has been found that ticket splitting can create 
divided government that can dilute clarity of responsibility among a governing coalition and thus 
affect government policy formulation and implementation (Burden and Kimball 2009; Powell and 
Whitten 1993). In this way, the electorates are unable to adequately hold political actors 
responsible for their performance (Powell and Whitten 1993). Be it as it may, ticket splitting has 
effects on democratic representation and accountability and it is important to study how elite 
interactions and voter level factors contribute to it. It worth pointing out that in Ghana, the general 
impression of the masses is that split-ticketing safeguards the public’s interests as politicians 
cannot condone and connive to engage in misappropriating the nation’s scarce resources (Dadzie 
2008; Lartey-Adjei 2012). In the study of split-ticket voting, not much attention is typically paid 
to party elites because the phenomenon is considered voter behavior reflected by individual choice 
made in the voting booth (Burden and Kimball 2009; Roscoe 2003). However, because the 
individual choice is a function of more than individual forces, it is imperative to include such 
factors when evaluating ticket splitting if we want to get to the bottom of the phenomenon. In fact, 
voter choice (electoral outcome) is influenced by how electoral systems, elite interactions, and 
alliances affect the choice sets that are available to the electorate (Cox 1997, 1999; Roscoe 2003). 
Therefore, since voter preference is structured by electoral systems and elite interactions 
(coordination), this dissertation includes these factors in evaluating ticket splitting and this is 
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where the Ghanaian ticket splitting is especially relevant. Studying ticket splitting this way will 
provide meaningful insights into split-ticket voting in other jurisdictions especially in emerging 
democracies. Thus, this dissertation will analyze split-ticket voting by considering both voter-level 
and elite-level factors under a single member first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. It will also explore 
multiple datasets (large-N surveys from Afrobarometer, aggregate electoral datasets, and 
fieldwork carried out by the author) to analyze split-ticket voting.  
The chapter will first define split-ticket voting and show how the Ghanaian concept is 
similar and different from the conventional definition. Second, the dissertation will review past 
research on split-ticket voting. This is critical because, it will help the present study identify what 
has been done in the subfield and thus, justify the present study based on how it intends to extend 
our knowledge by building on what others have done thus far. The chapter will distinguish between 
split-ticket voting and strategic voting and end by providing a brief overview of the dissertation.   
1.2 DEFINITION FOR TICKET SPLITTING 
Burden and Helmke (2009) provide a conceptual framework for ticket splitting that 
expresses the phenomenon as “a ticket is split if voter i votes for party j in contest r and votes for 
party ~j in some other contest” (Burden and Helmke 2009, 2). From this framework, split-ticket 
voting refers to an aspect of voting behavior where a member of the electorate votes for a candidate 
of one political party in an election for one office while voting for a candidate of another party in 
a concurrent election for a different office. For instance, on the same polling day, a voter may vote 
for a National Democratic Congress (NDC) presidential candidate and for a New Patriotic Party 
(NPP)3 legislative candidate or vice-versa. Thus, ticket splitting occurs when a voter casts at least 
one vote for a candidate/list representing one party and at least one other vote for a candidate/list 
representing a different party (or independent). These ballots must be cast at the same election4 for 
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candidates contesting seats in the same institution (e.g., a legislature using a mixed-member 
electoral system) or different institutions (e.g. concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections).  
Ticket splitting can further be classified into two dimensions (direction and timing). With 
respect to the direction, the focus is on political institutions (e.g. presidential and parliamentary 
elections) or the electoral systems involved (e.g. SMD plurality, proportional representation [PR], 
or mixed-member electoral system). Again, when we speak of ticket splitting in directional terms, 
we are interested in whether it is vertical (different offices: e.g. presidential and parliamentary) or 
horizontal (same office but under different electoral systems: e.g. a legislature using a mixed-
member electoral system). Conversely, ticket splitting in respect to timing considers whether the 
phenomenon occurred in concurrent or non-concurrent elections (Campbell and Miller 1957; 
Burden and Helmke 2009).  These classifications are briefly illustrated by Table 1.1 below. 
 Table 1.1: Ticket Splitting Across Offices and Time.  
 Concurrent Non-concurrent 
Horizontal Mixed member systems elections (Karp et al. 
2002; Burden 1998; Moser and Scheiner 2005) 
Staggered multi-member 
elections 
Vertical Presidential-legislative elections (Brunell and 
Grofman 1998, 2009; Helmke 2009) 
Midterm and by-elections 
(Chandra 2007, 2009) 
Source: Burden and Helmke (2009, 3) 
1.2.1 Working Definition for Ticket Splitting 
Since the Ghanaian ticket splitting is a vertical-concurrent type located at the lower left 
quadrant of Table 1.1, I will restrict this study to the Burden and Helmke (2009) definition above 
and use it as a working definition for this dissertation. In fact, many scholars are of the view that 
ticket-splitting can only take place in concurrent elections where electorates vote candidates from 
different political parties into different offices. As such Navia and Saldaña (2015) assert that ticket-
splitting can only occur when there is a concurrent election where voters choose candidates for 
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different offices. Voters split their tickets when they select a candidate from one party for one 
office and a candidate from a different party for a different office (Navia and Saldaña 2015, 486; 
see also Thomson 2007, Watts 2010). It is worth restating that, there are different forms of ticket 
splitting and these are summarized in Table 1.1 above.  
In Ghana, the phrase “skirt and blouse voting” is used to describe two distinct phenomena.  
The phrase is sometimes used to refer to the type of ticket splitting described above.  In its more 
original usage5, however, the phrase refers to an aggregate-level outcome where the winners in the 
presidential and legislative races in a given constituency (electoral district) come from different 
political parties (Daddieh 2011; Frempong 2017). In this way, the concept of skirt and blouse 
voting is different from the conventional concept of split-ticket voting used in political science 
literature.  
Skirt and blouse voting also represents voter behavior in the voting booth which is similar 
to its conventional usage in mainline political science literature. Scholars have identified two main 
reasons why skirt and blouse voting occur. First, skirt and blouse voting occur where a voter in the 
same set of elections chooses a presidential and a parliamentary candidate from different political 
parties in a concurrent election (Asunka 2016; Ichino and Nathan 2013, 2017; Lindberg 2013; 
Weghorst and Lindberg 2013). Second, skirt and blouse voting occur in instances where supporters 
of a political party vote for the party’s presidential candidate but vote for a parliamentary candidate 
from a different political party or an independent candidate (Boafo-Arthur 2006, 2008; Debrah 
and Gyampo 2013). The difference between the two reasons for electorates voting skirt and blouse 
is that the first falls within the conventional ticket splitting while the second is an organized act in 
“isolated” constituencies often characterized by mobilized voter protest due to in-party 
competition/factions or deliberate sabotage (Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2012; Debrah 2004).  
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Thus, the literature on skirt and blouse voting in Ghana has used the same phrase (“skirt 
and blouse voting”) to mean both split district outcome and split-ticket voting; this creates 
conceptual ambiguity that requires reclassification to harmonize it with similar concepts used in 
political science for consistency and comparability. In view of this, the dissertation reclassifies the 
concept into skirt and blouse voting (split-ticket voting) and skirt and blouse outcome (split district 
outcome/two office split at the aggregate level). The Ghanaian case triggers questions such as: 
why would the supporters of a political party defect from their parliamentary candidate in favor of 
a candidate of another party? Why would they not withdraw from both the presidential and the 
parliamentary candidates or abstain from the presidential candidate? What is so unique about the 
presidential candidate and not about the parliamentary candidates? These are questions not asked 
in ticket splitting literature from other settings and they make the Ghanaian case a unique one.  
1.3 A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE TICKET SPLITTING LITERATURE 
 The literature on ticket splitting is voluminous and diverse (Burden and Helmke 2009). For 
the purpose of this study, the current dissertation will briefly review the most influential work in 
this chapter and consider it in more detail in chapters 3-5 where it is applied alongside other 
research. This chapter emphasizes research about demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
of voters, strategic policy balancing, divided government, economic voting, candidate quality, and 
(mis)coordination in ticket splitting.   
1.3.1 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Voters 
Most of the literature under this sub-heading is in the US context because the literature in 
that area is well developed and widely cited. Scholars of elections often approach the study of 
split-ticket voting by analyzing the demographic and socioeconomic features of voters to find out 
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how ticket-splitters differ from other voters (Bybee et al. 1981; Campbell and Miller 1975; Roscoe 
2003). Demographically, ticket-splitters are said to be younger, more educated, and often relatively 
middle-class and white-collar in socioeconomic terms. They tend to live in more suburban areas 
than the typical middle-class voter (DeVries and Tarrance 1972). Based on such observable 
indicators of ticket splitters, DeVries and Tarrance (1972) recommend political actors to target 
such voters with specific campaign messages. In contrast to this work, Campbell and Miller (1957) 
found no link between ticket splitting and socio-economic characteristics of voters. Other scholars 
found that the relationship between age and ticket splitting was spurious and there is no statistically 
significant relationship between education and ticket splitting (Bybee et al. 1981; Roscoe 2003). 
Thus, there are conflicting findings about the relationship between the demographic features of 
voters and ticket splitting.  
Aside from demographic and socioeconomic features of ticket-splitters, scholars have also 
considered attitudinal factors of ticket-splitters such as voter perception and political attitudes 
toward the political parties. It has been found that partisanship intensity and higher interest in 
politics are inversely related to ticket splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell 
and Miller 1957). In contrast, Maddox and Nimmo (1981) found that while partisans split their 
ballots, strong partisans tend to split less frequently. This tells us that, under certain circumstances, 
even strong partisans may split their tickets, and this is one of the puzzles that this dissertation 
explores. It has also been found that voters who make late voting decisions are more likely to split 
their tickets (Maddox and Nimmo 1981; Bybee et al. 1981) including those who change their vote 
intentions based on unfolding issues and those who update their voting intentions over the course 
of the campaign (Bybee et al. 1981). 
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Furthermore, exposure to political information (voter sophistication) especially through 
print media usage has been found to influence voters to make decisions which positively correlate 
with ticket splitting (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Bybee et al. 1981; Gomes and Wilson 2006). 
However, counter evidence has shown that persons who are partisan may be selective in their 
media choice and as such may not necessarily split their votes. Also, strong partisans who are 
likely to vote a straight ticket are generally more sophisticated, suggesting that voter sophistication 
is not a good proxy for ticket splitting (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003). This 
dissertation controls for these voter-level factors. It must be pointed out however, that there are 
conflicting views on the relationship between exposure to political information and ticket splitting. 
For instance, while some scholars found association between reliance on the print media and ticket 
splitting (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Bybee et al. 1981), others found no positive relationship 
between television and ticket splitting (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Beck et al. 1992; Bybee et al. 
1981; DeVries and Tarrance 1972). 
1.3.2 Strategic Policy Balancing  
Aside from analyzing how ticket splitters are different from other voters by evaluating the 
demographic and socioeconomic features of voters, scholars have also examined the phenomenon 
by considering voter intentions. A classic theory about voter intention is Fiorina’s (1988) concept 
of strategic policy balancing. This concept is derived from a simple proximity spatial model in 
which voters prefer policies nearest to their ideal points (Downs 1957). It assumes that voters are 
generally concerned with the overall orientation of the policy implemented by a government and 
that these voters favor nonextreme policies. It further assumes that political parties hold different 
positions on the ideological continuum. Due to their preference for nonextreme policies, voters 
who are positioned at the median segment will be more likely to split their votes to achieve non-
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extreme policies where the parties’ policies overlap. Furthermore, the model assumes that voters 
are rational and are likely to maximize their utilities to obtain optimal policies from casting a split-
ticket (Fiorina 1988, 1996; Kedar 2005). Thus, voters through their voting decisions are signaling 
political parties to be less polarized and move towards the ideological center with moderate 
policies.  
Other studies, however, have shown that voters prefer high party polarization because that 
gives them (voters) distinct choices while ideological or perceived party similarities blur voter 
choice and so cause ticket splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Petrocik 1991; Petrocik and Doherty 1996; 
Roscoe 2003). This theory indicates that we should expect the likelihood of ticket splitting to be 
higher where voters do not see much difference between the parties. We are to expect more split-
ticket voting where the parties are perceived to be similar because voters do not have distinct 
choice at the polls.  
1.3.3 Divided Government 
Related to the strategic policy balancing theory is the divided government model. This 
theory is rooted in Fiorina’s (1988, 1992) policy balancing model which asserts that a voter's 
decision to split the ticket is an intentional and conscious choice for divided government. Divided 
government theory posits that where individual preference overlaps with those of the political 
parties, that individual will split to achieve moderate policy outcome. Scholars such as Jacobson 
(1990) and Petrocik (1991) who also view divided government as intentional result of ticket 
splitting have argued that splitting is a deliberate act of voters to match political parties to 
institutions the parties have expertise in (institutional matching) or issues they have skills to 
address (issue ownership). For instance, in the US, it was held that Republicans and Democrats 
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had different strengths. Democrats were suitable for Congress because they supported social 
intervention policies while Republicans were best for the presidency because they were best in 
managing the economy. Thus, ticket splitting is a purposeful act of voters to place parties in offices 
they handle best. However, these claims were challenged when in the 1990s Democrats won the 
presidency to manage the budget deficit while Republicans achieved a Congressional majority 
(Saad 1995; Roscoe 2003). Other scholars have disputed the assertion that positive attitudes toward 
divided government are responsible for ticket splitting. These scholars argue that individuals who 
hold moderate issue positions are no more likely to split than others. They found that divided 
governments are often accidental than deliberate voter intentions (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; 
Campbell 1960; Erikson 2016; Sigelman et al. 1997; Roscoe 2003). 
Scholars studying other countries have different view on ticket splitting and divided 
government. Ames et al. (2009) observed that Brazilians do not cast their votes with eventual 
government formation in mind. These scholars argued that Brazil’s divided government is 
inadvertent because voters make separate decisions when voting in presidential and deputy 
elections. Their main argument is that presidential and deputy elections are “unlinked.” Ames et 
al (2009) are of the view that the sequencing of the elections, such as the mid-term elections in 
United States, is responsible for divided government (Ames et al 2009; see also Shugart 1995; 
Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). Other scholars whose research is based in new democracies found 
ticket splitting in these settings to be akin to voters’ intention of protecting themselves by matching 
experienced politicians and challengers rather than creating a divided government. They argued 
that voters in new democracies will like to vote for new parties and candidates but would like to 
avoid making the mistake of having only ‘novice’ politicians into office. Thus, ticket splitting in 
these settings is largely electoral insurance rather than divided government (Ames et al 2009; 
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Helmke 2009). Hence, studying ticket splitting in new democracies offers profound prospects for 
expanding our knowledge in split-ticket voting.  
1.3.4 Economic Voting  
 Downs’ (1957) expected utility theory of voting constitutes the fundamental argument of 
economic voting theory which posits that a voter would favor a presidential candidate that renders 
the highest expected utility. Downs’s expected utility theory of voting was revised by Fiorina 
(1981) who argued that voters will vote for an incumbent president whose administration improved 
citizens’ economic conditions and punish an incumbent under whose leadership the economy 
deteriorated. Further, the revised model asserts that where an incumbent’s challenger shows 
prospects of better performance based on excellent track record, voters are likely to vote for the 
challenger. Fiorina’s (1981) revision, therefore, introduces retrospective and prospective voting 
into the decision calculus of voters.  
In essence, the economic voting model asserts that voters will evaluate the performance of 
the incumbent and that of the challenger when making their voting decisions. Where a challenger 
does not have the benefit of office experience, voters are to base their assessment on the prospects 
of the challenger (Benton 2005; Fiorina 1981; Helmke 2009). Splitting occurs where candidates 
with higher performance ratings are not from the same party (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck and 
Paldam 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). Some scholars argue that the economic voting is not 
effective because governments were not consistently punished for bad economic times or rewarded 
for good performance (Anderson 2007). Finally, it has been argued that retrospective voting based 
on performance is blind especially in situations where voters will like to punish politicians on acts 
beyond their control such as natural disasters (Achen and Bartels 2004). Furthermore, it has been 
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argued that clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993), a country’s electoral system 
(Benton 2005) and availability of alternatives (Anderson 2007) may inhibit voters’ ability to 
employ economic voting.  
1.3.5 Candidate Quality 
Scholarship on ticket splitting has also identified candidate-level factors to be responsible 
for the phenomenon. Three main candidate-level factors identified are: incumbency, campaign 
spending, and issue positioning (Born 1994; Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Burden and Kimball 2009). 
It has been observed that incumbency is often associated with candidate quality because 
incumbents have the advantage of office experience (Born 1994; Burden and Kimball 2009). 
Consequently, voters whose preferred Congressional candidate does not have the benefit of office 
experience for instance, will vote for their presidential candidate and either roll-off or vote for a 
more experienced candidate who is often the incumbent (Born 1994; Burden and Kimball 2009). 
On the contrary, it has also been found that incumbency may not always be advantage and that it 
can also be a liability (Burden 2009; Roscoe 2003; Scheiner 2005). Campaign spending has also 
been found to influence ticket splitting in some settings such that a candidate who is able to spend 
beyond certain threshold has a greater chance of getting the attention of the electorate and therefore 
can cause ticket splitting (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003). Though campaign 
spending can cause splitting, those who spend more sometimes lose the election to their lower-
spending counterparts (Frempong 2017; Roscoe 2003).  
Finally, a candidate’s issue positioning has been found to be responsible for ticket splitting. 
Advocates of issue positions argue that candidates who move closer to their opponent’s issue 
position or move away from their party’s position can create ticket splitting (Frymer 1994; Key 
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1966; Petrocik and Doherty 1996). It has been argued that high party polarization decreases 
splitting while less polarization increases splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Petrocik 1991; Petrocik and 
Doherty 1996; Roscoe 2003). Thus, when there is a clear difference between the parties or 
candidates contesting the elections, voters can make distinct choices but where the contestants look 
alike on ideological grounds and issue positions, voters do not have unique choice, therefore, they 
will split their votes (Key, 1966). In fact, scholars have found a strong statistical association 
between candidates’ issue positions and ticket splitting (Burden and Kimball 2009). Hence, all 
things being equal, where candidates position on issues are not very diverse, we expect higher 
likelihood of splitting. The logic of candidate quality and ticket splitting is that, where the most 
visible candidates in the different races belong to different parties, the greater the likelihood of 
ticket splitting.  
1.3.6 (Mis)coordination Ticket Splitting 
 Cox (1997, 1999) provides a model to understand how party elites make their entry 
decisions. This model is related to the concept that he referred to as the M+1 rule (strategic entry 
rule required of party elites), where M refers to the district magnitude. This model suggests that 
where a voting district (constituency) elects one candidate, the viable number of candidates in that 
constituency is two (that is the district magnitude plus one). Where elites field more than two 
candidates in that constituency, voters who care only about the present election and want their 
votes to count, will withdraw support from less viable candidates. For instance, a voter whose 
preferred candidate is the third-ranked candidate will rather prefer to vote for one of the top two 
candidates than for the third-ranked candidate. Consequently, the contest in SMD plurality is often 
reduced to a competition between the most viable candidates. In this way, SMDs with plurality 
rule favor two party systems. However, proportional representation (PR) systems are less 
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punishing to small parties because the district magnitude is greater than “1” and tend to produce 
less strategic defection (Duverger 1954). Thus, a voter whose preferred choice is the third-ranked 
candidate (or party) will still vote for that candidate and still be able to influence the system. As a 
result, PR systems tend to produce multiparty competition.  
Consequently, some scholars are of the view that mixed-member electoral systems that 
combine SMD plurality and PR will have a mixture of the two systems. This is because 
competition at the SMD tier will reduce to a two-party affair while the PR tier will produce 
multiparty competition (Milazzo, Moser, and Scheiner 2018; Moser and Scheiner 2005, 2012; Rich 
2014). However, proponents of contamination effects argue that the use of different electoral rules 
in the same voting district would yield a vote bonus at the PR tier for parties who contest elections 
at the SMD tier (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Guinjoan 2016; Herron and Nishikawa 
2001). Therefore, the overlap of electoral arenas in mixed electoral systems will encourage 
multiparty competition at the SMD tier contrary to what takes place in a pure SMD system. 
The major takeaway from (mis)coordination ticket splitting is that in pure SMDs, when 
party elites fail to coordinate their entry given by the first M+1 rule, voters will activate the second 
M+1 rule by concentrating their votes on the most viable candidates. It means that where a political 
party fields more than one candidate either due to nomination problems or factions, voters are 
likely to withdraw (split away) from that party. This is because the support base of that party may 
divide and voters who do not want to waste their votes will support their next preferred candidate 
who is likely to win. In the same vein, where an ideological bloc, for instance, leftist parties, field 
more than one candidate in a pure SMD, that bloc may be (mis)coordinating their entry. If their 
opponent commands similar support, voters are likely to defect from at least one of the candidates 
from the leftist bloc. It is worth stressing that voter coordination ultimately occurs at the polls 
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where voters defect from nonviable contestants. In the case of Ghana, where elections are 
conducted in concurrent presidential-legislative races in SMDs, voter coordination can lead to 
ticket splitting if the candidates a voter elects in the two races are not from the same political party 
(Beck et al. 1992; Burden and Kimball 2009). Thus, if a party wants to avoid influencing voters to 
split their tickets, it must coordinate on competitive candidates in both presidential and 
parliamentary races and ensure that there is harmony between the presidential and parliamentary 
candidates’ campaigning/marketing.  
1.4 DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPLIT-TICKET VOTING AND STRATEGIC VOTING 
Conceptually, strategic voting deals with voters’ strategic response or reaction to electoral 
rules with the view of making their votes count (Batto et al. 2016; Bawn 1999; Cox 1997; Roberts 
1988). In mixed systems for instance, supporters of dominant parties normally tend to vote 
sincerely for their most preferred candidates/parties in both the SMD and PR tiers because their 
preferred candidates/parties are often viable, therefore, they do not necessarily need to vote 
strategically. In contrast, supporters of minor parties tend to act strategically especially in district 
races by voting for the viable candidates of major parties closer to their ideologies but vote 
sincerely at the PR tier for their preferred candidates/minor parties. Aside the electoral rules 
determining the strategic acts of the electorates, the strategic moves of party elites to coordinate 
candidate nomination in district races with other parties often influence the strategic acts of the 
electorates. These strategic moves of elites often determine the electoral context. By electoral 
context, I mean the parties and candidates contesting in a particular district as well as the 
competitiveness of the election. Proponents of contamination effects argue that party elites can 
lessen the strategic acts of voters by fielding candidates in SMDs in order to boost party votes in 
the PR tier (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Ferrara and Herron 2005; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 
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2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). Thus, voters may have their preferred candidates or party 
identification, the electoral rule and the electoral context may influence their voting decision. In 
sum, strategic voting occurs where voters react to the electoral rules and context and regulate their 
vote choices to ensure that their votes count (do not waste their votes) especially where their most 
preferred candidates/parties are not viable.  
Split-ticket voting occurs where voters cross party lines when choosing their 
representatives (Gschwend et al. 2003; Johnston and Pattie 2003; Karp et al. 2002). It is voting for 
different political parties into different political institutions such as presidency and legislature – 
vertical splitting or for different parties into the same office but under different electoral systems 
e.g. a legislature using a mixed-member electoral system – horizontal splitting (Burden and 
Helmke 2009; Campbell and Miller 1957). Conceptually, two main viewpoints have been 
advanced to explain the patterns of split-ticket voting and these are whether voters are acting 
sincerely or strategically (Plescia 2016, 5). It has been argued that voters deliberately split to 
achieve divided government (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Fiorina 1992) or as an insurance for 
having both experienced politicians and new parties/candidates in office (Ames et al 2009; Helmke 
2009). However, scholars such as Alvarez and Schousen (1993), Beck et al. (1992) and Mattei and 
Howes (2000) do not find support for strategic incentives for ticket splitting. Proponents of sincere 
ticket splitting argue that voters split their votes where the viable candidates in the different races 
are not from the same political party and voters want to sincerely vote for the viable 
candidates/parties (Burden and Kimball 2009; Roscoe 2003). 
It worth pointing out, however, that strategic voting and split-ticket voting are two different 
concepts though they may overlap. As explained above, strategic voting occurs where voters want 
their votes to count by adjusting their voting preference in response to electoral rules and elite 
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strategic moves. These strategic acts of voters may result in split ticket or straight ticket when the 
party affiliation of candidates selected in the different races are considered. In the case of ticket 
splitting, the candidates selected by a voter in the different races are not from the same party while 
in the case of straight ticket, the candidates selected in both races are from the same party. In 
mixed-member electoral systems, split-ticket voting tends to be strategic especially if a voter’s 
preferred party/candidate has no chance of winning (Bawn 1999; Karp et al. 2002; Plescia 2016). 
Normally, it is the supporters of minor parties who often engage in this strategic behavior by 
casting a sincere vote at the PR tier and voting strategically at the SMD tier by defecting from 
unviable candidates which at times leads to ticket splitting. Supporters of major parties on the other 
hand, are more likely to cast straight tickets because they often field viable candidates. Thus, the 
convention is that voters vote sincerely at the PR tier and often strategically at the SMD tier and 
that there is no ticket splitting at the PR tier. However, it has been found that though at the PR tier 
there is no ticket splitting, supporters of major parties may at times split strategically to help their 
junior coalition partners cross the electoral threshold (Abramson et al. 2010; Gschwend 2007; 
Hobolt and Karp 2010). Finally, though straight ticket voting is often viewed as a sign of sincere 
voting, it could be strategic in instances where a supporter of a minor party decides to cast a 
strategic straight ticket ballot for a major party where the voter’s party has no chance of winning 
a seat (Plescia 2016). In sum, strategic voting and ticket splitting are two different concepts 
however, strategic voting can create ticket splitting where a voter’s strategic acts result in the 
selection of candidates from different political parties at the different races or tiers. Also, a 
supporter of a minor party may adopt strategic straight ticket voting for a major party where his or 
her preferred party has no chance of winning a seat. 
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1.5 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
 This dissertation is interested in ticket splitting and explores the subject largely from how 
coordination especially on the part of party elites influences the phenomenon. The conventional 
literature on the subject has largely approached the subject from voter perspective (Bybee et al. 
1981; Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell and Miller 1957). The current dissertation would like to 
incorporate elite level factors which are coordination centered to analyze split-ticket voting where 
Ghana presents appropriate context. The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 discusses the theory of strategic coordination which is based on Cox’s (1997, 
1999) strategic coordination theory introduced in the preceding section 1.3.6 above. The strategic 
coordination theory is the primary framework adopted by this dissertation to evaluate the concept 
of ticket splitting. The chapter breaks the theory into intraparty and interparty coordination 
successes and failures, discusses the features of each of these, as well as the strengths and 
weaknesses of the theory. It shows why the theory is appropriate for the Ghanaian case.  
The analysis which begins in Chapter 3 examines individual-level factors and elite-level 
factors (intraparty and interparty variables) of ticket splitting. Using Afrobarometer Round 6 
datasets, the chapter focuses its analysis on variables that have significant connection with ticket 
splitting. The analysis helps to examine both individual level factors and elites level factors in a 
single model to identify which have utility when it comes to explaining ticket splitting.  
 Chapter 4 employs an aggregate-level electoral dataset (1996-2016) from Electoral 
Passport6 to analyze the district-level aspect of the skirt and blouse outcome. Chapter 5 focuses on 
data from fieldwork carried out in Ghana that samples 303 party elites. This allows the dissertation 
to test coordination theory in more detail. It controls for important variables that are likely to 
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impact splitting by considering alternative explanations such as voter demographic variables, 
political attitude and political information. By utilizing multiple datasets, the dissertation provides 
more reliable evidence for conclusions arrived at in this study.  
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the findings from the research and highlights the 
dissertations’ contribution to the split-ticket voting literature. The chapter also discusses the 
limitations of the research and provides recommendations for future research in the subfield.  
1.6 REFERENCES 
Abramson, Paul R., et al. 2010. “Comparing strategic voting under FPTP and PR.” Comparative 
Political Studies 43.1: 61-90. 
Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2004. “Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses to 
Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks.” Working Paper, Princeton University 
Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the 
Economy. Cambridge University Press. 
Alvarez, R. Michael, and Matthew M. Schousen. 1993. "Policy moderation or conflicting 
expectations? Testing the intentional models of split-ticket voting." American Politics 
Quarterly 21.4: 410-438. 
Ames, Barry, Andy Baker, and Lucio R. Renno. 2009. “Split-ticket Voting as the Rule: Voters and 
Permanent Divided Government in Brazil.” Electoral Studies 28.1: 8-20. 
Anderson, Christopher J. 2007. “The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the 
Limits of Democratic Accountability.” Annual Review of Political Science 10. 271-96. 
Asunka, Joseph. 2016. “Partisanship and Political Accountability in New Democracies: 
Explaining Compliance with Formal Rules and Procedures in Ghana.” Research & Politics 3.1. 
Atwood, L. Erwin, and Keith R. Sanders. 1975. “Perception of Information Sources and 
Likelihood of Split-Ticket Voting.” Journalism Quarterly 52.3: 421-428.  
Batto, Nathan F., et al. 2016. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context. 
University of Michigan Press.  
Bawn, Kathleen. 1999. “Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity: Ticket Splitting, Rational 
Voters and Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany.” British Journal of Political 
Science 29.3: 487-505. 
Beck, Paul Allen, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen, and Charles E. Smith, Jr. 1992. “Patterns 
and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting.” American Political Science Review 
86:916-28. 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
21 
 
Benton, Allyson Lucinda. 2005. “Dissatisfied Democrats or Retrospective Voters? Economic 
Hardship, Democratic Accountability.” Annual Review of Political Science 10: 271-96. 
Best, Heinrich, and John Higley. 2010. Democratic Elitism: New theoretical and Comparative 
Perspectives. Brill. 
Boafo-Arthur, Kwame. 2006. “The 2004 General Elections: An Overview”, In Boafo-Arthur, ed., 
Voting for Democracy in Ghana: The 2004 Elections in Perspective, Vol. 1. Accra: Freedom 
Publications, pp. 33-58.  
Boafo-Arthur, Kwame. 2008. Democracy and Stability in West Africa: the Ghanaian Experience. 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. 
Born, Richard. 1994. “Split-ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing 
Model.” Legislative Studies Quarterly. 95-115. 
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. 1996. “A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests in Campaign 
Strategy.” American Journal of Political Science. 352-371. 
Brunell, Thomas L., and Bernard Grofman. 1998. “Explaining Divided US Senate Delegations, 
1788–1996: A Realignment Approach.” American Political Science Review 92.2: 391-399.  
Brunell, Thomas L., and Bernard Grofman. 2009. “Testing Sincere Versus Strategic Split-Ticket 
Voting at the Aggregate Level: Evidence from Split House–President Outcomes, 1900–2004.” 
Electoral Studies 28.1: 62-69. 
Burden, Barry C. 1998. “Chronology of the 1996 Presidential Campaign.” In Herbert F. Weisberg 
and Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier (eds.) Reelection 1996: How Americans Voted, ed. Chatham, NJ: 
Chatham House Publishers  
Burden, Barry C., and David C. Kimball. 1998. “A New Approach to the Study of Ticket 
Splitting.” American Political Science Review 92:533-44. 
Burden, Barry C., and David C. Kimball. 2009. Why Americans split their tickets: Campaigns, 
competition, and divided government. University of Michigan Press. 
Burden, Barry C., and Gretchen Helmke. 2009. “The Comparative Study of Split-Ticket Voting.” 
Electoral Studies 28.1: 1-7. 
Bybee, Carl R., et al. 1981. “Mass Communication and Voter Volatility.” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 45.1: 69-90. 
Campbell, Angus, and Warren E. Miller. 1957. “The motivational basis of straight and Split-Ticket 
Voting.” American Political Science Review 51.2: 293-312. 
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and E. Donald. 1960. The American Voter 
University of Chicago Press 
Chandra, Kanchan. 2007. Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in 
India. Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Chandra, Kanchan. 2009. “Why Voters in Patronage Democracies Split their Tickets: Strategic 
Voting for Ethnic Parties.” Electoral Studies 28.1: 21-32. 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
22 
 
Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral 
Systems. Cambridge University Press. 
Cox, Gary W. 1999. “Electoral rules and electoral coordination.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 2.1: 145-161. 
Cox, Karen E., and Leonard J. Schoppa. 2002. “Interaction Effects in Mixed- Member Electoral 
Systems: Theory and Evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy.” Comparative Political Studies 
35 (9): 1027– 53.  
Daddieh, Cyril K., and George M. Bob-Milliar. 2012. “In Search of ‘Honorable’ Membership: 
Parliamentary Primaries and Candidate Selection in Ghana.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 
47.2: 204-220. 
Daddieh, Cyril. 2011. “Democratic Consolidation Without a Second Turnover: Ghana’s 
Remarkable 2004 Elections.” In Abdoulaye Saine, Boubacar N’Diaye, and Mathurin Houngnikpo 
(eds.) Elections and Democratization in West Africa 1990-2009. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa 
World Press 
Dadzie, Ato Kwamena. 2008. “Let's vote 'skirt and blouse”, Ghanaweb.com Retrieved on July 8, 
2019, from https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Let-s-vote-skirt-and-blouse-
154036 
De Vries, Walter, and V. Lance Tarrance. 1972. The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in American 
Politics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
Debrah, Emmanuel, and Ransford Edward Van Gyampo. 2013. “The Youth and Party Manifestos 
in Ghanaian Politics-The Case of the 2012 General Elections.” Journal of African Elections 12.2: 
96-114. 
Debrah, Emmanuel. 2004. “The politics of elections: opposition and incumbency in Ghana’s 2000 
elections.” Africa Insight 34.2-3: 3-15.  
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Addison Wesley. 
Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in The Modern State. 
London: Methuen. 
Erikson, Robert S. 2016. “Congressional Elections in Presidential Years: Presidential Coattails 
and Strategic Voting.” Legislative Studies Quarterly. 
Ferrara, Federico, Erik Herron, and Misa Nishikawa. 2005. Mixed Electoral Systems: 
Contamination and its Consequences. Springer. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. Yale University 
Press. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1988. “The Reagan Years: Turning Toward the Right or Groping Toward the 
Middle?” In Barry Cooper, Allan Komberg, and William Mishler (eds.) The Resurgence of 
Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
23 
 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1992. “An Era of Divided Government.” Developments in American politics. 
Palgrave, London. 324-354. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 1996. Divided Government, Second Ed. Allyn & Bacon, Needham Heights, 
MA. 
Frempong, Alexander Kaakyire Duku. 2017. Elections in Ghana: 1951 – 2016. Digibooks Ghana 
Ltd. 
Frymer, Paul. 1994. “Ideological Consensus Within Divided Party Government.” Political Science 
Quarterly 109.2: 287-311. 
Gschwend, Thomas, Ron Johnston, and Charles Pattie. 2003. “Split-ticket Patterns in Mixed-
Member Proportional Election Systems: Estimates and Analyses of their Spatial Variation at the 
German Federal Election, 1998.” British Journal of Political Science 33.1: 109-127. 
Guinjoan, Marc. 2016. Parties, Elections and Electoral Contests: Competition and Contamination 
Effects. Routledge. 
Helmke, Gretchen. 2009. “Ticket-Splitting as Electoral Insurance: The Mexico 2000 Elections.” 
Electoral Studies 28.1: 70-78. 
Herron, Erik S., and Misa Nishikawa. 2001. “Contamination Effects and the Number of Parties in 
Mixed-Superposition Electoral Systems.” Electoral Studies 20.1: 63-86. 
Higley, John, and Michael Burton. 2006. Elite foundations of liberal democracy. Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Higley, John, and Michael G. Burton. 1989. “The elite variable in democratic transitions and 
breakdowns.” American sociological review: 17-32. 
Higley, John, et al. 1991. “Elite integration in stable democracies: a reconsideration.” European 
Sociological Review 7.1: 35-53. 
Hobolt, Sara B., and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2010. “Voters and coalition governments.” Electoral 
Studies 29.3: 299-307. 
Ichino, Nahomi, and Noah L. Nathan. 2013. “Do Primaries Improve Electoral Performance? 
Clientelism and Intra‐Party Conflict in Ghana.” American Journal of Political Science 57.2: 428-
441. 
Ichino, Nahomi, and Noah L. Nathan. 2017. “Primary Elections in New Democracies: The 
Evolution of Candidate Selection Methods in Ghana.” 
Jacobson, Gary C. 1990. The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in US House 
Elections, 1946-1988. Westview Press. 
Johnston, Ron, and Charles Pattie. 2003. “Evaluating an Entropy‐Maximizing Solution to the 
Ecological Inference Problem: Split‐Ticket Voting in New Zealand, 1999.” Geographical Analysis 
35.1: 1-23.  
Karp, Jeffrey A. 2009. “Candidate Effects and Spill-Over in Mixed Systems: Evidence from New 
Zealand.” Electoral Studies 28.1: 41-50.  
Samuel K. Darkwa   
24 
 
Karp, Jeffrey A., et al. 2002. “Strategic Voting, Party Activity, and Candidate Effects: Testing 
Explanations for Split Voting in New Zealand’s New Mixed System.” Electoral Studies 21.1: 1-
22.  
Kedar, Orit, 2005. “When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in 
Parliamentary Elections.” American Political Science Review 99, 185–199. 
Key, Valdimer Orlando, and Milton Curtis Cummings. 1966. The Responsible Electorate: 
Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960, [by] VO Key, with the Assistance of Milton C. 
Cummings; Foreword by Arthur Maass. Harvard University Press. 
Lartey-Adjei Festus. 2012. “Be Bold; vote skirt and blouse!” Ghanaweb.com Retrieved on July 8, 
2019, from https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Be-Bold-vote-skirt-and-
blouse-Sakara-258747 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Martin Paldam. 2000. “Economic Voting: An Introduction.” 
Electoral Studies 19: 113-121. 
Lindberg, Staffan I. 2013. “Have the Cake and Eat It: The Rational Voter in Africa.” Party Politics 
19.6: 945-961. 
Maddox, William S., and Dan Nimmo. 1981. “In Search of the Ticket Splitter.” Social Science 
Quarterly 62.3: 401.  
Mattei, Franco, and John S. Howes. 2000. “Competing explanations of split-ticket voting in 
American national elections.” American Politics Quarterly 28.3: 379-407. 
Milazzo, Caitlin, Robert G. Moser, and Ethan Scheiner. 2018. “Social Diversity Affects the 
Number of Parties Even Under First-Past-the-Post Rules.” Comparative Political Studies 51.7: 
938-974. 
Moser, Robert G., and Ethan Scheiner. 2005. Strategic Ticket-Splitting and the Personal Vote in 
Mixed‐Member Electoral Systems." Legislative Studies Quarterly 30.2: 259-276.  
Moser, Robert G., and Ethan Scheiner. 2012. Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the 
Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies. Cambridge University Press, 
2012. 
Navia, Patricio, and José Luis Saldaña. 2015. “Mis-Coordination and Political Misalignments in 
Ticket-Splitting: The Case of Chile, 2005–2009. “Contemporary Politics 21.4: 485-503. 
Petrocik, John R. 1991 “Divided Government: Is it All in the Campaigns?” The politics of Divided 
Government: 13-38. 
Petrocik, John R., and Joseph Doherty. 1996. “The Road to Divided Government: Paved without 
Intention.” In Peter F. Galderisi (ed.) Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the 
Constitutional Order. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.  
Plescia, Carolina. Split-ticket voting in mixed-member electoral systems: a theoretical and 
methodological investigation. Colchester: Ecpr Press, 2016.  
Powell, G. Bingham and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: 
Taking Account of the Political Context.” American Journal of Political Science 37:391-414. 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
25 
 
Rich, Timothy S. 2014. “Split-Ticket Voting in South Korea’s 2012 National Assembly Election”. 
Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 6, Number 3—Pages 455–469 
Roberts, Geoffrey K. 1988. “The ‘Second- Vote’ Campaign Strategy of the West German Free 
Democratic Party.” European Journal of Political Research 16:317– 37.  
Roscoe, Douglas D. 2003. “The Choosers or the Choices? Voter Characteristics and the Structure 
of Electoral Competition as Explanations for Ticket Splitting.” Journal of Politics 65.4: 1147-
1164.  
Saad, Lydia. 1995. “Budget Standoff Not Welcomed by Most Americans.” Gallup Poll Monthly 
362: 5-7. 
Scheiner, Ethan, 2005. Democracy with Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party 
Dominant State. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Shugart, Matthew Soberg. 1995. “The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided 
Presidential Government.” American Political Science Review 89.2: 327-343.  
Shugart, Matthew, and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2001. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best 
of Both Worlds? Oxford University Press. 
Sigelman, Lee, Paul J. Wahlbeck, and Emmett H. Buell Jr. 1997. “Vote Choice and the Preference 
for Divided Government: Lessons of 1992.” American Journal of Political Science: 879-894. 
Thomson, Alex. 2007. Glossary of US Politics and Government. Edinburgh, GBR: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Watts, Duncan. 2010. Dictionary of American Government and Politics. Edinburgh, GBR: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Weghorst, Keith R., and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2013. “What Drives the Swing Voter in Africa?” 
American Journal of Political Science 57.3: 717-734.  
 
1.7 NOTES:  
1. Constituencies with skirt and blouse outcome in 2012 
http://citifmonline.com/2016/11/14/constituencies-that-voted-skirt-and-blouse-in-2012-
infographic/ 
2. ‘Skirt and blouse’ voting in Ghana. The trend, winners and losers 
https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/skirt-and-blouse-voting-in-ghana-the-trend-winners-
and-losers.html 
3. NPP and NDC are the two dominant parties in Ghana. Together, their vote share is over 97% 
(Boafo-Arthur 2006; Frempong 2017)  
4. There are other types of ticket splitting in non-concurrent elections (e.g. midterm election in the 
US) where the electorates may vote to moderate the effects of their choice in the presidential 
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election by voting another party in the midterm legislative elections (Burden and Helmke 2009, 2; 
see also Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Fiorina, 1996). 
5. The phrase “skirt and blouse voting” was first coined in Ghana where in a party’s strongholds 
the party’s national executives decided to impose parliamentary candidates as the “consensus 
candidates” instead of electing the candidates in the party’s primaries and aggrieved nomination 
seekers massed up support to vote against the so called “consensus candidates”. The campaign 
message of the aggrieved nomination seekers was to elect the party’s presidential candidate but 
vote to cause the defeat of the “consensus candidates”. Thus, the original idea was not about the 
individual act of ticket splitting but to produce an electoral outcome where the party’s presidential 
candidate is elected and the “consensus candidates” lose the election in those constituencies 
(Frempong 2017). Since then both constituency split result and the individual act of ticket splitting 
is referred to in Ghana as skirt and blouse voting. No attempt has been made to reclassify the two 
usages of the concept per the literature I have sighted so far from Ghana though I follow the 
publication of leading Ghanaian electoral scholars. 
6. Electoral Passport http://www.electionpassport.com/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
27 
 
CHAPTER 2. DEVELOPING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation explores split-ticket voting. Instead of examining the subject exclusively 
from voter-level factors responsible for split-ticket voting, it evaluates the puzzle from both elite-
level and voter-level factors. This is because the individual choice made in the voting booth is a 
function of more than individual forces (Cox 1997, 1999; Roscoe 2003). As a result, the chapter 
develops a conceptual framework that can suitably address both voter-level and elite-level factors 
in a more cohesive and reliable way. Furthermore, the selected framework must aptly handle the 
subject using multiple levels of analysis.1 Since it is often valuable to utilize multiple levels of 
analysis in studying a phenomenon (Kollman 2018), a theoretical framework capable of handling 
multiple datasets such as survey data, aggregate electoral data, and fieldwork offers an added 
advantage of complementary and richer analysis when the same problem is viewed from various 
levels. Given these objectives, the dissertation finds Cox’s (1997, 1999) strategic coordination 
theory represented by the two M+1 rules to be a suitable framework capable of handling voter- 
and elite-level factors. 
In what follows, the chapter discusses strategic coordination theory which is the main 
theoretical framework adopted by this dissertation to explore the phenomenon of split-ticket voting 
in Ghana. It shows how the theory is suitable for handling both voter-level and elite-level factors 
of ticket splitting. Next, the chapter puzzles out the two dimensions of the elite level factors of the 
theory: intraparty and interparty coordination successes and failures. The penultimate section 
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the theory and shows where it is applicable to explain 
the phenomenon of ticket splitting and where it breaks down and therefore, fails to explain split-
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ticket voting. The final section shows why Ghana presents the appropriate kind of context to 
explore the coordination theory to investigate ticket splitting in new democracies.  
2.2 STRATEGIC COORDINATION THEORY 
While the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 above identifies several factors that correlate 
with split-ticket voting, there has been no comprehensive conceptual framework that captures how 
both voter and elite level factors interconnect to explain the phenomenon. Cox’s (1997, 1999) 
strategic coordination theory which is based on Duverger’s observation of how electoral systems 
affect the structure of electoral competition seem to give us an idea of how both voter and elite 
level factors interconnect to explain strategic voting which has a potential of helping our 
understanding of ticket splitting emerging from the strategic acts of voters and political elites. 
Duverger observed that electoral systems have specific logical effects on the structures of electoral 
competition on voters and competitors. Electoral systems that adopt plurality rule tend to lead to a 
two‐party system while systems with majority runoff tend to lead to multiparty competition 
(Duverger 1954, 1959). According to Duverger, the mechanical and psychological effects of the 
electoral rules influence the structure of electoral competition. The mechanical effect has to do 
with the process of how vote distribution is transformed into seat allocation. The term ‘mechanical 
effect’ emerges from how the strict application of electoral laws affects seat share. The 
psychological effect is how voters and political actors structure their behavior in anticipation of 
the mechanical effect. Thus, the term ‘psychological effect’ is the influence the mechanical effects 
have on voters and political elites. 
According to Cox (1997, 1999) the mechanical and psychological effects structure the 
electoral competition differently in different systems. For instance, in single member first-past-
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the-post (FPTP) system (SMDs) where a single candidate is elected under a plurality rule, voters 
tend to concentrate their votes on the top two contenders. As a result, competitions in SMD systems 
with plurality rules tend to favor two-party systems. However, in PR systems where more than one 
candidate is elected, the system is less punishing and therefore, favors multiparty competition. 
With this, Cox provided a formula (logical expression) to capture how the mechanical and 
psychological effects structure the electoral competition differently in different electoral systems. 
In his view, because the mechanical effect relates to the process by which a distribution of votes 
is transformed into a distribution of seats within a district, it is important to consider the number 
of seats in that district (district magnitude) in arriving at that logical expression. The expression 
should also hold for political actors and voters who are influenced by the mechanical effects of the 
electoral rule to adjust their behavior to make votes count (Cox 1997). This logical expression is 
given by M+1 where M refers to the district magnitude. This expression has come to be known as 
the M+1 rule. According to Cox (1997, 1999), there are two M+1 rules; the first relates to the 
entry strategy required of party elites while the second M+1 rule applies to the strategic acts 
required of voters. Cox (1997) contends that if political elites (parties and candidates) are to make 
votes count (reap the benefits in investing in parties and candidates), they are to adopt strategic 
entry while voters need to adopt strategic voting behavior. In this way, party elites are to coordinate 
their entry strategy on two candidates in SMDs where just one seat is allocated. If parties failed to 
coordinate on two candidates in SMDs, voters will have to concentrate their votes on the top two 
contenders for their votes to count. As a result, with time, electoral competition in SMDs will be 
reduced to a two-party affair while competition in PR systems will lead to multiparty system. It 
must be pointed out however, that empirical evidence shows that the M+1 rule does not necessarily 
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lead to two-party competition in all countries as demonstrated by countries such as Canada, India, 
and the United Kingdom (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001).   
Though voters are influenced to act strategically to make their votes count, they could do 
so based on how much the electoral system/electoral rules and elite interaction will allow them. 
These two can influence the strategic behavior of the voter. That is, they can cause the voter to 
either cast strategic or sincere vote. They can also help us to find out the type of ballot the voter 
casts, whether straight ticket or split ticket. Strategic voting explains how voters adjust their 
choices for their votes to count. In pure PR systems, voters do not have to vote strategically for 
their votes to count because the district magnitude is greater than one however, in SMDs, because 
the district magnitude is one, they have to act strategically. In mixed systems, voters can still vote 
sincerely at the PR tier and strategically at the SMD tier. The parties selected at the different tiers 
will show whether the voter voted straight ticket or split ticket. The type of party a voter supports, 
or elite interactions can influence the strategic acts of the voter. For instance, supporters of 
dominant parties tend to vote sincerely for their most preferred parties in both the SMD and PR 
tiers because their preferred parties are often viable. As such they do not necessarily need to vote 
strategically. This creates straight ticket voting. In contrast, supporters of minor parties tend to act 
strategically especially in district races by voting for the viable candidates of major parties closer 
to their ideologies but vote sincerely at the PR tier for their preferred minor parties leading to ticket 
splitting. These acts can cause ticket splitting or straight ticketing. 
Again, in mixed systems, due to the overlap of the electoral system, elites are incentivized 
to field candidates in SMD tier to create vote bonus in the PR tier which can cause voters to vote 
for the same party at both tiers thereby reducing strategic voting. This act of parties reduces ticket 
splitting in the sense that voters are motivated to cast straight ticket. This is what is referred to as 
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contamination effect (Ferrara and Herron 2005; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and 
Nishikawa 2001). It has also been found that though at the PR tier there is no ticket splitting, major 
parties who enter into alliance can cause their supporters to at times split strategically to help their 
junior coalition partners cross the electoral threshold (Abramson et al. 2010; Gschwend 2007; 
Hobolt and Karp 2010). Again, where parties do not field candidates in all districts or do not 
contest in all races, their supporters are forced to split their ticket in order to make their votes count 
(Benoit et al. 2006; Thrasher et al. 2014). Again, in concurrent legislative and presidential 
elections, parties can field candidates in legislative or presidential constituencies that they are not 
comparatively strong to boost their votes in constituencies that they are comparatively strong. This 
can create ticket splitting or split outcomes. It must be pointed out however, that not all voters may 
vote strategically because voters may select non-viable candidates for all sorts of reasons. Again, 
strategic voting and ticket splitting are two different concepts, strategic voting can create ticket 
splitting where a voter’s strategic acts causes the selection of candidates from different political 
parties at the different races or tiers. Again, though voters may act strategically, their acts are 
constrained by the electoral context which is structured by elite moves and electoral rules. 
Therefore, the decision to split tickets may depend on the available legislative and presidential 
choice set, coordination among parties (such as deals, joint nominations, etc.), as well as signaling 
among party elites.  
2.2.1 Intraparty Coordination Successes and Failures 
 As stated above, the first M+1 rule, the strategic entry decision of party elites, is applicable 
to party elites in the same party, those in the same ideological bloc, and from different ideological 
blocs. When coordination involves elites from the same political party, it is referred to as intraparty 
coordination. Here, party elites are to limit nomination to ensure that a single candidate emerges 
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as the representative of the party to contest the election under the party brand (Benoit 2001; Cox 
1997, 1999, 2006; Golder 2006). The way of limiting nomination requires that elites harmonize 
their actions and use democratic and transparent means that are acceptable to most people (Benoit 
2001; Cox 1999; Golder 2006). When this happens, party members and their supporters will have 
no incentive to coordinate their votes leading to possible ticket splitting in the main election. In 
this way, intraparty coordination success is more likely to reduce ticket splitting. That is, party 
supporters are less likely to split where there is intraparty coordination success.  
 However, where the nomination process is not democratic and transparent, and therefore, 
not acceptable to especially the aggrieved candidate(s), some party elites may have an incentive to 
contest the election as independent, or advocate for ticket splitting overtly or covertly. This is 
where intraparty coordination failure is said to have occurred. Thus, where a party fails to nominate 
a single candidate, there is intraparty coordination failure (Benoit 2001; Cox 1999; Golder 2006) 
and this is likely to increase the likelihood of splitting. Intraparty coordination failures often create 
opportunity for party elites to engage in ticket splitting. This is because, if the aggrieved 
nomination seeker and his/her supporters are not happy with say the verdict of the party’s 
parliamentary primaries, in a concurrent election, they will likely vote for the presidential 
candidate of the party and vote for another candidate or cast a blank ballot. It is worth pointing out 
however, that a party may have acrimonious primaries where disappointed nomination seekers 
disagree with the outcome but when party elites succeed in dissuading such nomination seekers 
from contesting the election as independents, this can be referred to as intraparty coordination 
success. Table 2.1 below summarizes the observable indicators of intraparty coordination 
successes and failures and their possible resultant impact on ticket splitting.   
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Table 2.1: Observable Indicators of Intraparty Coordination and Possible Impact on Splitting 
Intraparty Coordination Success Possible impact on ticket splitting/split outcome 
Limiting nomination Likely to reduce splitting  
Running fewer candidates Likely to reduce splitting  
Ability to prevent independents Likely to reduce splitting  
Creation of a joint platform Likely to reduce splitting  
Intraparty Coordination Failure Possible impact on ticket splitting/split outcome 
Over nomination  Likely to increase splitting  
Contentious primaries (independent contestants)  Likely to increase splitting  
Existence of splinter groups Likely to increase splitting  
No policy linkage between candidates Likely to increase splitting  
Sources: Authors’ own compilation from Benoit (2001), Cox (1999), and Golder (2006)  
2.2.2 Interparty Coordination Successes and Failures 
 As indicated above, the first M+1 rule, strategic entry decision of party elites, relates to 
party elites in the same ideological bloc and from different ideological blocs who for strategic 
reasons would like to contest the election together in a coalition or devise some sort of electoral 
deal for their mutual benefit (Benoit 2001; Cox 1999; Golder 2006). Often, it is easier for political 
parties from the same ideological bloc to form a coalition due to policy similarities (Benoit 2001; 
Cox 1999; Golder 2006). However, at times it becomes necessary for political parties from 
different ideological bloc to team up to defeat an “undesirable” political party in an election (Cox 
1999; Downs 1957; Golder 2006). To succeed in interparty coordination, parties in an alliance are 
to engage in strategic withdrawal, endorse a common candidate, harmonize their policies, adopt a 
joint campaign, and secure the backing of party supporters to vote for that candidate. Where this 
happens, supporters of those parties are likely to vote for all their candidates in concurrent 
presidential and parliamentary races in a given constituency. In this case, successful interparty 
coordination will reduce ticket splitting, all things being equal. However, if party elites fail to 
negotiate strategic withdrawal because some of the parties had already elected their candidates and 
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had made substantial investment in their campaigns, engaging in strategic withdrawal will become 
difficult. In such instances, members of the alliance are likely to campaign against each other (at 
least one of these legislative candidates will be running under a party label other than the label of 
the presidential candidate) and will therefore, be advocating for ticket splitting.  Instances where 
coalition parties run legislative candidates under a party label other than the label of the 
presidential candidate of the coalition, I expect high likelihood of splitting especially from their 
core supporters. This is because their core supporters will be voting at the presidential and the 
legislative races for candidates with different party labels. Again, I expect higher likelihood of 
splitting from short term instrumentally rational voters (that is voters who care only about who 
wins the present election), in instances where coalition parties run legislative and presidential 
candidates under single party label but the viable candidates in the different races are from the 
coalition party in one race and another party in the other race.  
 Interparty coordination success can lead to ticket splitting if the parties involved in an 
alliance enter deals. Typically, Ghanaian political elites in alliance prefer deals where instead of 
conducting the election under a common party brand, one party supports the other in the 
parliamentary race in return for a similar gesture in the presidential race (Agyeman-Duah 2005; 
Boafo-Arthur 2006; Darkwa 2019) in a concurrent presidential-legislative race. When such a deal 
becomes successful, supporters of the parties are likely to vote for one party in say, the presidential 
race and for another party in the parliamentary race in the same constituency. This increases the 
chances of ticket splitting leading to a possible split outcome (Agyeman-Duah 2005; Boafo-Arthur 
2006; Darkwa 2019; Frempong 2017).  
 Party elites are often left out when estimating split-ticket voting because the phenomenon 
is often viewed as the result of voter-level factors. However, as a voter's decision in the voting 
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booth is a function beyond the individual (Cox 1997, 1999; Roscoe 2003), elite coordination which 
affects the available choice set needs to be considered when explaining ticket splitting (Cox 1997, 
1999; Roscoe 2003). From the above discussions, it seems that elite interactions (strategic 
coordination) to greater extent determine the available options for the electorate in an election. In 
fact, Cox (1997, 1999) places elite coordination ahead of voter coordination. Roscoe (2003) argues 
that voters are like diners in a restaurant who are limited by the available menu. These diners could 
only make their orders based on the menu. In fact, voter coordination is necessitated by elite 
coordination and that is why elite coordination is vital in estimating ticket splitting. Table 2.2 
below outlines the observable indicators of interparty coordination successes and failures and their 
possible effects on splitting.  
Table 2.2: Observable Indicators of Interparty Coordination and Possible Impact on Splitting 
Interparty Coordination Success Possible impact on ticket splitting/split outcome 
Joint nomination/campaigns Likely to reduce splitting  
Strategic withdrawal Likely to reduce splitting  
Effective negotiations Likely to reduce splitting  
Ability to secure members’ support Likely to reduce splitting  
Interparty Coordination Failure Possible impact on ticket splitting/split outcome 
Fight for supremacy Likely to increase splitting  
Over nomination Likely to increase splitting  
Conflict over policy/ideology Likely to increase splitting  
Inability to secure members’ support Likely to increase splitting  
Sources: Authors’ own compilation from Benoit (2001), Cox (1997, 1999), and Golder (2006)  
 In sum, elite intraparty coordination success is likely to reduce ticket splitting while 
intraparty coordination failure is likely to increase ticket splitting all things being equal. Similarly, 
interparty coordination success is likely to reduce ticket splitting while failure is likely to increase 
splitting. However, that will depend on the kind of alliance formed by coalition parties and how 
they are able to secure the support of their members and those of the electorates. More importantly, 
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it will depend on the viability of the coalition candidates vis-à-vis the candidates of other 
contesting parties. In some instances, there could be elite coordination failure but if there are no 
viable alternatives, that will not increase splitting. Ultimately, voter coordination will depend on 
the viability of candidates of all the contesting political parties in for instance, concurrent 
presidential-parliamentary contests. However, because in situations where both MPs and 
presidents are directly elected in general elections the presidential office is more valued (Birch 
2003; Kadima 2006; Reif and Schmitt 1980; Tavits 2008), I expect elites to coordinate more on 
the presidential race. Again, because each party is expected to present only one presidential 
candidate nationally, parties are able to attract presidential candidates of comparable quality. The 
parliamentary contest on the other hand, is saddled with enormous coordination challenges ranging 
from subpar candidates to internal conflict within a constituency, the parliamentary contests are 
more likely to experience increased voter defection leading to more ticket splitting than the 
presidential race. Again, because each constituency is unique, the constituency parliamentary 
coordination problems will differ from constituency to constituency. In this case, some 
constituencies are expected to experience more ticket splitting than others. Ultimately, the 
fundamental logic of voter coordination and ticket splitting is that, voters will defect from unviable 
candidates in the different races. A voter’s electoral decision may be described as ticket splitting 
if candidates the voter selects in the different races belong to different parties. 
2.3 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE THEORY 
 The strategic coordination theory represented by the two M+1 rules is capable of 
explaining elite- and voter-level coordination as discussed in the preceding sections. This explains 
why competition in SMD-plurality systems tend to exercise a reductive impact on the number of 
candidates (Cox 1997, 1999; Duverger 1954). The theory also supports elite and voter coordination 
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in PR systems. This is because in PR systems the district magnitude is more than one, viable 
candidates in these systems tend to be greater than two which means that competition in PR 
systems favor multipartism. Elites in PR systems can coordinate on more than two candidates and 
still could achieve their objective of investing in candidates. Voters can also vote for their preferred 
candidates in PR systems and still influence the electoral outcome (Cox 1997, 1999; Bawn 1999; 
Rich 2014; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). The theory can explain ticket splitting in pure SMDs 
because if the two candidates a voter elects in a concurrent election involving two offices are not 
from the same party, we have ticket splitting. In pure PR systems, because voters can vote for their 
preferred candidates in concurrent presidential-legislative contest and still influence the outcome, 
theory breaks down when it is applied to explain ticket splitting in pure PR systems.  
 Again, the theory breaks down when it is used in a mixed-member electoral system that 
combines SMD-plurality and PR. In the first place, scholarship suggests that the M+1 rules do not 
apply in the SMD tier of the mixed electoral system as it is the case under a pure SMD-plurality 
system (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Guinjoan 2016; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). The 
reason is that, the overlap of the electoral systems creates vote bonus in the PR tier for parties that 
field candidates in the SMD tier. As a result, parties are motivated to contest in the SMD tier 
regardless of their chances of winning a seat. Thus, party competition at the SMD tier encourages 
multiparty system due to contamination effects that the overlap of the two systems create (Ferrara, 
Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Herron, Nemoto, and Nishikawa 
2018). Proponents of contamination effects argue that the overlap of the two systems in mixed 
electoral systems creates symbiotic interactions that boosts a party’s votes at the PR tier (vote 
bonus) when that party contests in SMD tier. 
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2.4 WHY GHANA 
 Ghana presents the appropriate kind of environment to explore coordination theory to 
investigate ticket splitting in new democracies. In the first place, like many Anglophone African 
countries, Ghana uses a pure SMD-plurality system (Wahman 2014) where the M+1 rules are 
applicable. Therefore, it provides a suitable environment to investigate how elite coordination 
(intraparty and interparty) interacts with voter coordination to explain the phenomenon of ticket 
splitting in new democracies. Second, elections in Ghana are competitive between the two major 
political parties (NDC and NPP) whose vote share is typically more than 90 percent combined, 
and results have shifted since 1992 (Frempong 2017; Graham et al. 2017 Kumah-Abiwu 2017; 
Lindberg 2007, 2013; Weghorst & Lindberg 2013). Between 2000 and 2016, the nation has 
experienced three alternations in power which occurred in 2000, 2008, and 2016 with the ruling 
party handing over power to the main opposition party. One thing that has characterized these 
elections and alternations in power is skirt and blouse voting/skirt and blouse outcomes ostensibly 
due to elite (mis)coordination (Frempong 2017; Lindberg 2007, 2013; Lindberg and Morrison 
2008; Weghorst & Lindberg 2013). Party elites either due to interparty coordination or intraparty 
coordination problems have openly and covertly advocated for ticket splitting. In fact, elite 
(mis)coordination has helped in the smooth transition of political power often in peaceful manner 
because, elites through their (mis)coordination could predict the outcome of the elections with 
certain level of certainty (Frempong 2017; Graham et al. 2017; Yobo and Gyampo 2015). These 
reasons make Ghana an ideal laboratory to investigate how elite and voter coordination interact to 
produce ticket splitting and facilitates political transitions or alternations of power in new 
democracies. Although what prevails in Ghana may not be fully generalizable in all emerging 
democracies, it still presents a suitable place to engage in such an exercise.   
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It worth pointing out that this study is applicable to most of the developing democracies in 
Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America whose political trajectory is similar to that of Ghana. 
Like many other emerging democracies, Ghana has a history of political instability stemming from 
military interventions especially where political elites are disunited. Thus, the coordination theory 
adopted by this dissertation to analyze ticket splitting made the selection of Ghana ideal laboratory 
to test whether it closely fits the theory. In his book, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political 
Theory, Stability, and Change, Eckstein (1992) made a case for the use of what he referred to as a 
‘crucial case’ to test a theory’s validity. He argues that, if one is to have confidence in a theory’s 
validity, then it should be applicable to a crucial case in the sense that, that case must closely fit 
the theory. In the future, I can look at how elite coordination affects ticket splitting, representation, 
and democratic stability.  
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Afrobarometer Round 6, aggregate electoral dataset from Elections Passport [1996-2016], and 
fieldwork carried out in 2017). 
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CHAPTER 3. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
Electoral coordination occurs…where competitors coordinate entry and citizens coordinate 
votes (Cox 1999, 145). 
3.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Ticket splitting or, split-ticket voting is fairly a common phenomenon in Ghanaian electoral 
politics, to the extent that the concept has been given a local term “skirt and blouse voting.” Though 
the concept is familiar to most Ghanaian voters, the phenomenon has not received much scholarly 
attention. Consequently, the literature on split-ticket voting has produced two versions of “skirt 
and blouse voting” with distinct, but related, meanings. In its first usage, skirt and blouse relates 
to the overall electoral outcome at the constituency level where different political parties or a blend 
of party candidates and independent candidates are elected at the constituency level for the 
presidency and the legislature (Daddieh 2011; Frempong 2017). This is equivalent to split district 
outcome (Cummings 1966; Burnham 1965; Feigert 1979) and therefore different from the 
traditional split-ticket voting in mainline political science literature. Its second usage refers to 
situations where voters at the voting booth choose candidates from different political parties or 
strategically withdraw from a candidate (Burden and Helmke 2009; Campbell and Miller 1957; 
Chandra 2009). In this way, the Ghanaian phenomenon (skirt and blouse voting) is similar to split-
ticket voting as used in conventional political science literature. Two reasons have been given as 
the motivation for the individual act of skirt and blouse voting in Ghana by some scholars and 
political actors. First, voters are said to be voting based on their evaluative assessment of the 
contesting candidates. Thus, if candidates that voter evaluative assessment favor are not from the 
same party, the result is ticket splitting (Asunka 2016; Lindberg 2013; Ichino and Nathan 2013, 
2017; Weghorst and Lindberg 2013). The second explanation advanced as the motivation for skirt 
and blouse voting is where supporters of a political party vote for the party’s presidential candidate 
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but vote for a parliamentary candidate (PC) from a different political party or an independent 
candidate (Boafo-Arthur 2006, 2008; Debrah and Gyampo 2013).   
Thus, the Ghanaian literature has used the same concept (skirt and blouse voting) to mean 
a split district outcome and split-ticket voting. Therefore, for clarity and comparability, this 
dissertation would like to distinguish between skirt and blouse outcome which is in tandem with 
its first usage and skirt and blouse voting which is in sync with its second usage. This distinction 
is necessary to harmonize the phenomenon with split-ticket voting and split district outcome 
(Brunell and Grofman 2009; Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009) to enable us compare and contrast 
the Ghanaian ticket splitter with similar voters elsewhere. The distinction is also necessary given 
that the concept has been used interchangeably to signify split district outcome and split-ticket 
voting. This creates conceptual ambiguity that needs some sort of reclassification to harmonize it 
with similar concepts used in political science for consistency and comparability. 
One may ask, why would the supporters of a political party defect from their PC in favor 
of a candidate of another party? Why would they not withdraw from both the presidential and the 
PCs or abstain from the presidential candidate? What is so unique about the presidential candidate 
and not about the PCs? Again, why will some voters split their tickets and others will not? What 
distinguishes the ticket splitter from a straight ticket voter? These are some of the questions that 
this chapter addresses. The basic argument of this chapter is that voters respond to the options 
available to them in each election by coordinating their votes to achieve expected outcome given 
the institutional framework that governs how votes are translated into seats. That is, their choices 
are determined by how party elites have coordinated their entry given the electoral system in 
operation. This is aptly captured by the quote from Cox (1999) at the beginning of this chapter 
which asserts that electoral coordination takes place where elites coordinate entry and citizens 
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coordinate votes. For instance, in single-member first-past-the-post (FPTP) districts, voters are 
likely to coordinate (concentrate) their votes around the two viable candidates for their votes to 
count (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954). This will create ticket splitting if the candidates elected in the 
two races are not from the same party. Also, in contexts where parties from the same political 
ideology enter the electoral contest by presenting more than one candidate, voters are likely to 
coordinate their votes for their votes to count. If candidates voted for in the different races by an 
electorate are not from the same party, the voter would be described as engaged in ticket splitting. 
This chapter uses individual-level survey data to empirically assess the theoretical 
argument made at the outset of this dissertation which is based on coordination problems faced by 
parties, candidates and voters (Cox 1997, 1999). In his groundbreaking work, Making Votes Count: 
Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems, Cox (1997) argued that voter 
coordination is due to party elites’ failure to strategically coordinate their entry as well as their 
efforts and resources. In view of this, the chapter seeks to find out how the individual level of 
analysis elucidates the coordination problems faced by parties, candidates and voters in Ghana and 
how it accounts for skirt and blouse voting in that country. In other words, the chapter seeks to 
find out how voters coordinate their votes after parties and candidates have entered the election. 
The chapter addresses the following questions: why would a voter withdraw support from his or 
her party’s PC in favor of a PC from another party but would vote for his or her party’s presidential 
candidate and vice-versa? Are the Ghanaian skirt and blouse voters (ticket splitters) different from 
their counterparts in the rest of the world?  
The rest of the chapter is made up of four parts. In the next part, I review several existing 
theories of voter behavior and relate them to the question of split-ticket voting. These theories 
establish the hypotheses that evaluate my main argument about coordination and several alternate 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
45 
 
explanations. Section 3.3 addresses the data and the various variables used to evaluate the 
hypotheses and their measurements. Thus, the main dependent variable, split-ticket voting or skirt 
and blouse voting, as well as the explanatory and control variables are also discussed in this 
section. Section 3.4 discusses the model of the split-ticket voting which is coordination based. The 
model is based on how elite coordination problems impact ticket splitting. It then presents the 
empirical analysis of a fitted binary logistic regression which is followed by the discussions of the 
results. The chapter ends with section 3.5. The section makes a case that no single factor can 
adequately explain ticket splitting and given the Ghanaian experience, coordination problems 
faced by party elites collectively become a strong candidate for one explanation of the conundrum 
of ticket splitting, a recurrent trend in electoral studies. It also affirms the primacy of the voter in 
the determination of the people’s representation in the national assembly, addressing who occupies 
the presidency and that political accountability resides in the electorate.  
3.2 THEORIES ON TICKET SPLITTING AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL  
When skirt and blouse voting is mentioned in Ghana, the meaning it conveys to the 
audience is that the winners at the legislative and presidential races in a given constituency are not 
from the same political party. A curious listener’s first impulse or instinct will be to ascertain the 
political identities of the winners of the presidential and parliamentary slots of the constituency 
who happen to come from different political parties. Thus, a reference to skirt and blouse voting 
in the first place denotes a split outcome. The second meaning, which is often lost out in the details 
is the individual voter behavior that produces the split outcome. Consequently, this chapter on the 
individual level explanation of skirt and blouse voting investigates the micro-foundations of skirt 
and blouse outcomes which must be established to put us in a better position to understand why 
skirt and blouse outcomes emerge.  
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Establishing the individual level determinants of skirt and blouse voting will also enhance 
our understanding of the contexts in which split outcomes are most likely to occur. Furthermore, 
conducting the individual-level analysis of skirt and blouse voting will better position us to find 
out if Ghanaian voters are distinctively and intrinsically different from ticket splitters in other parts 
of the world. We will also be better disposed to understand why some voters will split their ballots 
and others will not and account for why supporters of political parties will like to strategically 
abstain or withdraw support for their parties. It will also help us understand how variations in 
coordination problems among parties cause some political parties to attract more ticket splitting 
than others. To fulfill these tasks, it is important to link this study to the literature on split-ticket 
voting in light of what occurs in Ghana. 
3.2.1 Strategic/Policy-Balancing  
Critical early work on split-ticket voting outlines a policy balancing theory which is derived 
from a proximity spatial model in which voters prefer policies nearest to their ideal points (Downs, 
1957). Fiorina’s policy-balancing model was developed along Downs’s idea and operates on the 
assumption that voters are generally concerned with the overall orientation of the policy 
implemented by a government that wins an election. It asserts that political parties hold different 
positions on the ideological continuum; moderate voters who are positioned at the median segment 
will be more likely to split their votes to achieve non-extreme policies. This model further assumes 
that voters are rational and are likely to maximize their utilities to obtain optimal policies from 
casting a split-ticket (Fiorina, 1988, 1996; Kedar, 2005). In short, the theory asserts that most 
voters are generally assumed to favor nonextreme ideologies and would therefore, split their 
ballots to achieve that objective.  
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Contrary to the Fiorina model, other studies have shown that high party polarization gives 
voters distinct choices while ideological or perceived party similarity blurs voter choice and 
contributes to ticket splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Key 1966; Petrocik 1991; Petrocik and Doherty 
1996; Roscoe 2003). This theory indicates that we should expect the likelihood of splitting where 
voters do not see much difference between the parties. That is, where the extreme right and extreme 
left parties move close to the center, there is high likelihood of splitting all things being equal. 
Thus, to Fiorina, voters split to achieve policy moderation or split to make the parties look alike. 
Other scholars like Key (1966), Petrocik (1991), Beck et al. (1992), and Petrocik and Doherty 
(1996) argue that voters split because parties are similar. This dissertation leans more towards the 
position of the other scholars than that of Fiorina because voters are likely to split when they see 
no difference between the parties. Thus, the first hypothesis of this chapter is: 
H1: the more similar the parties become in voter perception, the greater the likelihood of 
ticket splitting and hence split district outcome.  
This means that where party positions become less differentiated either because parties and 
candidates strategically deviate from their ideological and or issue positions, they are more likely 
to influence voters to split their votes (Burden and Kimball 2009; Key 1966; Page 1978). Research 
has shown that where there are clear differences between the political parties, voters are more 
likely to rely on ideological and party positions when casting their votes and therefore, more likely 
to cast straight-ticket ballots. On the contrary, when parties blur policy and ideological differences, 
voters are more likely to rely on other considerations when voting and therefore, more likely to 
split their tickets (Key, 1966; Roscoe 2003). Key (1966) aptly captures this when he argues that 
clarity from the political parties produces clarity from the electorates while confusion from 
political parties causes confusion in voters leading to ticket splitting. 
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 It has been argued that for voters to be able to split their votes based on their assessment 
of party differentiation and policy positions, they must be sophisticated (Abramson 1983; 
Converse 1964; Kinder 1983). Other scholars such as Chandra (2007, 2009) and Mclaughlin 
(2008) are of the view that voters do not need to be sophisticated in order to be strategic in their 
choices but rather update their information by observing the preferences of other voters, often 
through information gleaned in opinion polls. Thus, voters can coordinate their choices to achieve 
their intended electoral and policy outcomes. What this means is that at the individual level, as 
candidates and parties converge ideologically, voters who are located at the middle segment of the 
ideological continuum are likely to split their votes based on their cognitive abilities and signals 
received from the environment. Parties and candidates who are located at the extreme segments of 
the ideological scale are likely to induce voters to cast straight ballots. Thus, where elite 
coordination leads to ideological polarization, voter coordination will result in straight-ticket 
voting and where elite coordination creates ideological similarity, voter coordination will yield 
ticket splitting. Where the total number of split-tickets and those who roll off their ballots as well 
as spoil ballots are more than straight ticket votes, there is likely to be split district outcome. 
3.2.2 Strategic Voting 
 Related to strategic/policy balancing discussed above is the concept of strategic voting. 
The classic literature on strategic voting emerges from the Duvergerian model that asserts that 
voters will abandon unviable parties and candidates in place of viable ones in FPTP systems 
(Duverger 1954). Many scholars have built on Duverger’s model to mean that in proportional 
representation (PR) systems where seats are allocated based on the proportion of votes received, 
voters are likely to vote sincerely while in pure single member districts (SMDs) with plurality 
rules, supporters of minor parties often face incentives to vote strategically to avoid wasting their 
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votes (Cox 1997; Karp 2009). An exception to this rule is that, in an SMD race with a majority 
runoff rule, voters are not likely to vote strategically, especially in the first round (Cox 1997; 
Duverger 1954). In mixed-member electoral systems which combine two different electoral rules 
to allocate seats to the same legislative house, voters are often faced with the conundrum of making 
the most of their votes. In such cases, it is expected that voters in SMD-plurality tiers would defect 
from nonviable district competitors toward the ideologically closest viable candidate (Duverger 
1954; Rich 2014). On the contrary, voters under the PR tier will vote for their preferred candidates 
as the electoral outcome is based on the proportion of votes garnered, hence voters under PR have 
little reason to defect from their first choice (Bawn 1999; Rich 2014; Shugart and Wattenberg 
2001).  
 However, scholars whose research is based on contamination effects argue that contrary to 
these expectations, the use of different electoral rules in the same voting district creates conditions 
that may undermine the Duvergerian model. These scholars found that, unlike the pure SMD-
plurality systems that have reductive effect on the number of parties, parties who contest in the 
SMD tier of mixed-member systems receive vote bonus at the PR tier (Ferrara, Herron, and 
Nishikawa 2005; Guinjoan 2016; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). This vote bonus motivates parties 
to contest in the SMD tier regardless of their chances of winning a seat. Consequently, party 
competition at the SMD tier produces a multiparty system in the SMD component similar to the 
PR component (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). Thus, 
strategic voting in a mixed-member electoral system is complex such that a voter who votes 
sincerely in the PR tier may still vote sincerely for a third-ranked candidate in the SMD component 
and this could amount to straight ticket voting. Another voter who votes sincerely at the PR tier 
may vote strategically in the SMD tier if the preferred candidate is the third-ranked contender 
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(Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Herron, Nemoto, and 
Nishikawa 2018). Ultimately, strategic voting and therefore, party competition in mixed electoral 
system is a complex one and defies the Duvergerian model (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; 
Guinjoan 2016; Herron, Nemoto, and Nishikawa 2018).      
It has also been found that in contexts where parties must cross a certain threshold (for 
instance, as it is the case in Germany and New Zealand where parties are required to poll five 
percent to qualify for seat share), voters are likely to vote for their next alternative if their first 
preference is not likely to meet the five percent threshold (Blais et al., 2004; Cox, 1997; Karp 
2009). Thus, voters are more likely to split their tickets to either support their second preferred 
candidate or defeat their least preferred alternative. This means that voters cast strategic votes to 
achieve a desired outcome. This is what Cox (1999) meant when he stated: 
“strategic” refers to actions that are primarily instrumental as opposed to consummatory – 
that is, actions taken because of their perceived impact on the final outcome of the election, 
rather than because of any intrinsic value they may have (Cox 1999, 149). 
It has also been argued that often, supporters of smaller parties may withdraw support from 
their preferred parties and or candidates if such choices would result in wasting of their votes 
(Bawn 1999; Benoit et al. 2006; Burden and Kimball 2009; Gschwend et al. 2003). Thus, assessing 
the options available to them, voters of smaller parties are more likely to split their tickets if their 
parties do not stand the chance of making any meaningful electoral impact. Similarly, instances 
where smaller parties are not able to run candidates in both legislative and presidential races, their 
core supporters are likely to split their votes by voting for their parties in races they run and other 
parties in races their parties do not run. Therefore, I expect supporters of a smaller party to split 
their votes if the party runs a legislative candidate but not a presidential candidate, sincere 
supporters of that party are likely to split their tickets. The reason is that they will vote for their 
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party’s candidate in the legislative race and for a different party’s candidate in the presidential 
race.” 
All things being equal, the strategic voting of the supporters of smaller parties are likely to 
go this way: First, they are likely to vote sincerely for their parties in areas and in races that these 
parties are likely to make electoral impact. For instance, generally, in PR systems smaller party 
supporters are likely to vote sincerely for their parties. While in SMD systems, in areas and in 
races that the smaller parties are not likely to make electoral impact, their supporters are more 
likely to withdraw their support to vote for parties whose policies and ideologies are similar to 
theirs and for the most viable candidates. Furthermore, in areas that the smaller parties do not 
contest both races, we expect their supporters to vote strategically because where they elect their 
parties in one race, they will need to vote to prevent the victory of their least preferred alternative 
in the other race. In this way, they will vote for their next alternative or vote to defeat the least 
preferred of the major contenders in that area or race.  
As stated above, strategic voting will translate into ticket splitting where the parties that an 
electorate votes for in the different races are not from the same party. Similarly, if the parties that 
supporters of smaller parties vote for in the different races are not from the same party, we have 
ticket splitting. Benoit et al. (2006) refers to the kind of ticket splitting from supporters of smaller 
parties as restricted choice menu, largely because often they are compelled to split because their 
parties are unable to contest in all races in all constituencies. It has often been argued that the 
challenges faced by smaller parties are largely due to their inability to offer enough choices to their 
supporters (Benoit et al. 2006). Thrasher et al. (2014) think that smaller parties often create ticket 
splitting due to misallocation of scarce resources and that if they master the allocation of their 
resources, they can overcome this kind of splitting.  
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3.2.3 (Mis)coordination Ticket-Splitting (MCTS) 
 Connected to strategic voting is the concept of “(mis)coordinated ticket-splitting” (MCTS). 
There are two strands of MCTS: where there is over nomination from ideologically similar parties 
and where there are intraparty conflicts (within the same party) either due to personality differences 
or nomination problems (Benoit 2001; Cox 1999; Golder 2006; Navia and Saldaña 2015). The first 
strand of MCTS is said to occur where ideologically similar parties do not harmonize their entry 
to produce a joint list or single candidate but they all contest in the same constituency seeking the 
votes of the same voters (Cox 1999; Navia and Saldaña 2015). MCTS is likely to produce ticket 
splitting especially if the supporters of such parties do not want to waste their votes. Both Cox 
(1999) and Navia and Saldaña (2015) found that the Concertación Alliance (Concertación Party) 
of Chile fell victim to MCTS because they did not coordinate their entry. In this way, they all “fall 
together” (lose the election) because of their failure to coordinate their efforts. MCTS is not unique 
to Chilean politicians1; it has also been applied to Japanese parties who often over-nominate 
candidates leading to voters withdrawing from such parties in order not to waste their votes (Cox 
1999). Cox (1999) observed that Japanese parties’ elites who failed to coordinate their entry often 
jointly lost the elections and therefore, came to be associated with a preexisting nonpolitical word, 
tomodaore “falling down together” (Cox 1999, 152). Thus, the term tomodaore is used to describe 
the defeat associated with elite miscoordination.  
The second category of MCTS occurs where within the same political party, nomination 
problems cause some members to defect and contest the election as independent candidates or 
where there is no proper cohesion between the presidential and PC’s campaign (Birch 2003; Cox 
1997, 1999; Debrah 2004; Tavits 2008). In this way, there is high likelihood of ticket splitting 
because, the probability of the same electorates voting for the presidential and PCs from the same 
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party is very slim. When party elites from the same party are divided, it encourages ticket splitting 
(Cox 1999; Benoit 2001). Thus, I expect MCTS in instances where party elites from the same 
ideological bloc fail to coordinate on a single candidate by dissuading nonviable candidates from 
contesting the election. Similarly, I expect MCTS where within the same party, party elites fail to 
dissuade unsuccessful primary seekers from contesting the election as independent candidates and, 
or instances where there is no proper interaction between the presidential candidate and the PCs.  
Instances where the second category of MCTS occurs, all things being equal, I expect 
voters to withdraw from the trailing candidate who could either be the presidential candidate or 
the PC (Cox 1997, 1999; Benoit 2001). In the case of Ghana, because it practices concurrent 
Presidential-Legislative elections, if there is no proper coordination between the presidential and 
parliamentary candidate of a party in a given constituency, party supporters are more likely to split 
their tickets. However, where the presidential office is treasured more than the parliamentary 
office, I expect party supporters to defect from the PC and vote for the presidential candidate of 
their party (Birch 2003; Kadima 2006; Reif and Schmitt 1980; Tavits 2008). Again, where the PCs 
are subpar in certain constituencies or where there are intraparty conflicts concentrated at local 
level which basically affects the parliamentary nomination/candidate, I expect supporters to defect 
from the PC (Benoit 2001; Birch 2003; Cox 1997, 1999; Burden and Kimball 2009; Kadima 2006). 
So, I expect coordination problems at local level to cause party supporters and floating voters to 
split away from the PC in favor of the presidential candidate leading to ticket splitting and 
consequently, split outcome. Thus: 
 H2: the greater the miscoordination at the constituency level, the higher the likelihood of 
splitting from the parliamentary candidate.  
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This means that, elite coordination success is likely to induce party supporters and other electorates 
to vote for all the party’s candidates. In this case, elite coordination success and ticket splitting are 
inversely related, meaning as elites succeed in coordination there will be less ticket splitting and 
as elites fail in coordination there will be more ticket splitting. However, in cases where 
ideologically similar parties present more than one candidate, voters who support that ideological 
tradition may be indifferent towards the candidates and that is likely to cause ticket splitting. 
Again, where nomination problems and factions divide a political party or there is no policy 
linkage between the presidential and the PC, there will be MCTS until such a time that the 
coordination problems are resolved. As in all other cases, MCTS will produce skirt and blouse 
outcome only if the net skirt and blouse voting and roll offs or abstentions are able to tilt the total 
number of straight ticket votes in a concurrent election.   
3.2.4 Economic Voting 
The fundamental argument of the economic voting hypothesis could be traced to Downs’ 
(1957) expected utility theory of voting which claims that a voter would favor a candidate who 
renders the highest expected utility. Fiorina (1981) further developed the Downs’s utility argument 
based on voter rationality by stating that voters will vote for an incumbent president who presided 
over a prosperous economy and punish incumbent presidents who presided over a deteriorating 
economy. Furthermore, where an incumbent’s competitor promises or shows prospects of better 
performance or the track record of a challenger trumps that of the incumbent president, voters are 
more likely to vote for the challenger.  
This distinction introduces retrospective and prospective voting into the decision calculus 
of voters. Helmke (2009) observed that Mexican voters consider the incumbent’s economic 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
55 
 
performance in making their decision, but also, they would have to weigh that decision based on 
the available alternatives. That is, voters may want to vote based on performance, yet if challengers 
are not viable, they will need to balance inexperienced hands with underperforming incumbents. 
Similarly, Benton (2005) also argued that Latin American voters would like to punish not only the 
incumbent but also non-incumbent political actors who have contributed adversely to their present 
economic circumstance. However, a country’s electoral system and available alternatives may 
inhibit voters’ ability to employ economic voting. Thus, economic and electoral concerns interact 
to affect voting behavior, political accountability, and public opinion in a nation. Finally, Powell 
and Whitten (1993) argued that a key determinant of economic voting is contingent on clarity of 
responsibility. In this vein, voter assessment of political actors’ performance is limited by the 
extent to which voters can assign responsibility to political actors.  
I expect economic voting variable, sociotropic evaluation, to be positively related to ticket 
splitting. Since voters who rate the incumbent’s performance as poor are more likely to split their 
votes from the president or the president’s party, worse economic performance is likely to be 
associated with ticket splitting, all things being equal. To make it more precise, if voters who give 
poor ratings to the president also rate the legislative candidate from the president’s party higher, 
there will be ticket splitting. Thus, the third hypothesis: 
H3: voters who rate the president low on past economic performance and rate the 
legislators from the president’s party high on approval ratings are more likely to split their tickets. 
This will only translate into skirt and blouse outcome if the total number of those who split their 
tickets and those who roll off their ballots exceed those who vote straight ticket. Thus, the fact that 
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we do not observe a skirt and blouse outcome does not mean there was no skirt and blouse voting 
(Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009). 
3.2.5 Ethnicity  
The scholarship on ticket splitting has also identified ethnicity as variable responsible for 
the phenomenon in divided societies. The conventional account on ethnicity and voter choice is 
that voting in ethnic societies is a mere headcount of membership (Horowitz 1985). That is, voters 
in ethnic communities vote sincerely for their ethnic parties irrespective of the effect of such votes 
on the final electoral outcome. Thus, there is no strategic voting among ethnic voters (Horowitz 
1985). It has also been argued that clientelism (voting for private benefits) is the sole driving force 
that incentivizes voting in ethnic societies (Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Hyden and Leys 1972; 
Lemarchand 1972). In contrast to the classic view on ethnic voting, Chandra (2009) posits that 
voters among Scheduled Caste communities in the northern India do not vote sincerely for their 
ethnic parties but rather vote strategically to ensure that their decisions make impact on the 
electoral outcome. This position is in consonance with McLaughlin (2008) who observed that in 
South Africa, ethnicity is not the motivation when electorates are voting at the national and 
provincial levels. Voters often select their “true” preferences at the national level but vote for a 
different party at the provincial level based on their anticipation of what other voters are doing.  
In Ghana, scholars are of the view that how ethnicity is viewed needs to be reconsidered in 
the sense that the electorates vote for their ethnic contestants only where they believe in their 
ability to perform (Debrah 2016; Frempong 2012, 2017; Osei 2012). The assertion that Ghanaian 
voters will vote for their coethnic contestants only where they believe in their ability to perform is 
similar to those of Banducci, Donovan, and Karp (2004) who found the Maori electorate of New 
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Zealand to be more critical of their Maori MPs. In Ghana, it is also argued that ethnically-based 
skirt and blouse voting is a tool used by voters to navigate otherwise difficult voting decision that 
they must make at the voting booth. After making such a decision, even if it amounts to voting 
against coethnics, the individuals are able to satisfy party and candidate choice without 
compromising their conscience (Interview with Mr. Kwesi Jonah in March 2017). The voter settles 
with the party and candidate that is viable in either race. The solution tool that ethnicity provides 
the voter is aptly captured by Campbell and Miller (1957) in relation to the conundrum that faces 
an ambivalent voter in making decision: 
This voter is also politically involved but his political motives are in conflict. He may prefer 
the candidate or policies of one party but feels a personal allegiance to the other, with the 
result that he cannot fully satisfy his political motives by voting a straight ticket. His split-
ticket is a compromise solution to his conflict (Campbell and Miller 1957, 312) 
Thus, we expect ethnicity to be employed as a tool used by voters to resolve difficult voting 
decisions especially when it is not obvious to vote straight ticket given the parties and candidates 
involved in the contest. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis: 
H4: voters who share ethnicity with the presidential candidate of one party and parliamentary 
candidate of another party are more likely to split their tickets if their coethnics are the viable 
alternatives and they are concerned about most viable options.  
Thus, ethnicity is expected to be significant and positive if coethnics are expected to perform 
better. The cumulative effect of ethnic skirt and blouse voting on skirt and blouse outcomes will 
depend on the overall impact of the voting choices made by all the voters in a given constituency 
(Brunell and Grofman 2009).  
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3.2.6 Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Voters 
Often scholars view ticket splitting from the angle of demographic and socioeconomic 
features of voters to find out how ticket-splitters differ from other voters (Bybee et al. 1981; 
Campbell and Miller 1975; DeVries and Tarrance 1972). They have also addressed the topic from 
the attitudinal point of ticket splitters (Beck et al. 1992; Bybee et al. 1981; DeVries and Tarrance 
1972; Gomes and Wilson 2006), while others have touched on political information inventory of 
these voters (Downs 1957, Gomes and Wilson 2006, Zaller 1992).  
Demographically, ticket-splitters are said to be younger (Campbell and Miller 1957; De 
Vries and Tarrance 1972). Thus, younger voters are more likely to split their tickets than their 
older counterparts in simultaneous elections. Recent works on age and ticket splitting however, 
have found contradictory evidence and concluded that the relationship between age and ticket 
splitting is spurious (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003).  
It has also been argued that ticket splitters are more educated and more likely to have white-
collar jobs (Beck et al., 1992; Dalton, 2013; DeVries and Tarrance 1972). Though there is 
convergence on education and ticket splitting, some scholars think that education level rather than 
education in general is significant. For instance, whereas Campbell and Miller (1957) think that 
lower level of education is associated with ticket splitting, others are of the view that higher level 
of education has higher probability of ticket splitting (Dalton, 2013; De Vries & Tarrance, 1972).  
The role of income in ticket splitting is found to be mixed. Whereas DeVries and Tarrance 
(1972) found an association between income and ticket splitting, Roscoe (2003) found income to 
be related to ticket splitting only in scattered instances and that its impact is insignificant and 
inconsistent. Men are found by Campbell and Miller (1957) to be more disposed to split their ticket 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
59 
 
than women. However, others found no significant relationship between gender and ticket splitting 
(Beck et al., 1992; Rallings and Thrasher, 2003).   
In addition to demographic and socioeconomic features of ticket-splitters, electoral 
scholars have also considered attitudinal factors of ticket-splitters such as voter perception and 
political attitudes toward the political parties. However, the findings are often contradictory. Some 
scholars have found that the intensity of partisanship and higher interest in politics are inversely 
related to ticket splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell and Miller 1957). In 
contrast, Maddox and Nimmo (1981) found that largely, all partisans split their ballots but that is 
context determinant. It is argued that partisans who work for their parties or candidates have strong 
partisanship and therefore less likely to split their tickets (Burden and Kimball 2009). An 
individual’s interest in the campaign is found to be positively related with ticket splitting (Maddox 
and Nimmo 1981). In contrast, Beck et al. (1992) found no association between interest in 
campaign and ticket splitting. Other scholars have found that interest in campaign alone is not 
likely to affect ticket splitting but those interested in the result of the election are more likely to 
split their tickets (Mclaughlin 2008; Roscoe 2003). Therefore, I expect to see interest in the 
campaign to be significant when those interested in it expect a certain electoral outcome. This 
means that depending on voters’ expectations, interest in the campaign may produce ticket splitting 
or straight ticket voting, and the direction can either be positive or negative. Consequently, I expect 
the following hypotheses as political attitude hypotheses: 
H5A: Voters who attend meetings with candidate(s) or campaign staff are less likely to split. 
H5B: Voters who work for candidates or political parties are less likely to split their votes. 
I expect negative association between the variables: “working for a candidate” and “campaign 
meeting” and ticket splitting. 
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3.2.7 Political Information 
It has been argued that voters who are politically informed are more likely to engage in 
rational decisions and often rely on information shortcuts referred to as heuristics when deciding 
on which candidate or party to vote for (Downs 1957; Popkin 1991). Also, a voter's ability to 
correctly locate issues and candidates on a 7-point ideological scale as well as gather information 
from the media has been associated with voter sophistication (Neuman 1986; Zaller 1992). Thus, 
the politically informed are sophisticated voters who make rational decisions on political issues 
including voting in general and ticket splitting in particular. This is not to make a sweeping 
generalization that the politically informed and sophisticated persons split their votes because there 
is conflicting view on political sophistication and ticket splitting. For instance, while Converse 
(1964) found a negative relationship between political sophistication (political information) and 
ticket splitting, other scholars found counter evidence (Dalton, 2013; Lachat, 2007). This may 
mean that politically sophisticated persons are more likely to be strong partisans who are less likely 
to engage in splitting or they may rely on one-sided information that suit their political inclination. 
This caveat notwithstanding, the scholarship on ticket splitting has considered political 
information as one of the variables that induce splitting (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Maddox and 
Nimmo 1981). However, there is conflicting evidence on reliance on the media for political 
information and ticket splitting. For instance, while reliance on the print media is found to be 
associated with splitting (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Bybee et al. 1981), there is no positive 
relationship between television and ticket splitting (Beck et al. 1992; Bybee et al. 1981; DeVries 
and Tarrance 1972). With these in mind, the dissertation will control for media (radio, television, 
and newspaper). It will be interesting to find the relationship and the direction that each media type 
has on ticket splitting in Ghana as compared with those indicated above.  
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In sum, based on the literature related to split-ticket voting, I expect perceived party 
similarity to increase ticket splitting all things being equal. Thus, to confirm H1, I expect voter 
perception of party similarity to be positively related to splitting. Next, I expect elite 
miscoordination to positively relate to splitting to confirm H2. I also expect voters who rate an 
incumbent president bad on the economy to defect from the president or the president’s party to 
confirm H3. Again, I expect voters who share ethnicity with a presidential candidate of one party 
and a parliamentary candidate of another party to split their tickets if their coethnics are the viable 
alternatives to confirm H4. Furthermore, I expect persons who attend political campaigns with 
candidates and those who work for political parties/candidates to be negatively related to splitting 
to confirm H5A and H5B. In addition, I expect political information variables such as newspaper, 
television and radio exposure to be positively related to splitting. Finally, income and education 
are expected to be positively related to splitting meaning the higher the level of education and the 
wealthier one becomes, the higher the likelihood of making informed and independent choices 
including voting.   
3.3 DATA AND MEASUREMENT  
This chapter uses data from the Afrobarometer dataset to assess individual-level attitudes 
about parties and candidates in Ghana to evaluate the hypotheses listed above. The Afrobarometer 
is a Pan-African research organization that carries out public attitude surveys on series of topics 
including democracy, governance, and economic conditions in over 35 countries in Africa2 
(Network Afrobarometer 2014; Bratton 2004; Fry, 2013). The first round of surveys took place in 
July 1999 and by March 2018, the research network had published seven rounds of its surveys 
which have been used extensively by scholars across the globe. This chapter focuses on round six 
of the survey published in June 2015, because it is the closest to the 2016 Ghanaian election. The 
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surveys are based on personal interviews of persons within the voting age while the sample drawn 
from 2,400 respondents is nationally representative of the population with regard to demographic, 
partisanship, occupation and socioeconomic circumstances of the larger Ghanaian society. Also, 
the surveys were carried out by experts who asked respondents questions in their local languages 
and this makes responses more likely to be reflective of the true intentions of respondents. 
Although the dataset is appropriate and reliable, a substantial number of respondents did 
not identify with a party when asked in the interview. Although this set of persons could represent 
the pool of floating voters who often swing the elections (Asunka 2016; Debrah and Gyampo 2013; 
Weghorst and Lindberg 2013), their failure to properly identify their partisanship poses some 
challenge to the use of the dataset since one is not sure whether their responses amount to 
misreporting or not. This aside, the Afrobarometer data poses other problems. First, the survey did 
not directly ask questions about skirt and blouse voting. Consequently, I resort to proxies to derive 
possible skirt and blouse voters (that is respondents who do not feel the same level of closeness to 
the parliamentary and presidential candidates of the same party). Second, the Afrobarometer 
survey was not carried out right before or after elections therefore, my assessments of likely 
behavior may understate or overstate skirt and blouse likelihood. Despite these shortcomings, the 
dataset is capable of testing my research hypotheses in a systematic way.  
3.3.1 Dependent variable 
The main dependent variable of this dissertation is skirt and blouse voting. It is a dichotomous 
variable – a respondent splits or does not split the ballot. Ideally, I would like to work with a survey 
that asks respondents the political affiliation of candidates they will vote for in the legislative and 
presidential elections in order to identify likely ticket splitters. Unfortunately, that is not possible 
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because the Afrobarometer questions do not directly assess behavior, therefore, I have to use as 
close of a proxy as I can get. 
 For instance, respondents were asked to indicate their closeness to political parties. They 
were also asked to identify which presidential candidate they will vote for if elections were held 
tomorrow. However, there was no corresponding question asking which legislative candidate they 
will vote for in the same election. Therefore, responses for these two questions were used to deduce 
likely skirt and blouse voters. Those who are likely to split their ballots (respondents who do not 
feel the same level of closeness to the parliamentary and presidential candidates of the same party) 
were coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”. Thus, respondents who, for instance, indicated they 
would vote for NDC presidential candidate but stated that they were closest to the PNC were coded 
as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”.  
It is important to state that the proxies I used are likely to understate possible ticket splitters 
given that about 46 percent (45.58%) respondents as per Table 3.1 did not indicate their closeness 
to legislative candidates and as such treated as missing. It could be possible that non-partisan 
identifiers are more likely to split and since I do not know their candidate preference, I dropped 
them because it is better to understate likely splitters than to overstate them. Thus, the choice of 
less likely splitters as my dependent variable is to adopt a relatively conservative approach in order 
not to overstate my dependent variable. It is also significant to note that more respondents feel 
closely attracted to the NPP (opposition) presidential candidate (858 respondents, i.e. 35.75%) 
than the NDC (incumbent) presidential candidate (557 respondents, i.e. 23.21%) as per Table 3.2. 
This is fair because normally, voters are more likely to identify with an incumbent’s challenger 
when the economy is not doing well. This is confirmed by the actual electoral results in Table 3.3 
where the NPP presidential candidate won 31 more constituencies (153-122) than the NDC 
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presidential candidate. A closer look at Tables 3.1 and 3.2 shows that relatively stable respondents, 
23.75 percent and 23.21 percent respectively said they feel closely attracted to the NDC 
presidential and legislative candidates. Compared to Table 3.3 where the NDC presidential 
candidate won 16 more constituencies (122-106) than the party’s legislative candidates and the 
NPP legislative candidates won 16 more constituencies (169-153) than the party’s presidential 
candidate shows that largely, splitters withdrew from the NDC legislative candidates in the 2016 
general election. 
Table 3.1: Respondents' Closeness to the Legislative Candidates  
Name of Political Party Number  Percentage  
National Democratic Congress (NDC) 570        23.75  
New Patriotic Party (NPP) 658        27.42  
Others 78          3.25  
Missing 1094        45.58  
Total 2400      100.00  
Source: Author’s Compilation from Afrobarometer Round 6 Dataset   
 
Table 3.2: Respondents' Closeness to the Presidential Candidates  
Name of Political Party Number  Percentage  
National Democratic Congress (NDC) 557        23.21  
New Patriotic Party (NPP) 858        35.75  
Others 130          5.42  
Missing 855        35.63  
Total 2400      100.00  
Source: Author’s Compilation from Afrobarometer Round 6 Dataset   
 
Table 3.3: Actual Performance of Presidential & Legislative Candidates in 2016 Elections 
Name of Political Party 
Constituencies 
Won (Pres.) 
Percentage Seats Won 
(Legislative) 
Percentage 
National Democratic Congress 122 44.36 106 38.55 
New Patriotic Party 153 55.64 169 61.45 
Total 275 100 275 100.00 
Source: Author’s compilation from 2016 Electoral Results from Ghana’s Electoral Commission   
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3.3.2 Independent Variables 
The main empirical interest in this paper is to test which voter level variables are 
responsible for skirt and blouse voting in Ghana and to determine whether Ghanaian voters behave 
in a manner consistent with ticket splitters in other parts of the globe or they do not. The following 
paragraphs outline how the independent variables are coded. The coding details for all the variables 
and the questions used are provided at Appendix 3.1. 
Perceived party similarities: I have made the claim that perceived party distinctiveness 
gives voters distinct choice while perceived party similarity blurs voter choice. This means that 
voters who see significant difference between the parties are likely to vote straight ticket while 
voters who do not see significant difference between the parties are likely to engage in ticket 
splitting. To measure perceived party similarities, I use question 62 of the Afrobarometer Round 
6 which asked respondents: “Which of the following do you see as the most important difference 
between the ruling party and opposition parties in Ghana?” The variable perceived party 
similarities is measured as binary with respondents who see no significant difference between the 
parties coded as “1” otherwise coded as “0”. The variable, perceived party similarities, is expected 
to be positively related to splitting, thus as perceived party similarities increases, splitting increases 
and as perceived party similarities decreases splitting decreases. 
Parliamentary Split: I measure parliamentary split using questions 52A & 52F that asked 
respondents their trust in the ruling party and the president. Given that the president is from the 
ruling party, respondents who do not feel the same level of trust in the ruling party and president 
are likely to defect from (withdraw from) the PC of the ruling party and vice-versa. The two 
questions are: Q52A. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
66 
 
about them to say: The President? Q52F. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t 
you heard enough about them to say: The Ruling Party? From these questions, I deduced likely 
parliamentary split (proxy): those who do not feel the same level of trust in the ruling party and 
president were coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”.  
Economic Voting: The analysis incorporates a key variable to assess sociotropic 
evaluation3. Question 4A of the survey asked, “In general, how would you describe the present 
condition of this country?” sociotropic voting is measured using a five-point scale from 1-5 for 
“very bad” to “very good”. It is expected that those who are not satisfied with the incumbent’s 
economic performance are likely to split their ticket by voting for alternatives and maintain some 
of the incumbent party’s legislators as a hedge/insurance against voting for challengers and 
incumbents.  
Ethnic minority: In Ghana, the two dominant political parties, NDC and NPP have their 
core support from the Ewe and Akan ethnic groups. These two ethnic groups often vote straight 
tickets and therefore coded as “0” while the remaining ethnic group members coded as “1” because 
they are more likely to split their tickets4. This variable was computed using responses to the 
question, “What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?” Ethnic minority is expected 
to be positively related to ticket splitting especially in situations where electorates from minority 
ethnic groups coordinate their votes to impact the electoral results. 
Campaign Meetings: I generate the variable campaign meeting using question 23B, 
“Thinking about the last national election in 2012, did you: Attend a meeting with a candidate or 
campaign staff?” Campaign meeting is a dichotomous variable with “Yes” and “No”. All things 
being equal, respondents who do attend political party’s campaign with candidates are said to have 
strong partisanship and therefore less likely to split their tickets while those who do not attend are 
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weak partisans. Thus, respondents who answered “Yes” are coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”. 
I expect voters who attend campaign meetings with candidates to be negatively related to splitting.  
Work for Party/Candidate: Just like those who attend political parties’ campaign, those 
who work for political parties are expected to have strong partisanship and therefore less likely to 
split their ballots while those who do not are weak and therefore more likely to split. The variable, 
Work for a candidate, was generated using question 23D, “Thinking about the last national 
election in 2012, did you: Work for a candidate or party?” Respondents who answered “Yes” are 
coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”. This variable is expected to be negatively related to splitting 
meaning persons who work for a candidate are less likely to engage in ticket splitting. 
3.3.3 Control Variables 
Education: The variable education was generated using the education level of respondents. 
This variable is coded on a ten-point scale (0-9) representing respondents who do not have “formal 
schooling” to those with “post-graduate education”. Seven of the respondents did not select their 
education level while three selected the “I do not know” option. These two categories of 
respondents were considered as missing. Education is expected to be positively related to splitting. 
Male: The variable male was generated using respondents’ sexes. Female respondents were 
coded as “0” and male coded as “1”. 
Residence: Under residency, the survey sampled respondents from the urban and rural areas 
of the country. About 46 percent of the respondents were sampled from the rural areas and the 
remaining 54 percent from urban areas. I coded residents from urban areas as “1” because they are 
expected to be more sophisticated and therefore more likely to split their votes. Rural residents 
were coded as “0” because they are expected to vote straight ticket, all things being equal.  
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Age: The variable age was generated using respondents age which range between 18 and 
105 and was coded as continuous. I expect age to be negatively related to splitting.  
Income: Income is on a five-point scale ranging from those who “never go without cash 
income” to those who “always go without cash income” coded “0” – “4” respectively for the Model 
1. Generally, respondents who have regular source of income are considered to be independent 
and therefore likely to split their tickets. This variable was generated using responses to question 
8E, “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without cash 
income?” 
Political Information/Sophistication: Political information/sophistication variables; 
television radio, and newspaper exposure were generated using question 12A-C, “How often do 
you get news from the following sources: Radio, TV, and Newspaper? Respondents who listen to 
radio daily are thought to be politically informed and therefore sophisticated in their decisions. 
These voters are more likely to split their tickets and are therefore coded as “1” otherwise coded 
as “0”. The expected direction of radio exposure is positive meaning as radio exposure increases, 
ticket splitting is expected to increase, all things being equal. Respondents with television and/or 
newspaper exposure are expected to be well informed like their radio exposure counterparts. 
Therefore, respondents who watch television and/or those who read newspaper(s) on daily basis 
are coded as “1” otherwise, coded as “0”. 
3.4 Estimation Strategy for Voter Choice under Coordination Theory 
 The intuition behind voter choice under the coordination theory operates on the assumption 
that voters will like their votes to count in the sense that they will like their votes to impact the 
electoral outcome by voting for their most preferred candidates or parties (Cox 1997, 1999; Karp 
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2009; Karp et al 2002). Voters are also constrained by the choices available to them and by the 
laws governing how votes are translated into seats (Cox 1997, 1999; Duverger 1954; Roscoe 
2003). Consequently, they will end up either voting for their preferred candidates/parties or vote 
in such a way as to help defeat their least preferred choice. In this way, rational voters will 
coordinate their votes on the most competitive candidates. If the candidates selected in the different 
races are not from the same political party, we are likely to have split-ticket voting. This 
dissertation is interested in ticket splitting, that is the core interest of the dissertation is to identify 
instances where a voter votes for different political parties in a concurrent presidential-legislative 
election. Consequently, my dependent variable is binary (an electorate votes split-ticket or not), 
hence, I employed logit regression which is suitable for the dependent variable. I estimated a total 
of six models to analyze ticket splitting using Afrobarometer Round 6 datasets. In the first model, 
I regressed the dependent variable on only the control variables. Second, I regressed the dependent 
variable on only the independent variables. In the third, I regressed the dependent variable on all 
the other variables both independent and control variables. These were done to determine how the 
different models/variables affect splitting. There was quite significant amount of missing values 
in the dataset. Therefore, to ensure that the results are not influenced by missing data, multiple 
imputation technique was employed to deal with missing data5 (StataCorp 2017). In terms of 
labeling the models, where only the control variables were run, it was labeled Model 1A. Model 
2A denotes the regression model with only independent variables while Model 3A denotes the 
regression model that contains all variables (control and independent variables). In each of these 
cases, missing values were not replaced. Similarly, where only the control variables were run with 
missing values replaced, it was labeled Model 1B. Model 2B signifies the model with only 
independent variables run with missing values replaced. Finally, in Model 3B, all the variables 
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were used to run logistic regression with missing values replaced. Thus, six models were employed 
to test the hypotheses put forward in this chapter using binary logit regression. 
3.4.1 Results  
When only the control variables were employed in logistic regression, radio exposure and 
newspaper exposure were the only significant variables as shown by Model 1A in Table 3.4. When 
missing values were replaced through multiple imputation techniques, it was only radio exposure 
which was significant. Interestingly, none of the demographic variables (education, male, urban, 
age, and income) was significant as demonstrated by Model 1A in Table 3.4 and Model 1B in 
Table 3.5 below. I then used only the independent variables to ran logistic regression using the 
same dataset. At this time, most of the independent variables appeared to be significant and in the 
expected direction as per Model 2A in Table 3.4 below. Again, where missing values were replaced 
through multiple imputation techniques as per Model 2B in Table 3.5, the variables maintained 
their direction in Model 2B as they were originally in Model 2A. Interestingly, when missing 
values were replaced, sociotropic voting variable which was significant in Model 2A, became 
insignificant in Model 2B. Also, attendance to campaign meeting which was initially not 
significant in Model 2A became significant in Model 2B.  
Finally, I combined all the variables (control variables and independent variables) to run 
logistic regression using the same dataset. The results are illustrated in Model 3A in Table 3.4 
below. At this time, all the independent variables largely behaved the same way they behaved in 
Model 2A when only the independent variables were used (compare Model 2A and Model 3A). 
Interestingly, income which was not significant in Model 1A became the only significant 
demographic variable in Model 3A. Again, television exposure which was not significant in Model 
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1A became significant in Model 3A. Also, newspaper exposure which was significant in Model 
1A became insignificant in Model 3A.  
Table 3.4: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Voting with missing data 
 6Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A 
Variables with Missing Values with Missing Values with Missing Values 
    
Perceived Party Similarities (H1)  0.2719* 0.2640* 
  (0.1502) (0.1554) 
Parliamentary Split (H2)  0.2674* 0.2806** 
  (0.1379) (0.1424) 
Sociotropic Voting (H3)  0.1246** 0.1242** 
  (0.0527) (0.0550) 
Ethnic Minorities (H4)  0.4021*** 0.3040** 
  (0.1326) (0.1416) 
Campaign Meeting (H5A)  -0.1604 -0.2435 
  (0.1797) (0.1851) 
Working for a Candidate (H5B)  -0.9528*** -1.0017*** 
  (0.2255) (0.2323) 
Education  -0.0101  0.0247 
 (0.0314)  (0.0347) 
Male  -0.0071  0.0923 
 (0.1193)  (0.1334) 
Urban  -0.0450  -0.0203 
 (0.1272)  (0.1395) 
Age  0.0007  0.0008 
 (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
Income  0.0617  0.1205** 
 (0.0429)  (0.0477) 
Radio Exposure -0.5132***  -0.5115*** 
 (0.1319)  (0.1448) 
Television Exposure 0.1965  0.2582* 
 (0.1379)  (0.1499) 
Newspaper Exposure 0.4498**  0.4050 
 (0.2266)  (0.2475) 
Constant -0.7228*** -1.1482*** -1.2533*** 
 (0.1608) (0.1229) (0.2202) 
Observations 1,510 1,343 1,311 
Log Likelihood 
McFadden’s R2 
-903.46 
0.012 
-786.82 
0.043 
-751.72 
0.058 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.5: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Voting with missing data (All Variables) 
 Model 1B Model 2B Model 3B 
Variables with Imputation with Imputation with Imputation 
    
Perceived Party Similarities (H1)  0.6408*** 0.6632*** 
  (0.1085) (0.1094) 
Parliamentary Split (H2)  0.2567*** 0.2553** 
  (0.0963) (0.0971) 
Sociotropic Voting (H3)  0.0412 0.0420 
  (0.0387) (0.0393) 
Ethnic Minorities (H4)  0.2416*** 0.2822*** 
  (0.0928) (0.0969) 
Campaign Meeting (H5A)  -0.3227** -0.3251** 
  (0.1293) (0.1312) 
Working for a Candidate (H5B)  -0.9257*** -0.9491*** 
  (0.1574) (0.1592) 
Education  0.0030  0.0318 
 (0.0226)  (0.0241) 
Male  -0.1182  0.0318 
 (0.0855)  (0.0903) 
Urban  -0.0946  -0.0583 
 (0.0910)  (0.0947) 
Age  0.0002  0.0001 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Income  -0.0054  0.0247 
 (0.0315)  (0.0333) 
Radio Exposure -0.3097***  -0.2471** 
 (0.0975)  (0.1012) 
Television Exposure 0.1506  0.2173** 
 (0.0984)  (0.1024) 
Newspaper Exposure 0.2000  0.1894 
 (0.1747)  (0.1827) 
Constant 0.3109** 0.0053 -0.1682 
 (0.1192) (0.1229) (0.1541) 
Observations  
McFadden’s R2 
2,400 2,400 2,400 
Note 7 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Additionally, I replaced missing values through multiple imputation techniques and used 
all the variables to run the final regression. At this point, sociotropic variable which lost its 
significance when missing data was replaced in Model 2B still lost its significance as shown in 
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Model 3B in Table 3.5 above. Also, campaign meeting attendance which gained significance when 
missing values were replaced in Model 2B maintained its significance when missing values were 
replaced and all variables were used in the Model 3B. Again, interestingly, income which became 
significant when all variables were used without replacing missing values lost its significance 
when missing values were replaced as illustrated by Model 3B in Table 3.5. It must be pointed out 
however, that the standard measure of fit calculated using McFadden’s R2 shows that the model 
does not do a good job in explaining the relationship between ticket splitting and the variables 
used. This is because, the values of the McFadden’s R2 do not lie within the conservative 0.2 and 
0.4 range of McFadden’s R2 (McFadden 1974, 1977). However, we can state that Model 3A with 
McFadden’s R2 of 0.058 fits better than Model 2A with McFadden’s R2 of 0.043 and still better 
than Model 1A with McFadden’s R2 of 0.012. Standard measure of fit cannot be calculated for 
multiple imputation technique model. Per Stata Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual Release 
15, standard measure of fit does not work with models estimated using multiple-imputation 
technique. 
To estimate how changes in probabilities are likely to affect changes in the likelihood of 
ticket splitting for each variable, first, I held all other variables at their medians. Second, I 
generated the change in probability of a given variable, for instance education, by changing 
education from its minimum to its maximum values. The results are illustrated in Table 3.6 below. 
As indicated by the changes in probabilities in Table 3.6 below, the probability of ticket splitting 
increases by (.045) among electorates who perceive the political parties to be different when the 
voter perception variable is changed from its minimum to its maximum. Also, when the 
parliamentary split variable, was changed from its minimum to its maximum, the probability of 
splitting increased by (.048) among voters who do not feel the same level of trust in the ruling 
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party and president. Again, when the variable, working for a candidate is changed from its 
minimum to its maximum, the probability of split is reduced among voters who work for political 
parties/candidates by (.114). Similarly, when the variable, attend campaign meeting was changed 
from its minimum to its maximum, the probability of splitting decreases by (.036) among voters 
who attend campaign meeting with candidates. Finally, the probability of split-ticket voting 
increases by (.052) among ethnic minorities when the variable ethnic minorities is changed from 
its minimum to its maximum value.  
Table 3.6: Effect of Changing Variables from Their Minimum to Maximum Values on 
Probability of Ticket Splitting  
Variable Change in 
Probability 
of Splitting 
Perceived Party Similarities (H1) 0.045 
Parliamentary Split (H2) 0.048 
Sociotropic Voting (H3) 0.090 
Ethnic Minorities (H4) 0.052 
Campaign Meeting (H5A) -0.036 
Working for a Candidate (H5B) -0.114 
Education  0.035 
Male  0.015 
Urban  -0.003 
Age  0.010 
Income  0.082 
Radio Exposure -0.093 
Television Exposure 0.044 
Newspaper Exposure 0.071 
Note: Estimates are derived from Model 3A holding all other variables constant at their medians. 
 
3.4.2 Discussion  
From the above results, it is evident that most of the variables are significant and are in the 
expected direction consistent with findings from similar studies on voter behavior in Ghana, on 
the African continent, and in other parts of the world. A couple of them, however, were surprisingly 
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different from expectations. First, the perceived party similarities variable was significant in all 
the models with signs in the expected direction. This confirms H1 that the more voters perceive 
the contesting political parties to be similar, the more the likelihood of ticket splitting. Per Table 
3.6 the probability of ticket splitting among persons who see no significant difference between the 
parties increases by (.045) when perceived party similarities variable changes from its minimum 
to maximum. In fact, candidates who are able to increase voter perception of party similarities by 
either moving closer to their opponents’ issue position or move away from their party’s issue 
position are more likely to induce ticket splitting than their counterparts who stress core party 
uniqueness in the political space. Thus, when parties or candidates become more similar they 
increase ticket splitting and in contrast, they reduce ticket splitting when they emphasize core party 
distinctiveness.  
In my fieldwork (appendix 3.2), respondents 2 and 98 indicated that politicians often move 
their policies closer to their opponent’s policy position or away from their party’s policy position 
and thereby encourage ticket splitting. For instance, when the previous government abolished 
teacher and nursing trainee allowances, some legislators from the president’s party created 
scholarship schemes for their constituents. In this way, such legislators moved away from their 
party’s position and thereby created ticket splitting. Again, when the then opposition NPP 
promised free senior high school, the incumbent president also promised the same and said that 
his government is pursuing progressive free senior high school, and therefore his government 
needs a renewed mandate. Thus, often when political elites adopt policies of their opponents, they 
are able to induce skirt and blouse voting. In other words, elite coordination (intentional act of 
moving away from party’s position or closer to opponents’ position) in the form of issue 
positioning can influence ticket splitting. As a result of these, in the 2016 elections there were 29 
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split constituencies (constituencies with split outcome) out of 275 constituencies, the highest ever 
since 1996. 
Second, the significance of the parliamentary split variable (H2) in all the models supports 
the coordination driven approach of the dissertation showing that where there is no proper cohesion 
between the presidential and parliamentary candidates of a political party, supporters will 
withdraw from the PC. Per Table 3.6, the probability of ticket splitting among persons who do not 
feel the same level of trust in the ruling party and president and are likely to withdraw from the 
PC of the ruling party increases by (.048) when that variable increases from its minimum to its 
maximum. This happens where the presidential race is most valued than the parliamentary race 
and also where there are intraparty conflicts that are concentrated in local areas. This finding 
corresponds with other studies and explains why some voters will withdraw from their PCs but 
vote for their presidential candidates and a PC from a different party (Boafo-Arthur 2006; Debrah 
and Gyampo 2013). In Ghana, like in Chile, as observed by Navia and Saldaña (2015), winning 
the presidency is more important to elites than winning the legislature. Therefore, party elites and 
party supporters attach more weight to the presidential race and so would prefer voting for their 
presidential candidates because the presidency is considered to be of higher level than the 
parliamentary race. This is in line with second-order national elections theory (Reif and Schmitt 
1980) which posits that voters attach less importance to elections at the lower levels of government 
and therefore will prefer voting at the higher levels of government to the lower levels.  
Beside the evidence from the empirical work in this chapter and the literature in support of 
parliamentary split (H2), the fieldwork (qualitative research) I carried out in Ghana just after the 
2016 election discussed in Chapter 5 supports why some party supporters will withdraw from their 
PCs and vote for the presidential candidate. First, there is so much competition at the local level 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
77 
 
for the parliamentary race of the party and this creates internal problems. Some of my respondents 
revealed that most politicians prefer to be parliamentarians than holding offices that are 
appointment based. This is because, the political appointees, such as ministers, board chairs, as 
well as municipal, metropolitan and district chief executives (equivalence of mayors), do not have 
guaranteed tenure backed by the Constitution. The president can hire and fire any of these at any 
time, but the parliamentarian has a guaranteed tenure. This aside, unlike the presidency that has a 
two-term limit, the parliamentarian can be in office as long as the people are willing to renew his 
or her mandate. This makes the competition for the parliamentary nomination very competitive 
and acrimonious even within the same political party. Additionally, due to their work, the 
parliamentarians are “distanced” from their constituencies most of the time. Their in-party 
competitors who are political appointees of the president such as the municipal, metropolitan and 
district chief executives are stationed among the people and carry out development projects and 
therefore easy to win the hearts of the electorates. Some of these, at times sabotage the 
parliamentarians just to take over their positions. Second, respondent 6 revealed that some of the 
parliamentarians, before or after they get to office, involve themselves in local conflicts such as 
chieftaincy and ethnic conflicts9. These conflicts are locally centered and therefore, the local 
politicians suffer for them. These and other factors account for why some party elites and 
supporters of a party may withdraw from their PCs and even at times may openly and secretly 
campaign against the PCs. It is also important to note that, though supporters often withdraw from 
the PC in support of the presidential candidate, in my fieldwork it came to light that at times, the 
reverse can be true. Respondents 2 and 9 alluded to the fact that government policy that abolished 
teacher and nursing trainee allowances caused some PCs from the president’s party who 
established scholarship schemes to receive more votes while the president lost in some of these 
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constituencies8. Thus, supporters may withdraw from the president and support the PC due to 
differences in policies.  
Third, the study confirms hypothesis H4 represented by the ethnic minority variable which 
was statistically significant in all four models it appeared and in the expected direction. The 
probability of ethnic minorities splitting increases by (.052) among ethnic minorities when that 
variable is changed from its minimum to its maximum. This finding is supported by discoveries 
from similar studies on Ghana. For instance, scholars such as Adu-Amankwaah (2008), Debrah 
(2016), and Frempong (2001) found that ethnicity is not used for clientelistic purposes in Ghana 
especially among minority ethnic groups. Contrary to Horowitz (1985), voting among Ghanaian 
ethnic communities is not a mere headcount of membership. In fact, most voters only vote for their 
coethnics when they had performed well or expected to do better than non-coethnics (Adu-
Amankwaah 2008; Debrah 2016; Frempong 2001). It was for this reason that former President Dr. 
Hilla Limann lost the 1992 election in his own home district and Vice-President Prof. Atta Mills 
lost the 2000 and the 2004 elections (also in his home turf) to their competitors who were 
considered more viable candidates (Adu-Amankwaah 2008; Frempong 2001).  
Respondent 2 indicated in an interview that the reason why ethnicity is not too much an 
issue in Ghana is that, the two major parties, NPP and NDC, do their best to nominate candidates 
from the predominant ethnic groups in each constituency and get the minor ethnic groups to 
support them11. Thus, elite coordination is at work here. Therefore, splitting is often based on 
candidate quality and whether or not there are intraparty conflicts in the various parties. One of 
my respondents said that, “…in Akan land all the candidates are Akan and in Ewe land all the 
candidates are Ewes. Moreover, the presidential candidates of the two major political parties are 
often very experienced who have been in politics for decades and are known beyond and within 
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Ghana. Therefore, competence rather than ethnicity is responsible for splitting”9. These views 
notwithstanding, ethnicity cannot be discounted in Ghana when it comes to voter choice. For 
instance, the current National Chairman of the NDC (the major national opposition party), during 
my interview with him, said, “Some communities such as the Kokombas will always want to vote 
for a Kokomba irrespective of the party the person belongs to”11. These contrasting views on 
ethnicity notwithstanding, ethnicity is a mobilizing force and a mechanism that communicates to 
the electorates the viable candidates in that locality. If the viable candidates are from the same 
party, there will likely be less ticket splitting. However, where the viable candidates are from 
different parties, then, the likelihood of splitting increases. Thus, ethnicity is a voter coordination 
tool that creates splitting or otherwise depending on the direction the coordination takes especially 
among ethnic minorities.  
Fourth, the variable, working for a candidate was significant in all the models and the signs 
were in the expected direction. From Table 3.6, the probability for persons who work for 
candidates to split reduces by (.114) when the variable, work for candidate, is changed from its 
minimum to its maximum. This shows that persons who work for candidates are less likely to 
engage in ticket splitting. These people are often influenced by candidates they work with and 
therefore less likely to split their ticket. This finding is consistent with what other scholars such as 
Burden and Kimball (1998, 2009) and Roscoe (2003) who studied American ticket splitters found. 
These scholars found persons who work for candidates to less engage in ticket splitting.  
Fifth, though the economic voting variable, sociotropic voting (H3) was not significant in 
all the models especially when missing values were replaced, its significance in Models 2A and 
3A is consistent with previous work on Ghana. Some of these studies found that a president’s 
economic performance impacts his reelection or his party’s chances in the next elections (Debrah 
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2016; Lindberg 2013). Boafo-Arthur (2006) and Ninsin (2006a, 2006b) also found that Ghanaian 
electorates have sayings such as “Hwɛ w’asitena mu na to aba pa”, which simply means that 
“examine your life and vote appropriately”. Thus, like their counterparts elsewhere, Ghanaian 
electorates are capable of using evaluative variables such as government’s economic performance 
to split their tickets. They will vote for a president who pursues policies that create economic 
prosperity and if the PC from the president’s party is not responsive to the electorates, they will 
vote against that PC and this will create ticket splitting. Thus, through economic voting, voter 
coordination can lead to splitting when an incumbent president’s economic performance is at stake.  
Finally, the demographic and socioeconomic variables were not that significant as in other 
studies. Only income was partially significant in just one (Model 3A) out the four models that 
demographic variables were used in the regression analyses. The political information variables; 
radio, television and newspaper exposure present interesting findings. First, radio exposure has 
been significant in all the models but was not in the expected direction as per Tables 3.4 and 3.5 
above. Per Table 3.6, the probability of splitting is reduced by (0.93) among persons who listen to 
radio daily when radio exposure variable was changed from its minimum to its maximum value. 
This suggests that ticket splitters might be listening to radio stations that match their political biases 
or relay messages against ticket splitting. Newspaper exposure was only significant in Model 1A 
while Television exposure was significant in Models 3A and 3B when all the variables were 
combined in the models. Based on the performance of the political information variables (radio 
exposure’s signs were not in the expected direction; newspaper exposure and television exposure 
were significant in few models), it could be said that their effects are largely inconsistent as shown 
by many other scholars (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Beck et al. 1992; Bybee et al. 1981). Due to 
their inconsistent relationship with ticket splitting, it stands to reason that they could be tools used 
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by elites to disseminate public opinion in vogue at the time of an election to influence voter choice 
in certain direction (Chandra 2007, 2009; Mclaughlin 2008). It will be fascinating to investigate 
the instrumental role of political information, especially, radio exposure on ticket splitting. It is 
likely that the direction of political information variables may largely depend on the objectives of 
those who employ them.  
In fact, it would have been great to investigate voter coordination in more nuanced ways 
where it may lead to less ticket splitting rather than more ticket splitting. For instance, in a given 
constituency, parties A and B presented candidates for the presidential race and a voter prefers 
party A’s candidate in that contest. Now, assuming in the legislative race parties A, B, and C 
presented candidates and the same voter prefers C to A to B (C >A > B), if that voter does not 
think C is viable and therefore, votes for A instead of C, in that case, voter coordination would 
lead to less ticket splitting. This scenario could have been possible if the Afrobarometer dataset 
had data on expected candidate preference prior to the elections and actual voting decision after 
the elections. Again, my data does not allow me to identify which parties fail to coordinate. Q90B 
would have been a good example from the data to address an instance where the Nkrumahist 
parties: Convention People’s Party (CPP), People’s National Convention (PNC), Progressive 
People’s Party (PPP), Democratic People’s Party (DPP), and Great Consolidated Popular Party 
(GCPP) failed to coordinate by presenting five candidates. However, because I used that question 
to deduce my likely ticket splitters (my dependent variable), I could not use the same question to 
generate an independent variable. In the light of this limitation, the next two chapters employed 
different datasets (constituency electoral dataset for chapter four and fieldwork survey data for 
chapter five) to complement findings from this chapter.   
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
In sum, ticket splitting at the individual level is necessary to evaluate why some voters do 
split their ticket and others do not. In this way, we can also predict possible ticket splitters, all 
things being equal. Some scholars have, however, cast doubt on the individual-level variables on 
the basis that it is possible for two people to be identical in many of the individual-level variables, 
yet one splits, and the other does not (Burden and Kimball 2009; Roscoe 2003). Indeed, this points 
to other variables beyond the individual level but that does not stop us from explaining why for 
instance, weak partisans would split, and strong partisans would not. We are also better disposed 
to understand why elite miscoordination can lead even strong partisans to split in certain contexts. 
We are also better disposed to understand why some politicians will like to induce ticket splitting 
through issue positioning by moving closer to their opponents’ issue position or away from their 
party issue position. Again, we are able to understand why some politicians in an MP’s party will 
care less in advocating skirt and blouse because such politicians may prefer the MP’s office for 
which tenure is guaranteed by the constitution.      
This section has given us a bigger picture to consider in analyzing individual level variables 
that impact ticket splitting and this is in line with Burden and Helmke (2009) who argue that the 
focus of ticket splitting will expand beyond its consideration in an American setting when we study 
the phenomenon on comparative basis. We can understand why, for instance, the presidential race 
is very important to the Ghanaian electorates and their political actors to the extent that some 
supporters of a political party would like to vote for their presidential candidate and for a PC from 
another party. This same point can be understood when viewed from an American perspective by 
employing Burden and Kimball (2009). From Burden and Kimball (2009), we understand that at 
least the two dominant parties in America are able to attract high profile individuals for the 
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presidential race but the same thing cannot be said about legislative candidates in many cases. 
Consequently, many will vote for their presidential candidate and for other party’s candidate in the 
legislative race, as the candidate from one’s own party may be weak.  
If America, the oldest democracy, is faced with such a challenge (subpar candidates) at the 
constituency level (electoral district) that causes voters to split their ticket (Burden and Kimball 
2009), then Ghana is not likely to be an exception. Ghana is also faced with a similar challenge, 
especially given that the coordination problem at the constituency level is bigger; ticket splitting 
may be endemic at that level. Finally, if we need to study ticket splitting beyond the American 
setting, then we can understand why ethnicity becomes a tool for communicating viable candidates 
in a voting district rather than engaging in clientelistic voting. It can be said that ethnicity in Ghana 
is not for clientelistic purposes because a number of big politicians have lost the elections in their 
home turf to their opponents. For instance, former President Dr. Hilla Limann lost the 1992 
elections to Mr. Jerry Rawlings in his own region (Adu-Amankwaah 2008; Frempong 2001). 
Again, Vice-President Prof. Atta Mills lost the 2000 elections to candidate Kufuor and also in 2004 
to President Kufuor both in Prof. Mills’ home town (Adu-Amankwaah 2008; Frempong 2001).  
It has been argued that factors that induce ticket splitting are very diverse and no single 
study can unearth all of them (Burden and Helmke 2009). This chapter has therefore focused on 
how elite (mis)coordination encourages voter coordination that often induces ticket splitting 
because voters would like their votes to count (Cox 1997, 1999) and therefore, would like to 
withdraw support from less viable candidates. In the same way that demographic, socioeconomic, 
attitudinal variables, and political information variables are important in explaining ticket splitting 
at the individual level, voter coordination in its nuance and complexity is required to understand 
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the phenomenon at the individual level. Ticket splitting at the individual level can be viewed from 
multiple angles so long as its focus is on the individual action at the voting booth.  
In effect, the chapter has made three important points. First, it has reclassified skirt and 
blouse voting into skirt and blouse voting (split-ticket voting) and skirt and blouse outcome (split 
district outcome). Previously, the concept was plagued with conceptual ambiguity where the same 
concept had two usages. The chapter has reclassified skirt and blouse voting to enable the Ghanaian 
concept to be comparable to similar concepts in political science. Second, ticket splitting at the 
individual level can be studied from voter coordination perspective. That is looking at how voters 
make sense of the options available to them in an election to make the most electoral decision 
bearing in mind that voters want their votes to count (Chandra 2007, 2009; Cox 1997, 1999). 
Finally, though ticket splitting was certainly not one of the objectives of the Afrobarometer in its 
data collection, collecting data on it will help advance the comparative study of African politics 
because other barometers do that. That is, the chapter recommends that the administrators of 
Afrobarometer dataset should try to incorporate questions that assess voter intentions such as ticket 
splitting in their data collection. Again, the dataset could not allow the examination of how voter 
coordination could lead to less ticket splitting. Furthermore, the dataset does not allow me to 
distinguish which parties fail to coordinate. 
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3.7 NOTES 
1. As we shall soon see, MCTS is what has come to bedevil the Ghanaian political actors since the 
inception of the Fourth Republican Constitution in 1992 and especially the Nkrumahist Tradition 
which has many splinter groups contesting each of the seven elections since 1992. 
2. The Afrobarometer project is a joint enterprise of “the Center for Democratic Development 
(CDD) in Ghana, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa, the Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi in Kenya, and the Institute for Empirical 
Research in Political Economy (IREEP) in Benin. Michigan State University (MSU) and the 
University of Cape Town (UCT) provide technical support to the network” (Network 
Afrobarometer 2014, 2). 
3. Sociotropic evaluation addresses the question of how economics influences politics. That is, 
voters consider the general economic condition of a country to make their voting decisions Kinder 
and Kiewiet (1979; 1981). Thus, when economic conditions are good, voters are likely to vote for 
the incumbent president for presiding over a prosperous economy and punish incumbents when 
general economic conditions are bad. Sociotropic evaluation which focuses on the economic 
condition of the nation is contrasted with egocentric evaluation (pocketbook voting) which asserts 
that voters make their voting decisions by looking at their personal financial situation at the time 
of the election.     
4. The Ghanaian Constitution prohibits the formation of political parties on ethnic lines or on 
regional bases and requires all political parties to have functional offices in all the constituencies. 
However, research findings reveal that the two major parties, the NPP and the NDC have their 
main support from Akan and Ewe ethnic groups respectively (Ayee 2002; Debrah 2016; Frempong 
2017; Fridy 2006) and therefore, are more likely to vote straight ticket. Other ethnic groups on the 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
91 
 
other hand, are more likely to split their votes (Adu-Amankwaah 2008; Debrah 2016; Frempong 
2001; Fridy 2006). In short, I expect more ticket splitting from other ethnic groups than Akan and 
Ewe but elite coordination is likely to influence voting choice of ethnic members.  
5. I am grateful to Professor Mason Moseley and Professor Erik Herron who suggested the multiple 
imputation technique to me to handle missing data in this dissertation. 
6. The dataset I used had a lot of missing values. To ensure that missing data do not affect my 
results, multiple imputation techniques were adopted to replace missing values. After this, I rerun 
the binary logit regression to compare the regression results from the dataset with missing values 
with those from replaced missing values 
7. Standard measure of fit cannot be calculated for multiple imputation technique model. Per Stata 
Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual Release 15, standard measure of fit does not work with 
models estimated using multiple-Imputation technique. 
8. Interview with Deputy Director of Operations, National Commission for Civic Education 
(NCCE) Ghana on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 and with the Director of Research to the main 
opposition NDC on Wednesday, March 15, 2017 by author.  
9. Interview with National Civic Society leader on Monday, March 13, 2017 by author. 
10. Interview with Deputy Director of Operations, National Commission for Civic Education 
(NCCE) Ghana on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 by author.  
11. Interview with the Director of Elections (currently the National Chairperson) to the main 
opposition NDC on Wednesday, March 15, 2017 and with the Achimota Zonal Chairperson of the 
ruling NPP on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 by author. 
 
Appendix 3.1: Description of the variables 
Indicator  Description of the Variable (questions in 
the 2015 Afrobarometer Survey)  
Model 1 Coding Rule 
Split-ticket 
voting 
Q90. Do you feel close to any particular 
political party?  
Q99. If presidential elections were held 
tomorrow, which party’s candidate would 
you vote for? 
Binary: 1= those who do not feel the same 
level of closeness to the political party and 
presidential candidates of that party 
0 = otherwise 
Perceived 
Party 
Similarities 
(Similarity 
between 
Parties) 
Q62. Which of the following do you see as 
the most important difference between the 
ruling party and opposition parties in Ghana? 
Binary: 1=There is no difference; 0=otherwise 
(the honesty or integrity of party leader; the 
religion of party leaders or member; their 
economic and development policies; the 
experience of party leaders; the ethnicity of 
party leaders or members; the personalities of 
party leaders; the regional identity of party 
leaders; None of these) 
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Parliamentary 
split: 
Q52A. How much do you trust each of the 
following, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say: The President? Q52F. 
How much do you trust each of the 
following, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say: The Ruling Party?  
Binary: 1= Those who do not feel the same 
level of trust in the ruling party and president; 
0=otherwise 
Sociotropic 
(Economic 
Voting) 
Q4A. In general, how would you describe: 
The present condition of this country? 
Scale: 1=Very bad; 2=Fairly bad; 3=either 
good nor bad; 4=Fairly Good; 5=Very good 
Ethnic 
minorities 
Q87. What is your ethnic community, 
cultural group or tribe? 
Binary: 1=others; 0=Akan and Ewe/Anglo 
Campaign 
meetings 
Q23B. Thinking about the last national 
election in 2012, did you: Attend a meeting 
with a candidate or campaign staff? 
Binary: 1=Yes; 0=No 
Weak partisans will split 
Work for 
candidate 
Q23D. Thinking about the last national 
election in 2012, did you: Work for a 
candidate or party? 
Binary: 1=Yes; 0=No 
Weak partisans will split 
Education Q97. What is your highest level of 
education? 
Scale: 0= No formal schooling; 1= Informal 
schooling only; 2= Some primary schooling; 
3= Primary school completed; 4= Some 
secondary school; 5= Secondary school 
completed; 6= Post-secondary qualifications; 
7= Some university; 8=University completed; 
9= Post-graduate 
Male Q101. What is your gender? Binary: 1= male 0= female 
Urban Urban or rural primary sampling unit Binary: 0= rural; 1= urban 
Age Q1. How old are you? Continuous variable: age of respondents was 
taken as given  
Income Q8E. Over the past year, how often, if ever, 
have you or anyone in your family: Gone 
without a cash income? 
Scale: 0= Never; 1= Just once or twice; 
2=Several times; 3= Many times; 4=Always 
TV Exposure Q12B. How often do you get news from the 
following sources: Television? 
Binary: 1= Everyday  
0= otherwise  
Radio 
Exposure 
Q12A. How often do you get news from the 
following sources: Radio? 
Binary: 1= Everyday  
0= otherwise 
Newspaper 
Exposure 
Q12C. How often do you get news from the 
following sources: Newspapers? 
Binary: 1= Everyday  
0= otherwise 
 
 
Appendix 3.2: Fieldwork 
The fieldwork took place in Ghana in March 2017, covering seven out of the 275 constituencies 
with 303 respondents. Most respondents were contacted between Sunday, March 5, 2017 and 
Friday, March 17, 2017. One person elected to have his interview via Skype on Friday, March 24, 
2017. The 303 participants were essentially party elites with just a handful of them representing 
civil society, the media, and members of academia.  
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Prior to administering the questionnaires, pilot samples were run with colleagues that have the 
same level of involvement in the subject area in the United States. Their constructive feedback and 
critiques enriched the final questionnaire. Again, the pilot survey was carried out in Ghana among 
a subset of the selected sample whose response led to rewording of some of the questions to reflect 
the level of comprehension of the project’s research subjects. Thus, efforts were made to ensure 
that the questions and the design work as intended were not ambiguous and that respondents were 
asked the right questions to measure key variables. It worth pointing out that prior to administering 
the questionnaires, all the committee members made inputs to the questionnaires. Professor Mason 
Moseley for instance, tremendously helped in finetuning the survey before in Ghana finishing 
touches were made to reflect the language and comprehension levels of the average Ghanaian 
research respondents. What the fieldwork entails could be summed up under four main headings 
below. 
 
A. Time and location of the interviews  
As indicated above, the fieldwork took place in Ghana between Sunday, March 5, 2017 and Friday, 
March 17, 2017 involving seven electoral districts (constituencies). The seven constituencies 
selected were Ablekuma South, Bantama, Ellembelle, Evalue Ajomoro Gwira, Ketu South, 
Klottey Korle, and Wulensi. The selection criterion for the constituencies was to help sample those 
that have experienced skirt and blouse outcome(s) and those that have not as well as constituencies 
where interparty alliance had taken place and those where interparty alliance had never taken place 
before. The sample was also to include cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan constituencies, swing 
constituencies and party strongholds, huge population size1 (with 60,000 or more voters) and those 
with less than 60,000 voters. Finally, consideration was given to constituencies where a former 
party affiliated candidate who protested by going independent won and where no former party 
affiliated candidate who protested by going independent won. The number of constituencies 
involved, and the selection criteria is summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Cases (constituencies) and their Fitness to the Selection Criteria  
Constituency 
Skirt & 
blouse 
outcome 
Experienced 
Interparty 
alliance 
Cosmopolitan  Swing 
constituency 
Party 
stronghold 
Huge population 
size +60,000 
votes 
Won by 
Independent 
Protester 
Sample 
size 
Ablekuma 
South  
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 37 
Bantama  No No Yes No Yes Yes No 51 
Ellembelle Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 39 
Evalue A. 
Gwira 
Yes Yes No Yes No No No 39 
Ketu South No No No No Yes Yes No 46 
Klottey 
Korle  
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 38 
Wulensi Yes No No Yes No No  Yes  46 
Others         7 
Total Number of Participants 303 
 
                                                             
1 Constituency with more than 60,000 registered voters is considered large because it exceeds the national average of 
about 56,000 registered voters and about 39,000 valid votes cast as per the 2016 electoral statistics. 
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B. Questions for Participants (a full questionnaire can be found under this section) 
Participants of the survey were mainly party elites2 (designated as members/officials of political 
parties). They were asked a total of 27 questions (a blend of open-ended and multiple-choice). 
Response from the open-ended questions were compared to those from the multiple-choice to 
identify the consistency of responses given by participants. Furthermore, responses from the open-
ended questions helped to collect information from participants about their assessments on why 
skirt and blouse voting takes place, as well as their opinion about elite coordination successes and 
failures (both interparty and intraparty). The survey questionnaire is categorized into questions 
that collect information on the personal and district demographic profiles of participants as well as 
those that collect information about their party ID, their views on intraparty and interparty 
coordination of their political parties. A full complement of questions asked respondents are given 
below. 
Questionnaire to Party Elites (Members/Officials) 
Personal and District Demography Where do you vote (constituency name)? _________ 
1. Which of the following best describes your educational status? 
A) Some primary schooling  
B) Primary school completed  
C) Some secondary school/high school  
D) Secondary school/high school completed  
E) Post-secondary qualifications, other than university  
F) Some university  
G) University completed and beyond  
H) I don’t know 
2. Are you a member/official of any political party? Yes/No 
3. If you answered Yes, on Question 2, which political party is that? _______________________ 
4. What is your position in the party? _______________________________________________ 
Party ID and Intraparty Coordination 
5. Please select the statement that most closely matches your view. In general, the recent 
parliamentary primaries of your political party were successful.  
A) Strongly Disagree 
                                                             
2 Initially, the questionnaires were titled, “Questionnaire to Party Officials”. This was reworded, “Questionnaire to 
Party Elites (Members/Officials)” based on advice from participants on the field. I was told that the usage of party 
officials in Ghana is often limited to the few party-elected executives responsible for the day-to-day running of the 
parties. Thus, the adoption of the term “party officials” would have acted as limitation for people I had to interview. 
However, as I needed to interview all those involved in party affairs (MPs, nomination seekers, grassroots, cadres, 
etc.), I needed to change the word “official(s)” to “member(s)” in order to attract wide audience. I sought clearance 
from Professor Herron on the field to go ahead with the alteration.  
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B) Moderately Disagree 
C) Neutral (neither agree nor disagree) 
D) Moderately Agree 
E) Strongly Agree 
6. Did any defeated candidate of your party threaten to leave the political party? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don’t know  
If you answered Yes, on Question 6, answer questions 7 and 8, otherwise skip to question 9. 
7. The party leadership was able to resolve issues of defection and has since then coordinated 
well.  
A) Strongly Disagree 
B) Moderately Disagree 
C) Neutral (neither agree nor disagree) 
D) Moderately Agree 
E) Strongly Agree 
8. How did they do it? ___________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
9. Did some losing parliamentary contestants threaten to go independent?  
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don’t know 
10. Did some losing parliamentary contestants go independent?  
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don’t know 
11. If Yes, was the party’s leadership able to convince the disgruntled member(s) to rescind their 
decision?  
A) Yes 
B) No   
C) Don’t know 
12. Did any of your party executives endorse the candidature (be it presidential or parliamentary) 
of another party? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don’t know 
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13. Please looking at the results of the 2016 general elections do you think some 
members/supporters of your party voted “skirt and blouse”? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don’t know 
14. If you answered Yes, on Question 13, why do you think they voted skirt and blouse? ______ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
15. Did your presidential/parliamentary candidate plead with supporters/members or the 
electorates not to vote “Skirt and Blouse”? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don’t know 
16. If Yes, why do you think the request was made? If No, why not? ______________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
17. Leading to the elections did your party maintain a common pool of resources for both 
presidential and parliamentary campaigns. Yes/No 
Interparty Coordination 
18. Would you recommend your party to enter into an electoral alliance in order to defeat an 
‘undesirable’ political party” 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don’t know 
19. Has your party ever entered into formal or informal electoral alliance with another party 
either during the main elections or presidential run-off? 
D) Yes 
E) No 
F) Don’t know 
20. Why or why not? ____________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
21. Did your party endorse another candidate for either the presidential or parliamentary slot? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don’t know 
22. Why or why not? ____________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________________________________  
23. Did your party decide to leave out any constituency or withdraw a candidate from a 
particular constituency to help another party win that seat? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don’t know 
24. Did your party contest in both presidential and parliamentary seats in all constituencies?  
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don’t know 
25. If No, why? ________________________________________________________________    
______________________________________________________________________________ 
26. Have you ever voted skirt and blouse (that is to vote for presidential and parliamentary 
candidates in the same election from different political parties) before? 
A) Yes 
B) No 
C) Don’t know 
27. Why? _____________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
C. Participants in the study and how they were recruited  
As stated above, there were 303 participants in the study who were essentially party elites with 
just a few of them representing civil society, the media, and members of academia. To ensure that 
the research samples all the relevant political parties fairly, political parties whose parliamentary 
candidates pulled at least ten percent in any of the 275 constituencies in the 2016 general elections 
were included in the sample. In this way, five political parties were selected. They were the 
Convention People’s Party (CPP), National Democratic Congress (NDC), New Patriotic Party 
(NPP), People’s National Convention (PNC), and Progressive People’s Party (PPP) (parties are in 
alphabetical order). As the political parties have unequal strengths in terms of resources and 
membership, it was decided to fix minimum and maximum number of samples to collect from 
each party as 35 and 90. Given the specific nature of respondents required for this research and the 
parties involved, randomized selection was not very feasible, therefore, an attempt was made to 
undo any biases in the data collection. Consequently, respondents from the seven constituencies 
were grouped into clusters of polling stations using the Electoral Commission of Ghana’s code 
book. 
Thus, in terms of cluster, in Ablekuma South where we collected 37 samples, we surveyed eight 
each from Chorkor and Korle Bu but seven each from Korle Gonno, Mamprobi, and New 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
98 
 
Mamprobi. In Bantama, we collected 51 samples, eleven samples were taken from Abrepo-
Mpatasie while ten each were taken from Ahenbronum, Bohyen, Kokoso-Asubonteng, and North 
Suntreso. In Ellembele we sampled eight respondents each from Aiyinase South, Awiebo Nyiake, 
Ayawora, and Kwasikrom while seven were taken from Nyame Bekyere making a total of 39. 
From Ketu South where we sampled 46 respondents, we administered ten surveys in 
Avedzi/Teshie, while surveying nine each in Flagatigorme, Gbugbla, Huime-Agordome, and 
Kpodzi-Agbogbome. In Korle Klottey which is part of Accra, the national capital where Ablekuma 
South is located and are adjoining constituencies, we collected 38 samples. Eight samples each 
were from Asylum Down, North Adabraka, and Odaw-Naa/Sahara while seven samples each were 
taken from Osu Doku and Ringway Estates. Like Korle Klottey and Ablekuma South, Evalue 
Ajomoro Gwira and Ellembele are contiguous constituencies as such we collected 39 samples from 
each of them. From Ellembele, we collected eight samples each from Aiyinase South, Awiebo 
Nyiake, Ayawora, and Kwasikrom while seven samples were collected from Nyame Bekyere. In 
Evalue Ajomoro Gwira, we collected eight each from Apataim, Brawire, Gwira Banso, and 
Kokoado but seven from Sikaneasem. Finally, in Wulensi where we sampled 46 respondents, we 
surveyed eight respondents from Chando, Gbungbaliga, Kajeso, and Lungni but seven each from 
Tinagyeilia and Wulensi South.   
Information to participants prior to conducting the interview 
Participants were briefed on the objective of the research project which was to collect data on how 
inter/intraparty coordination successes and/or failures affect “Skirt and Blouse” voting in Ghana. 
They were told that the main purpose of the research is to advance current understanding of the 
phenomenon of split-ticket voting in political science in general and in electoral studies in 
particular. They were further told that their participation in the project will involve responding to 
an approximately 20 to 30 minutes interview conducted by me or member(s) of my team. Their 
participation in the project was entirely voluntary. If a participant was unwilling or unable to 
participate in the project for any reason, that person could refer me or the enumerator to any other 
person who may be of assistance to the research efforts. They were told that if they have further 
questions about the study, they could contact me via skdarkwa@mix.wvu.edu, or my faculty 
advisor, Prof. Erik Herron via +1.304.293.9805 or by Erik.Herron@mail.wvu.edu. 
Additionally, they were told that if they are willing to participate, their involvement in the project 
will be kept confidential, and no reports disclosing personal identifying information will be used. 
The questionnaires will be treated as confidential information, stored in a secured location for the 
duration of the project, accessed only by myself. After analyzing the data, information obtained 
will be securely stored as a password protected document on an external hard drive. Participants 
must be 18 years of age or older to participate. They were allowed to skip any question(s) that they 
did not wish to answer and were told they may discontinue the interview at any time they felt like 
doing so. Finally, they were told that West Virginia University’s Institutional Review Board’s 
acknowledgement of the project is on file. They were also presented with the cover letter for their 
participation. Most of the persons contacted were very willing to participate in the research project. 
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Descriptive Statistics on Demographic Profile of Participants 
Table 2: Disposition of Respondents  
Description  Frequency Percent 
Member 25 8.26 
Chair 24 7.92 
Secretary 23 7.59 
Youth leadership 25 8.25 
Campaign Coordinator 21 6.93 
Treasurer 12 3.96 
Director of Elections 8 2.64 
Women Organizer 24 7.92 
Grassroots/Cadres 30 9.9 
Member of Parliament 8 2.64 
Research 12 3.96 
Results Analyst 15 4.95 
Polling Agent 28 9.24 
Communication team member 30 9.9 
Civil Society  5 1.65 
National Commission for Civic Education 1 0.33 
Academia 3 0.99 
Media 9 2.97 
Total 303 100 
 
Table 3: Participants’ Educational Status 
Description  Frequency Percent 
Some primary schooling 12 4.0 
Primary school completed 21 6.8 
Some secondary school/high school 32 10.6 
Secondary school/high school completed 45 14.9 
Post-secondary qualifications, other than university 51 16.8 
Some university 50 16.5 
University completed and beyond 90 29.7 
I don't know 2 0.7 
Total 303 100 
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Table 4: Participants’ Party Affiliation 
Description  Frequency Percent 
CPP 41 13.54 
PNC 38 12.54 
NDC 87 28.71 
NPP 86 28.38 
PPP 44 14.52 
Not a member of any party 7 2.31 
Total 303 100 
 
Table 5: Participants’ Constituency  
Description  Frequency Percent 
Ablekuma South 37 12.22 
Bantama 51 16.83 
Ellembele 39 12.87 
Evalue Ajomoro Gwira 39 12.87 
Ketu South 46 15.18 
Klottey Korle 38 12.54 
Wulensi 46 15.18 
Other 7 2.31 
Total 303 100 
 
 
D. Membership of the research team and instructions they were given 
Membership of my research team was made up 13 persons in all. I briefed them on the goals of 
the research and the sampling frame. I also briefed them on the research ethics and what they were 
to do. They were not to influence respondents in their questions. If the respondents are not willing, 
they should not be forced, and the respondents were allowed to end the interview anytime during 
the survey. The 13-member team is made up of four field officials of the National Commission for 
Civic Education (NCCE) at the regions, a research person from the Ghanaian Legislative House, 
seven research persons from civil society and academia and me.   
To ensure that the field workers do their work, I visited some of the constituencies they were 
working in (Ellembelle, Evalue Ajomoro Gwira, Ketu South, and Wulensi) to touch base with 
them. This aside, I collected the telephone numbers of some of the people they administered 
questionnaires to and interviewed them on the phone. These telephone interviews offered me the 
opportunity to obtain critical information that I would have missed. These are all discussed under 
telephone interviews below. These telephone interviews are different from the face-to-face 
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interviews. They were meant to crosscheck what the field personnel were doing and to corroborate 
their reports. Though the face-to-face interview enriched the fieldwork, because most of the 
material collected were detailed narratives of intraparty and interparty coordination successes and 
failures, they were separated from the survey and were rather used to support the survey which is 
more quantitative in nature. Thus, the quantitative analysis in this chapter were based on the 227-
administered survey from the field whereas the face-to-face interviews were used to buttress the 
quantitative analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4. AGGREGATE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
4.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter evaluated the micro-level foundations of split electoral outcomes, 
identifying features associated with individual-level decisions to split tickets in Ghana. This 
chapter uses constituency-level electoral data (aggregate level data) to explore how strategic 
coordination affects skirt and blouse outcomes (split electoral outcomes). Often, the use of an 
aggregate level dataset to examine ticket splitting–which is an individual level factor–is 
susceptible to the ecological inference fallacy1 (Burden and Kimball 2009; King 2013; King et al 
2004; Roscoe 2003). However, in this case, because I employ an aggregate dataset to explain skirt 
and blouse outcomes, which is equally an aggregate level phenomenon, the issue of ecological 
inference is not a problem here. In fact, the utilization of the aggregate dataset offers a more 
nuanced way of examining how coordination influences splitting.  
The chapter employs voter and elite coordination factors/mechanisms such as electoral 
volatility (Wahman 2014), effective number of parties (Cox 1997; Laakso & Taagepera, 1979), 
SF-ratio (Cox 1997), deals/alliance configurations (Birch 2003), and disputed primaries in 
parliamentary elections (Cox 1997) to investigate the relationship between elite coordination and 
split outcome. Chapter 3 dealt with ticket splitting while this chapter focuses on split outcomes 
using aggregate data. The chapter contends that elite coordination failures and successes influence 
split outcomes (skirt and blouse outcomes).  
The concept of split-ticket voting has been extensively researched in many political settings 
due to its effects on democratic representation and accountability. Some scholars have found voters 
who engage in this phenomenon to be sophisticated (Abramson 1983; Converse 1964; Kinder 
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1983; Neuman 1986; Zaller 1992). Others have argued that centrist voters interested in moderate 
policies abhor extreme policies and will, therefore, vote simultaneously for two different parties 
so that the overall public policies formulated and implemented by the political establishments will 
be moderated (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989, 1995; Fiorina 1992, 1996). Finally, many of these 
scholars also assert that parties have different areas of expertise and that voters match parties to 
their respective office of competence. At the same time such voters create divided government for 
each arm of government to play a watchdog role over the other (Jacobson 1990; Petrocik 1991). 
The bottom line of these arguments is that individual voter behavior of ticket splitting at the 
microlevel produces certain electoral outcome at the macro or the aggregate level such as divided 
government. Research has found an empirical connection between split-ticket voting and split 
district outcomes (Burden and Kimball 2009; Campbell and Miller 1957; Rusk 1970). Again, 
extant literature on ticket splitting has found a statistically strong relationship between the two 
concepts; ticket splitting and split district outcome, both in terms of magnitude and direction 
(Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Gschwend, Johnston, and Pattie 2003; Roscoe 2003).  
 Since the inception of Ghana’s Fourth Republican Constitution in 1992, the country has 
made several strides and has passed the “two-turnover-test” of democratic consolidation 
(Huntington 1991) and has had its third peaceful transfer of power (Graham et al. 2017 Kumah-
Abiwu 2017). A prominent feature of Ghanaian voting behavior, which doubtlessly has 
contributed to this feat, is the prevalence of ticket splitting discussed in Chapter 3. Skirt and blouse 
voting is so popular that it has been given a local name (skirt and blouse voting for split ticket-
voting and skirt and blouse outcome for split district outcome). The remarkable thing about this 
phenomenon is its display of nuance and complexity.  
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Over the years, skirt and blouse voting in Ghana has varied substantially from election to 
election and from constituency to constituency and this raises several empirical questions. First, 
why would some constituencies produce skirt and blouse outcomes and others would not? 
Furthermore, why do skirt and blouse outcomes appear to be more common in some constituencies 
in each election and over time? What really accounts for the subnational variations in skirt and 
blouse voting and outcomes? Second, are skirt and blouse outcomes intended to create divided 
government or for crafting appropriate representation by a constituent? My dissertation argues that 
differences in elite coordination (successes and failures) at the constituency level are largely 
responsible for the subnational variations in skirt and blouse outcomes. That is, variations in elite 
coordination across districts and from election to election primarily account for the variations in 
skirt and blouse outcomes. This argument is based on Cox’s (1997, 1999, 2005, 2006) coordination 
theory which looks at coordination at two levels: First, at the district level (interparty and 
intraparty) coordination and second, across districts (linkage) among legislative and presidential 
candidates. The chapter addresses the questions raised above using constituency-level aggregate 
electoral dataset which is apt as the phenomenon of interest is a split outcome which is realized at 
the constituency level.  
Elections are interactions between voters, parties, and candidates mediated by institutional 
and social contexts. Elite electoral interactions (coordination) are motivated by a vital incentive of 
electoral success while voter coordination is to avoid wasting votes (Birch 2003; Cox 1999, 2006). 
These interactions and mediating factors2 such as institutional and social contexts affect the way 
voters cast their ballots and may in turn affect the electoral results, which may produce a split 
outcome (Burden and Kimball 2009; Campbell and Miller 1957; Rusk 1970). Institutional scholars 
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have identified factors such as ballot type, methods of translating votes into seats, and political 
systems as the mechanisms responsible for split outcomes. 
 Some scholars have argued that ballot type affects ticket splitting and consequently split 
outcomes (Beck 1997; Beck et al. 1992; Campbell and Miller 1957; Rusk 1970). Per Campbell et 
al. (1960) the physical characteristics of an election ballot has a great influence on whether a voter 
will cast a straight or split vote. In their analysis, it came to light that states without a straight party 
option have higher probability of ticket splitting and therefore, split district outcomes. Aside from 
these scholars, Brace (1993) also noted that ballot type may influence voters to cast split or straight 
vote in an election. Other scholars such as Ames et al. (2009) and Burden and Helmke (2009) have 
emphasized the type of political system in place as responsible for whether voters will vote 
sincerely or strategically; split their ballot or vote a straight ticket. Thus, the different 
configurations of political and electoral systems in place in a nation affects coordination and 
electoral outcomes.  
Generally, it has been found by scholars that pure PR systems produce multiparty 
competition at the district level while SMD-plurality systems tend to exercise a reductive impact 
on the number of candidates (Cox 1997; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005). This is because in 
SMDs, the district magnitude is “1”. Given this ceiling, voters, parties and candidates who want 
to maximize their satisfaction become strategic in their dealings. That is, voters want to influence 
the election while parties and candidates want to get the best return from their investment. In this 
way, a voter whose preferred choice is the third-ranked candidate will rather prefer to vote for one 
of the top two candidates than for the third-ranked candidate. Consequently, the contest in SMD 
is often reduced to a competition between the most viable candidates. In this way, SMDs favor 
two party systems. However, in PR systems because the district magnitude is greater than “1”, the 
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system is less punishing to small parties. Thus, a voter whose preferred choice is the third-ranked 
candidate will still vote for that candidate and be able to influence the system. As a result, PR 
systems tend to produce multiparty competition. 
This situation is different in mixed-member electoral systems which employ both SMD 
and PR in a single election. Instead of the SMD tier exercising a reductive effect on the number of 
parties in the system, the interaction of the two systems often leads to multiparty competition at 
the SMD tier just as it is the case with the PR tier. It has been argued that the placement of 
candidates at the SMD tier boosts a party’s votes at the PR component and this symbiotic 
interaction between the two tiers creates what is referred to as ‘contamination effect’ (Ferrara, 
Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Guinjoan 2016; Herron and Nishikawa 2001). Proponents of 
contamination effect posit that the placement of a candidate in the SMD tier accrues vote bonus 
for a party at the PR component and encourages multiparty competition in the SMD tier contrary 
to what takes place in pure SMD systems. This is because parties improve their performance at the 
PR tier when they contest at the SMD tier. Due to this, parties are incentivized to contest at the 
SMD tier irrespective of their chances of winning seats at that tier (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 
2005; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Herron, Nemoto, and Nishikawa 2018). Thus, where more than 
one set of electoral rules are employed within a voting district in the same set of election, the 
Duvergerian rule is defeated because, multiparty competition which is a feature of the PR 
tier/systems spills over to the SMD tier. 
Guinjoan (2016) asserts that proponents of a contamination effect hold that the overlap of 
electoral arenas is the main reason why parties may contest in areas they are not viable leading to 
non-Duvergerian equilibria. He is of the view that the overlap of electoral arenas alone is not 
enough to explain why parties may compete in areas they do not expect to win. To him, a party’s 
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decision to run or not is made by considering all the different arenas that a party contests in. These 
arenas are interconnected and that the decision to compete transcends each individual arena. This 
is because parties are not equally viable (‘asymmetrically viable’) in all arenas. Thus, where parties 
are ‘asymmetrically viable,’ they may run even in arenas in which they are not viable and therefore, 
know they will not win. He identified two factors that create asymmetric viability: incongruent 
electoral system and territorial or subnational variations in a party’s support. Where two electoral 
arenas adopt the same set of rules for the elections, a party is likely to be equally viable in these 
arenas. However, parties become asymmetrically viable in arenas where different sets of rules are 
used. Furthermore, though a national party may not be equally viable in all the territories, it may 
take advantage of its viability in other regions to compete in areas where it is not viable. Though 
Guinjoan (2016) built on the contamination project, he limited his analysis to parties forgetting 
that elite decision to contest are influenced by what voters are doing or what they expect voters to 
do. In fact, voter behavior influences parties’ decisions to contest and therefore, voter level factors 
cannot be ignored when deciding to contest. It must be stressed here that because Ghana uses the 
pure SMD system in a plurality first-past-the-post (FPTP), we expect Duvergerian outcomes to 
hold there however, elite interactions may provide some important nuances in different districts.   
With respect to the political system in place, splitting in federal systems is likely to be 
different from those in unitary systems (Ames et al. 2009; Burden and Helmke 2009). Similarly, 
bicameral and unicameral legislative systems are more likely to produce different split outcomes 
due to the different incentives faced by elites and voters (Ames et al. 2009; Burden and Helmke 
2009). Thus, the differences in politics and electoral systems present different incentives to 
political actors in respect to electoral coordination (Ames et al. 2009; Tavits 2008). Finally, how 
votes are translated into seats also affects how the electorates cast their votes and thus, influences 
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the type of party system in place (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954; Riker 1962). These conditions affect 
how voters cast their votes and subsequently affect the composition of the electoral outcome. Thus, 
casting blank votes, ballot roll-off and ticket splitting are affected by the institutional and electoral 
system in place and these also impact the electoral outcome.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the extant theories of 
ticket splitting and split outcomes such as divided government, party system volatility, effective 
number of parties, S-F ratio and (mis)coordination among party elites. Each of these will introduce 
the hypotheses that will be tested in the chapter. Section 4.3 discusses the data and measurement 
of the independent variables. It also addresses the dependent variable which is split constituency 
outcome also referred to as two-office split-result, as well as the independent and control variables. 
Section 4.4 then presents the model of split outcomes based on coordination problems faced by 
voters, candidates, and party elites. The success or failure of how these stakeholders handle the 
coordination problems affects ticket splitting and split outcomes. This section also presents the 
empirical analysis based on binary logistic regressions, which is then followed with a discussion 
of the implications. The chapter ends with section 4.5 which is the concluding part that provides a 
succinct discussion of how the coordination problem is the main determinant of ticket splitting and 
split outcomes.  
The chapter makes a case that throughout Ghana’s Fourth Republic, split outcomes have 
been a consistent phenomenon in its elections and this could not be attributable to the desire of 
Ghanaians for divided government, but rather elites’ desire for certain electoral outcomes for 
purposes other than divided government. The justification of this position is based on two 
premises. First, the aggregate results show that between 1992 and 2016, seven elections have been 
conducted, and in all such elections, the party that won the presidency also won the majority of 
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seats in parliament. Second, there were two instances in which the presidential election required 
runoffs, and in both instances, the rest of the contesting parties supported the candidate from the 
party which had won a majority of seats in parliament in the same election irrespective of whether 
that party was leading the presidential race (Ayee 2002; Frempong 2017; Yobo and Gyampo 
2015). In both instances, the position of political elites was to protect/insulate the country’s young 
democracy from the challenges of divided government which could potentially lead to military 
takeover (Ayee 2002; Darkwa3 2019; Frempong 2017) 
4.2 THEORIES OF TICKET SPLITTING AND SPLIT CONSTITUENCY OUTCOME  
 This section reviews the relevant theories of ticket splitting and split outcomes. These 
include divided government which suggests that voters prefer moderate policies and therefore, 
would split their votes between extreme polarized parties to ensure that policies produced receive 
necessary concessions satisfactory to the median voter. There are many nuances to the theory of 
divided government and they are discussed in section 4.2.1. Party system volatility is another 
theory that explains why voters split and why there are split outcomes. There are three strands of 
the concept. The first strand, which is largely Eurocentric, assumes that party entry and exit in the 
party system is stable and that most forms of turbulence in the party system are due to voter 
behavior. The second strand concerns new democracies and argues that high party volatility is 
largely based on elite conduct such as electoral alliances, party entry, and withdrawals from the 
party system. The third form attributes volatility to a blend of elite- and voter-level factors. These 
are explained in section 4.2.2.   
The next concept that the chapter addresses is district magnitude, explained in section 4.2.3. 
This section argues that electoral systems and the methods of converting votes into seats are likely 
to create conditions favoring the effective number of electoral competitors that can contest 
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elections in a given constituency. Elites are to strategically coordinate their entry to field 
candidates not exceeding the district magnitude plus one. 
The SF-ratio (second to first loser ratio, that is, the vote share of the third-place candidate 
divided by the vote share of the second candidate) is discussed in section 4.2.4. The theory of 
strategic coordination argues that where elites field candidates more than the district magnitude 
plus “1” in SMD, voters will withdraw from supporting less competitive candidates and will 
concentrate their votes on the top two contenders. The SF-ratio is a reliable index that measures 
voter coordination. Another theory used to explain ticket splitting and hence, split outcome is the 
concept of (mis)coordination on the part of elites. This concept, discussed in section 4.2.6, 
considers two forms of elite coordination; largely coordination successes and failures that produce 
ticket splitting and therefore split outcome.  
4.2.1 Divided Government4 
The concept of divided government will largely be discussed from the US perspective 
because the literature on divided government in the US is well-developed and widely cited. Hence, 
it is appropriate to talk about the US when the concept of divided government is discussed. How 
the concept works in other states such as Brazil and Mexico will also be briefly discussed. In the 
American system, proponents of divided government argue that voters willfully divide their votes 
to achieve specific policy outcomes or representational arrangement moderation (Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1989, 1995; Fiorina 1992, 1996). In respect to policy position, the model asserts that 
parties hold different positions on the ideological continuum. Moderate voters who are positioned 
at the median segment (assuming a single dimension of salient cleavages) will be more likely to 
split their votes to achieve non-extreme policies. However, other scholars have shown that high 
party polarization gives voters distinct choices while ideological congruence blurs voter choice 
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and causes ticket splitting (Petrocik and Doherty 1996; Roscoe 2003). Regarding representational 
arrangements, scholars who research on divided government, largely those whose work is based 
on the US, assert that the different political parties have their strengths and areas of competence 
and for that matter voters would place candidates/contestants in offices they can best handle. This 
is referred to as institutional matching or issue ownership or selecting ‘horses for courses’ 
(Jacobson 1990; Petrocik 1991). It has also been argued that voters intentionally vote to divide or 
to balance party control of the government so that the parties play a watchdog role, to prevent 
abuse of the public mandate (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Fiorina 1992, 1996; Jacobson 1990; 
Mebane 2000; Petrocik 1991). However, the institutional matching theorists’ position that 
Democrats are suitable for Congress because they support social intervention policies while 
Republicans are best for the presidency because they manage the economy better has proven to be 
without merit. Thus, these claims were disproved when in the 1990s Democrats were assigned the 
presidency to manage the budget deficit while Republicans enjoyed a Congressional majority 
(Saad 1995; Roscoe 2003). There are also those who are of the view that divided government is 
an unintentional act, incidental, for instance, to the structural features of the American system such 
as separation of powers, checks and balances, as well as the practice of presidential system 
(Campbell 1960; Jacobson 1990).  
Ames et al (2009) also argue that Brazilians for instance do not cast their votes with 
eventual government formation in mind. To them, the country’s divided government is accidental 
because voters make separate decisions for presidential and deputy elections. As a result, they 
argued that the elections are “unlinked.” It has further been argued that the sequencing of the 
elections, such as the mid-term elections in the United States, is responsible for divided 
government (Ames et al 2009; Shugart, 1995). 
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Contrary to the above positions, Helmke (2009) argues that voters in new democracies do 
not divide government in line with the Fiorina model but rather would like to “protect themselves” 
by contemporaneously voting for challengers in one race and incumbents in another. This is to 
lessen the risks associated with voting for inexperienced and unknown challengers. The theory of 
divided government is one that directly connects with split outcomes irrespective of the voter 
intentions or reasons assigned it. This relates to the concept of two-office split-result (Burnham 
1965; Cummings 1966; Feigert 1979) where one party wins the executive and the other has 
legislative majority at the national level. Divided government is expected to have a direct 
relationship with split outcome (Burden and Kimball 1998; Gschwend, Johnston, and Pattie 2003). 
At the individual level too, divided voting (ticket splitting) could be linked directly to divided 
outcomes (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009).  
4.2.2 High Party Volatility  
The concept of electoral volatility explains how voters are willing to switch between parties 
from election to election. It shows that voters do not have strong party attachment with stable and 
consistent voting behavior from election to election (Evans 2002; Pedersen 1979; Rose & Urwin 
1970; Taagepera & Grofman 2003). Electoral volatility also shows that voters are free to choose 
who to vote for in an election based on the issues of the day or candidates involved (Birch 2003; 
Tavits 2008). Given that voters do not have strong party attachment with stable and consistent 
voting behavior from election to election and the fact that voters are free to choose who to vote for 
in an election based on the issues of the day or candidates involved, we can have a link between 
volatility and ticket splitting. Volatility refers to the net change in the party system due to changes 
of voter preferences over time. To measure volatility, I will sum up the change in each party’s vote 
share in the current and previous election, then add up the absolute values of the changes in vote 
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shares (for all parties) and then divide the sum of the absolute values by two. Conventionally, when 
volatility or turbulence in the party system is mentioned in established democracies, it is assumed 
that party supply (party entry and exit) is largely in a state of equilibrium and that all changes are 
mainly due to voter activities such as switches in partisan affiliations, abstentions, among others. 
As a result, Pedersen (1979) defines volatility as “the net change within the electoral party system 
resulting from individual vote transfers” (Pedersen 1979, 3). It is worth stressing that most of the 
studies on volatility which are largely based on the established democracies did not distinguish 
between the role of electorates and elites when considering party-system changes. 
Meanwhile, studies from emerging democracies have found that volatility in new 
democracies is largely elite-driven (Gunther 1989; Mair 1997; Van Biezen 2003). These scholars 
assert that elite strategizing is substantively responsible for the erratic electoral outcomes from 
election to election and therefore better explains volatility in nascent party systems (Gunther 1989; 
Mair 1997; Toole 2000). Like their counterparts whose work is focused on advanced democracies, 
these scholars are also at the other extreme by explaining volatility solely from an elite perspective 
and ignoring the role of the voters. To borrow the terms of Roscoe (2003), voters are like diners at 
a restaurant whose choices are limited by the available menu. Thus, scholars who have studied the 
subject in advanced and emerging democracies are similar in opposite ways as they view the 
phenomenon exclusively from voter and elite perspective respectively. 
Finally, there are other scholars who view party system stabilization as the combined effect 
of elite and voter actions (Cox 1997; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rose & Munro 2003). These studies are 
based on electoral politics where strategic coordination of elites and the electorates are critical. 
Voters who want to avoid wasting their votes on nonviable contestants prefer to coordinate on the 
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few viable ones for their votes to count. Likewise, when elites are planning their withdrawal, entry 
and alliance strategies, they consider both voter expectations and the electoral rules in place.  
These considerations aside, two scholars who have made significant contributions to 
research on volatility are Birch (2003) and Tavits (2008). To Birch, the overall volatility between 
successive elections is determined by the interactive effects of three factors. The first factor is the 
change in party support of individual voters who vote at both past and current elections. The second 
factor is the change in the configuration of the electorates due to exits, entries, and variations in 
abstention. Third, factors such as non-contestation, changes in the range of parties on offer due to 
party entries, exits, and alterations in the composition of coalitions affect volatility in many ways. 
These are voter and elite level factors responsible for volatility. Birch, thus, distinguishes between 
volatility, which is largely voter action, and party replacement which is purely the acts of elites as 
responsible for party system stabilization. Birch further argues that the former works best in 
advanced democracies while the latter is suitable for new democracies.  
Building on that concept, Tavits (2008) distinguishes the roles of elites and voters in the 
determination of party system stabilization in new democracies. She found that electoral volatility 
(party system – changes and stability) is highly elite driven and shaped by factors such as high 
candidate and party attrition rate and high rate of alliance fluidity in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Voters’ role is largely influenced by the available choice set especially parties and candidates 
running. Such elite acts are motivated by certain incentives that encourage or discourage system 
stability. This finding is supported by work on Africa where the main challengers in these 
democracies often change between elections (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Lindberg 2007; 
Wahman 2014). It is further supported by some scholars who found instances where strong 
candidates either switched parties or ran as independent candidates when they fail to secure party 
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nomination they contested (Lindberg 2007; Randall and Svasand 2002; Wahman 2014). Based on 
these findings, this dissertation adopts Pedersen’s (1979) conceptualization of volatility to measure 
voter-level effects (voter coordination) of party system change since there are several elite-level 
factors (elite coordination) such as disputed primaries in parliamentary elections and deals between 
parties and candidates. I expect high party volatility to produce split outcome if the net change in 
voter preferences over time in the different races lead to the election of candidates from different 
parties in the same constituency. Thus, the first hypothesis is that:  
H1: the higher the level of volatility in a constituency, the higher the likelihood of split outcome.  
It is expected that high volatility will directly correlate with split outcome and thus, have a 
positive relationship with split outcome. This means that as the level of volatility increases, split 
outcome increases and as volatility level declines, split outcome is expected to fall. 
4.2.3 Effective Number of Parties (ENP) 
Duverger (1954) posits that “The simple-majority single ballot system favors the two-party 
system” (Duverger 1954, 217) while the “simple majority system with second ballot and 
proportional representation favors multipartism” (Duverger 1954, 239). Simplifying these 
propositions, Cox (1997, 1999) argues that every electoral system prescribes a “ceiling” for the 
effective number of candidates that can contest the elections. This is given by the M+1 rule; where 
M represents the district magnitude (number of seats in a given district). Since parties and 
candidates can field contestants to exceed the M+1 rule, and given that parties differ in relative 
strength, Laakso & Taagepera (1979) have developed effective number of parties (ENP) index to 
measure how votes are distributed among the competitors. The ENP calculates the relative strength 
of parties based on their vote or seat share4. Though the ENP is not interested in the count of 
parties, it relies on the number of parties and their vote/seat share to generate their relative strength. 
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The ENP should be close to 1 where there is one party dominance (where one party receives a 
landslide victory), and close to the number of parties contesting the election when each party 
receives an equal vote share. The more the ENP exceeds the M+1 rule, the higher the probability 
of a split outcome where the candidates that voters prefer in the different races are not from the 
same party. 
As I noted in a previous chapter, Cox (1997, 1999) distinguishes two M+1 rules. In its first 
usage, the M+1 rule relates to the entry rule that the district magnitude prescribes to political elites 
and candidates. This rule suggests that the viable number of candidates in, for instance, a single 
member district (SMD) is two (M+1 candidates). Thus, the first M+1 rule relates to strategic entry. 
As there are fewer seats than potential candidates, and given the entry rule, party elites are required 
to coordinate in order not to exceed the district magnitude in terms of the required number of 
candidates. 
 In its second usage, the M+1 rule relates to strategic voting after parties and candidates 
have entered the elections. It shows that the contest in SMD is likely to reduce to a two-candidate 
affair. In some contexts, there could be more than two effective candidates in a single member 
district, but over time in FPTP the M+1 rule has a reductive effect on candidate entry because of 
the tendency for voters to focus on the more competitive candidates (voter coordination) by 
defecting from the less competitive ones. Generally, there are only two effective or viable 
candidates in SMDs with a plurality rule even where there are multiple candidates contesting in 
that constituency, voters tend to concentrate on the top two candidates. Thus, the second M+1 rule 
relates to strategic voting. As voters will like their votes to count, they will like to be strategic in 
their voting if party elites and candidates fail to coordinate on M+1 candidates. The caveat is that 
not all voters are strategic because there are party core voters who will vote sincerely for their 
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parties irrespective of the chances of their parties’ candidates. Thus, the presence of sincere voters 
and elite coordination problems explain how ticket splitting takes place where there is higher party 
fragmentation. Hence, the second hypothesis is that,  
H2: the higher the level of party fragmentation in a district, the higher the likelihood of split 
outcome if candidates that voters prefer in the different races are not from the same party.  
This implies that the further the district magnitude is exceeded by contestants in a 
constituency (which is a sign of elite coordination failure), the higher the possibility of split 
outcome if the candidates that voters prefer in the different races are not from the same party. My 
focus here is to determine whether elite coordination is successful which is determined by the first 
M+1 rule. It is only when elites fail in their coordination that the second M+1 (voter coordination) 
becomes inevitable. Meaning where party elites and candidates have failed to coordinate on M+1 
candidates, given the presence of at least some sincere voters, then I expect the result of sincere 
and strategic voting to likely lead to ticket splitting and consequently to split outcome. That is, 
where the candidates elected in the different races are not from the same party. Here, the expected 
relationship between exceeding the district magnitude and split outcome is positive in respect of 
magnitude and direction. It worth pointing out however, that as an exception, an SMD race with a 
majority runoff rule, is not likely to have party competition to be reduced to a two-party affair 
(Cox 1997; Duverger 1954). In such a system, the district magnitude could be one (M=1), but the 
effective number of parties is not reduced to two in the first round (Cox 1997; Duverger 1954). 
4.2.4 SF-Ratio in Single Member Plurality System 
Flowing from the above, where the first M+1 rule is breached, the second M+1 is expected 
to follow where voters will now do their coordination by defecting from the less viable candidates 
or concentrating their votes on the two top contenders as in the above example of a single member 
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district. To determine this, we are to find the vote difference between the second and third placed 
contestants. Cox (1997) provides us with an appropriate measure, referred to as the SF-ratio, which 
represents the vote ratio between the second and first losers (that is the ratio between the second- 
and third-placed contestants) in a single member plurality FTPT constituency. The SF-ratio 
provides a useful guide of voter coordination indicating defection from non-competitive to more 
competitive contestants (Moser and Scheiner 2009; Wahman 2014). Cox (1997) argues that where 
voters have information on the viable candidates in single member plurality constituencies, the 
SF-ratio will be close to zero, but where voters are uninformed or do not want to cast strategic 
votes, the SF-ratio will be close to one. Thus, the SF-ratio is between zero and one whether voters 
vote sincerely or strategically. Employing Cox’s SF-ratio to investigate ticket splitting in mixed 
member systems in a ten-country case comprising 35 elections, Moser and Scheiner (2009) found 
that in established democracies splitting was more of a strategic act whereas personal voting drives 
splitting in new democracies. The most important finding of Moser and Scheiner (2009) is that in 
both established and new democracies, the SF-ratio provides an indication of voter defection from 
unviable competitors, and this could be computed from the district aggregate electoral dataset.  
Though the SF-ratio has been used by many scholars to measure voter coordination by 
assessing voter defection from unviable contestants, it has been criticized of its inability to account 
for instances where a high number of parties other than the second and third placed ones receive 
small share of votes that become substantial when added together (Singer & Stephenson 2009). 
The SF-ratio has also been criticized by Gaines (1999) for wrongly indicating non-Duvergerian 
equilibrium in instances where there is a tie between the second and third placed contestants. These 
criticisms notwithstanding, the SF-ratio remains a useful measure of computing voter coordination 
from aggregate data, especially when it comes to investigating voter defection from less 
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competitive parties/candidates. In single member districts (SMDs), an SF-ratio of one or close to 
it is an indication that elites did not coordinate on only two competitors prior to the election or the 
presence of more sincere voting, while SF-ratio of zero is an indication of thorough elite 
coordination on only two candidates and that there was no second loser. Where the SF-ratio is 
close to zero, we have a Duvergerian equilibrium which asserts that SMD system leads to two 
party system at the district/constituency (Duverger 1954). SF-ratio close to zero also means that 
there is less sincere voting going on. Where there is less sincere voting going on, all things being 
equal, the effect of sincere voting on the overall election will be infinitesimally small but enough 
to keep third-rank parties contesting elections. This means that winning an election in either 
legislative or presidential race is largely a function of strategic voters who are also more likely to 
withdraw from trailing candidates. Thus, where elites fail to coordinate on viable candidates, there 
will be higher likelihood of defection from less competitive candidates. This will cause split 
outcome if the viable candidates in the different races are not from the same party. Hence, the third 
hypothesis is that: 
H3: the more elites fail to coordinate on viable candidates, the higher the likelihood of 
voter defection from less competitive candidates and the higher the likelihood of a split outcome 
if the viable candidates in the different races are from different parties and there is a presence of 
sincere voters. 
I will rely on the legislative race to generate my SF-ratio since in most cases, voters vote 
sincerely at the presidential race and strategically at the legislative races. This is because, all parties 
normally can have candidates of comparable quality at the presidential race than in the legislative 
race. As such, the SF-ratio at the parliamentary race is more likely to measure voter defection from 
less competitive candidates than in the presidential race. This also shows how voter coordination 
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can explain ticket splitting especially where candidates that voters select are from same party 
(decrease splitting) or different parties (increase splitting).      
4.2.5 (Mis)coordination  
 The preceding discussion brings us to the issue of strategic coordination adopted by party 
elites in their interactions. Cox’s main argument about strategic coordination is that, because there 
are fewer seats than potential candidates, party elites are to coordinate their entries based on the 
first M+1 rule discussed above under 4.2.3 District Magnitude. Cox specifically gave a classic 
example of elite coordination where he stated that if there are about 15 viable competitors from, 
say, Social Democratic Parties who are willing to enter the election, elites are required to 
coordinate the actions of many people for that political party to make any significant impact in the 
election (Cox 1999, 146). To Cox, elites are expected to do one important thing which is to limit 
the number of viable candidates willing to enter the electoral fray from a given political party or 
political ideology. A generally accepted method of limiting the number of contestants is the 
nomination process. He was quick to caution that if the nomination process were not transparent 
and democratic it would pose problems. Again, party elites are required to persuade disappointed 
nomination seekers from contesting the election as independent candidates so that the party’s votes 
are not divided. This means that elites may fail in their coordination when they do not limit 
nomination but allow all viable candidates to enter the electoral fray or do not manage a transparent 
and credible nomination. Where the nomination process ends up with aggrieved nomination 
seekers defecting, then it is a clear evidence of elite failure.  
Consequently, the coordination role expected of party elites regarding contestants’ entry is 
two-pronged. First, they (party elites) are to harmonize the entry of all the viable nomination 
seekers with the view of limiting the number of contestants. Where elites fail in this task, it is 
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expected that there will be unrestricted entry (free-for-all entry) which is likely to adversely affect 
the electoral fortunes of that party or ideological block. This is what Cox (1999), and Navia & 
Saldaña (2015) found to cause the defeat of the Concertación Alliance (Concertación Party) of 
Chile. That was also the plight of most Japanese parties that Cox studied. Second, in limiting the 
number of contestants, elites are to ensure that the nomination process is democratic, transparent, 
generally accepted, and not viewed as done to favor a particular contestant. Anything short of this 
is likely to trigger dissent especially from contestants who experience unfavorable terms. Thus, it 
is likely to expect high rates of disagreements (disputes) from aggrieved nominees where the 
nomination process is seen to be undemocratic. Undemocratic nomination is what has bedeviled 
many emerging democracies including Africa leading to high rates of disputed primaries in these 
settings (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Lindberg, 2007; Wahman, 2014).  
These scholars have found that, disputed/unfair nomination in African democracies has 
produced two effects. The first is a high rate of candidate replacement by parties. The second is 
high rate of independents. That is, instances where strong candidates fail to secure the party 
nomination they contest, such contestants either switch parties or run as independent candidates 
(Pettai and Kreuzer 2001; Resnick, 2013; Wahman, 2014). In Ghana for instance, it has been found 
that lack of internal democracy in some of the political parties, (especially the dominant ones), 
account for disputed primaries in parliamentary elections leading to aggrieved primary contestants 
at the constituencies contesting the elections as independent candidates causing ticket splitting 
(Bob-Milliar 2012; Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar 2010; Debrah 2014; Smith 2002a). In a similar 
vein, some scholars attribute Brazilian ticket splitting and for that matter its split outcome as a sign 
of “extreme party underdevelopment” (Ames et al 2009; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Power 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
123 
 
2000). Therefore, I expect elite failure in the nomination process especially with regards to 
disputed primaries in parliamentary elections to cause ticket splitting, consequently: 
H4: the higher the level of disputed primaries in parliamentary elections due to unfair nomination 
procedure, the higher the likelihood of ticket splitting and hence split outcome. 
 Disputed primaries in parliamentary elections are expected to be positively related to ticket 
splitting and split outcome, all things being equal. This means that, as elite miscoordination in the 
form of disputed primaries in parliamentary elections increases, ticket splitting and for that matter, 
split outcome is expected to increase all things being equal. It is significant to note that even in the 
midst of elite coordination problems some voters will still vote (sincerely) for their nonviable 
candidates/parties. 
 Party elites do not only experience coordination failures (disputed primaries), they also 
experience significant coordination successes, and these keep their parties alive. In fact, many 
comparative scholars such as Benoit (2001), Birch (2003), Golder (2006), and Tavits (2008) have 
found party elites to engage in alliances and changes in the configurations of alliances that have 
shaped voter choices in certain directions during elections. Birch (2003) for instance, observed 
that in countries where the president is directly elected, the presidency is more valued than the 
legislature, and that politicians negotiate all sorts of deals for electoral purposes. Such different 
configurations of deals made by politicians affect the available choice set and therefore, impact 
the way voters cast their ballots. In Ghana for instance, when one of the two major parties enter 
alliance with the smaller parties, often, the smaller parties defer the presidential slot to the bigger 
party in exchange for support in the parliamentary race (Agyeman-Duah 2005; Boafo-Arthur 2006; 
Darkwa 2019; Frempong 2017). In this vein, the bigger party also defers the legislative races in 
some constituencies to the smaller party. It was by such deals that some of the minor parties such 
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as the NCP, PCP, CPP and EGLE have had seats in parliament between 1993 and 2016 (Darkwa 
2019; Frempong 2017). Hence, this study expects a positive link between electoral deals and ticket 
splitting. Thus, 
H5: the more elites negotiate deals in which one party trades its presidential contest and supports 
the other for a corresponding assistance in the parliamentary race, the higher the likelihood of 
ticket splitting and hence split outcome.  
 Thus, the negotiated deals among elites involving trading off parliamentary race by one 
party for support in presidential contest from the other party are likely to produce ticket splitting 
with a likely split outcome. In emerging democracies, because political institutions are less 
developed and personal votes count a lot (Birch 2003; Moser & Scheiner 2009; Tavits 2008), 
political elites are very flexible in entering new deals and altering existing ones all with the view 
of improving their electoral objectives. Thus, alliances are very fluid in emerging democracies and 
these in turn affect their electoral outcomes in a way different from their developed counterparts. 
It worth stressing that often the varying configuration of alliances in new democracies produce 
ticket splitting and to some extent, split outcomes.   
4.3 DATA AND MEASUREMENT  
 The data for this chapter comes from multiple sources. The first and the main dataset is 
taken from the Election Passport5 which provides constituency-level electoral data for six 
Ghanaian general elections (1996 to 2016). This dataset is reliable and has been used by many 
scholars and research organizations in electoral studies. However, as it is the case of many datasets, 
the Electoral Passport dataset has missing data for 2008 and 2012 presidential races at the 
constituency level. The missing dataset is supplemented with data from the Electoral Commission 
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of Ghana, the institution responsible for elections. Thus, the aggregate electoral data for this project 
is complete and reliable. The second dataset is the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 
compiled by the Ghana Statistical Service. Four of these reports published between 1995 and 2014 
are used to determine the ethnic profile for each constituency for the period under review. These 
reports are the GLSS3 published in March 1995, GLSS4 published in October 2000, GLSS5 
published in September 2008 and the GLSS6 published in August 2014. Third, the dissertation 
uses published works and media reports that have recorded constituencies with disputed party 
primaries where disappointed primary seekers have entered the election as independents because 
disagreements relating to these primaries were not resolved. The reports also published deals 
entered by political parties for electoral purposes. These materials played very critical role in 
identifying constituencies with disputed primaries in parliamentary elections and deals among 
elites6.  
4.3.1 Dependent variable 
The main dependent variable is skirt and blouse outcome (split constituency outcome) that 
is whether a constituency had a split outcome or not. I generated a variable for skirt and blouse 
outcomes for the period 1996 to 2016 by comparing the parliamentary and presidential results of 
each constituency. Skirt and blouse constituencies are coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”. As 
the dependent variable is dichotomous (a constituency split or not), the dissertation uses binary 
logistic regression, and the level of analysis is the constituency. Details of the coding for both 
dependent and independent variables are provided in Appendix 4.2 below.  
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4.3.2 Independent Variables 
To evaluate the five hypotheses presented above, the dissertation provides five main 
independent variables which are disputed primaries in parliamentary elections, deals, district 
magnitude (effective number of parties), volatility, and second to first loser ratio (SF-ratio) for 
parliamentary elections where elite and voter coordination are prevalent.  
Disputed Primaries in Parliamentary Elections: In Ghana, disputed primaries in 
parliamentary elections (a major elite coordination problem) occur mainly due to lack of internal 
party democracy in the nomination process. There are published works and media reports that have 
recorded constituencies with disputed party primaries6. Since disputed primaries in parliamentary 
elections are likely to cause split outcomes, every constituency with at least one disputed primary 
is coded as “1” otherwise coded as “0”. It would have been preferable to distinguish constituencies 
based on where just one party had a disputed primary and where more than one party had disputed 
primaries in parliamentary elections so that I could use the percentage of disputed primaries in 
parliamentary elections in each constituency instead of the dichotomous variable. However, given 
that there are 275 constituencies in Ghana and I could not follow the parties’ primaries in person, 
I only depended on available data from published works and newspaper publications; those I could 
lay hands on do not provide this nuanced information. As a result, there could be false negatives, 
especially instances where I may incorrectly indicate the absence of disputed primary in some 
constituencies. Table 4.1 below provides a summary of disputed primaries for each electoral period 
between 1996 and 2016. The column for prior period records instances where a constituency that 
had had a disputed primary in the immediate past election has a recurrent experience in the current 
election period. The column for previous experience, on the other hand, considers instances where 
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a constituency witnessing disputed primary now, had had a similar experience in any of the past 
elections except the immediate past one.  
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Parliamentary Disputed Primaries (1996–2016) 
Year Observation Disputed 
Primaries 
Undisputed 
Primaries 
Prior Period  Previous 
Experience  
1996 200 20 180 N/A N/A 
2000 200 12 188 2 2 
2004 230 19 211 0 3 
2008 230 19 211 6 3 
2012 275 26 249 3 6 
2016 275 37 238 3 12 
Author’s compilation from published books and media reports6  
Effective number of parties (ENP): I generated the ENP from legislative elections results 
by first computing the vote share of the competing parties/candidates in a given constituency. 
Second, I squared each contestant’s vote share and summed up the values. Finally, I computed the 
reciprocal of sum of squares. This is summarized by the formula, ENP = 1/sum[pi˄2] where pi is 
the share of votes/seats of the ith party (Cox 1997; Laakso and Taagepera 1979)7 
Volatility: I computed electoral volatility from legislative electoral results for each 
constituency using the Pedersen index which measures the aggregate change in vote share in that 
constituency. I modified the Pedersen Index to have my values ranging from “0”–1” rather than 
from “0”– “100”. To do this, I first computed the change in each party’s vote share at time t and 
time t-1 (current and previous election). Second, I summed up the absolute values of the changes in 
vote shares. Finally, I divided the sum of the absolute values by two. This index ranges between 0 
and 1. In general, values close to one indicate high party volatility, while values close to zero 
indicate low levels of volatility.    
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SF-Ratio: I generated the SF-ratio using the vote ratio between the third-place and second-
place candidates from the legislative results in a given constituency. Where there is no third-place 
candidate, the SF-ratio is zero and where the vote difference between the third-place and second-
place candidates is small, the SF-ratio approaches one. Generally, higher SF-ratio (close to one) is 
a signal of less voter coordination, while low SF-ratio implies effective party elite coordination. 
Deal: Deal is a coordination tool employed by Ghanaian political actors. It happens where 
a party enters formal or informal electoral coalition (electoral arrangement) with either another 
party or with a candidate of another party. Deal is measured as a dichotomous variable where 
constituencies with deals are coded as “1”, otherwise coded as “0”. In such deals, the minor party 
often defers its presidential slot and supports the major party’s presidential candidate in exchange 
for support from the latter in the legislative race in selected constituencies that the latter defers to 
the minor party. 
4.3.3 Control Variables 
To address alternative explanation at the constituency level of analysis, this dissertation 
controls for regional effects, distance and Ethnic fractionalization.  
Regional Effect: I control for regional effect, as contiguous constituencies are more likely 
to vote in identical ways. The regional effect assigns each constituency in a region the same value, 
based on the percentage of constituencies in that region in relation to the skirt and blouse outcome 
in that region in the previous election. To measure this, I computed the proportion of skirt and 
blouse outcome at time t-1 for each constituency within each region. The justification is that some 
regions (geographical areas) of Ghana are considered swing regions in the sense that they often 
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change their voting pattern. These regions are notorious for skirt and blouse voting (Frempong 
2017; Lindberg 2013; Weghorst & Lindberg 2013). 
Distance: To control for how legislators’ closeness to their constituents from the national 
capital where they converge to make laws may affect skirt and blouse, I use the distance from the 
constituency capital (or the most prominent city in each constituency) to the national legislative 
house as a measure.  The assumption is that legislators closer to the national capital may be able 
to interact more with constituents and thus affect skirt and blouse more than those far away. 
Ethnic fractionalization: I computed ethnic fractionalization using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) by squaring each ethnic group’s population share in that constituency and 
then found the sum of those numbers. To obtain the proportion of each ethnic group’s population 
share, I used the ethnic profile of each constituency as per the appropriate GLSS report. For 
instance, I used the GLSS 3 published in March 1995 when computing the 1996 ethnic 
fractionalization and the GLSS 4 published in October 2000 for the 2000 ethnic fractionalization 
figures. The GLSS report is given at the regional level. To generate the constituency equivalence, 
I used the proportion between the presidential valid votes cast at the regional and constituency 
levels.  
4.4 Estimation Strategy for Skirt and Blouse Outcome under Coordination Theory 
 This chapter of the dissertation is interested in how coordination successes and/or failures 
impact ticket splitting, and hence, split outcomes. Elite coordination success is expected to lessen 
skirt and blouse voting and therefore reduce skirt and blouse outcomes. Where elites fail to 
coordinate, or their coordination ends in failure, voters are likely to coordinate on the most viable 
candidates. Where any of these or their combination occur, I expect skirt and blouse voting to 
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increase, resulting in skirt and blouse outcomes if there are no mutual crossovers. Thus, elite 
coordination success is expected to diminish skirt and blouse outcomes. Since the interest of this 
chapter is skirt and blouse outcomes, it employs logit regression because the dependent variable is 
binary. Three models were assessed for each of the six elections considered here using the same 
aggregate electoral datasets. The first model regressed the dependent variable on only the control 
variables. The second regressed the dependent variable on only the independent variables. Finally, 
the dependent variable was regressed on all the independent and control variables. These were 
done to determine how the different models affect split outcome. 
4.4.1 Results  
 The results for the three models are shown in Tables 4.2 to 4.5 below. Consistent with the 
theoretical expectations of the dissertation, most of the elite level coordination coefficients were 
significant and were in the expected direction as per the regression models in Table 4.5 and the 
changes in probabilities in Table 4.6. Generally, the independent variables were meaningfully 
significant, and the results confirmed most of the research hypotheses. As indicated by Table 4.2 
below, where the dependent variable was regressed on only the control variables the results present 
interesting findings. The results found no support for regional effect which suggests that 
contiguous constituencies are influenced by the voting behavior of the adjoining ones. Distance, 
which purports that skirt and blouse is likely in instances where a legislator’s constituency is far 
from the National Assembly, was supported by the model.  
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Table 4.2: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Outcome Using Aggregate Electoral Data (Control 
Variables Only) 
VARIABLES Estimate/SE 
  
Regional Effect 1.1024 
 (0.6725) 
Distance  0.0022*** 
 (0.0004) 
Ethnic fractionalization  -0.0002*** 
 (0.0001) 
Constant -2.4203*** 
 (0.2729) 
Observations 1,410 
Log likelihood 
McFadden's R2 
-413.78 
0.036 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, ethnic fractionalization was significant with a negative coefficient, meaning ethnic 
fractionalization and split outcome (skirt and blouse outcome) are negatively related. That is, as 
ethnic fractionalization increases, skirt and blouse outcome reduce, and vice-versa. When the 
dependent variable was regressed on only the independent variables as shown in Table 4.3, the 
dissertation found support for hypotheses two, four, and five which are all elite level coordination-
based hypotheses. The second hypothesis which predicted that when the district magnitude is 
exceeded because elites did not coordinate their entry or failed in their coordination, there will 
likely be a split-ticket voting leading to a possible split outcome was supported by the dissertation. 
Again, hypothesis four predicted that ticket splitting and consequently, split outcome will surge as 
parliamentary disputed primaries increase and vice versa was also supported by the model. The 
fifth hypothesis; electoral deals entered into by elites was also supported by the model. Thus, H5 
which predicted that deals between political actors that require trading off one race for a support 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
132 
 
in another race to produce split outcome was confirmed by the model. However, hypotheses one 
(volatility) and three (SF-ratio) were not supported by the model as shown in Table 4.3 below. 
Table 4.3: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Outcome Using Aggregate Data (Independent 
Variables Only) 
VARIABLES Estimate/SE 
 
Disputed Primaries in Parliamentary Elections 2.3874*** 
 (0.2404) 
Volatility -0.0964 
 (0.3770) 
Effective number of parties 3.1381*** 
 (0.3786) 
SF-Ratio -0.3837 
 (0.5797) 
Deals 1.5969*** 
 (0.3389) 
Constant -9.0956*** 
 (0.7884) 
Observations 1,410 
Log likelihood 
McFadden's R2 
-326.97 
0.238 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To ensure that the results were consistent, I regressed the dependent variable on all the 
variables; both independent and control variables. The results given in Table 4.4 below are not 
much different from those in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 above. Again, hypotheses two (effective number 
of parties), four (disputed primaries at the parliamentary elections), and five (deals) were 
confirmed by the model with the signs in the expected direction as before. Again, hypotheses one 
(volatility) and three (SF-ratio) were still not supported by the model in Table 4.4 as in Table 4.3 
when only the independent variables were used in the regression. It worth pointing out, however, 
that when all the variables were combined in a single model, it was only ethnic fractionalization 
hypothesis which was significant among the control variables.   
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Table 4.4: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Outcome Using Aggregate Electoral Data (All 
Variables) 
VARIABLES Estimate/SE 
 
Disputed Primaries in Parliamentary Elections 2.4028*** 
 (0.2437) 
Volatility -0.2081 
 (0.4530) 
Effective number of parties 3.1758*** 
 (0.4238) 
SF-Ratio -0.2234 
 (0.5914) 
Deals 1.5563*** 
 (0.3472) 
Regional Effect 1.2274 
 (0.9533) 
Distance  0.0005 
 (0.0005) 
Ethnic fractionalization   -0.0002** 
 (0.0001) 
Constant -8.7825*** 
 (0.8615) 
Observations 1,410 
Log likelihood 
McFadden's R2 
-323.71 
0.246 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.5 presents a model that includes year dummies with all the variables used in Table 4.4 
above and the results were consistent with those discussed above. Hypotheses two (effective 
number of parties), four (disputed primaries in presidential primaries), and five (electoral deals) 
were all significant as before. Again, among the control variables, it was only ethnic 
fractionalization hypothesis that was significant. In terms of the measure of fit for the models, it is 
significant to note that the model in Table 4.6 with McFadden’s R2 of 0.252 which is the model 
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Table 4.5: Logit Analysis of Skirt & Blouse Outcome Using Aggregate Electoral Data 1996-2016 
(With Year Dummies) 
VARIABLES Estimate/SE 
 
Disputed Primaries in Parliamentary Elections 2.3913*** 
 (0.2468) 
Volatility -0.0918 
 (0.7439) 
Effective number of parties 3.4483*** 
 (0.4577) 
SF-Ratio -0.1112 
 (0.6089) 
Deals 1.5293*** 
 (0.3593) 
Regional Effect 1.2066 
 (1.0032) 
Distance  0.0003 
 (0.0006) 
Ethnicity  -0.0002* 
 (0.0001) 
1996 Election -0.4698 
 (0.6952) 
2000 Election -0.8891** 
 (0.4037) 
2004 Election -0.3790 
 (0.3718) 
2008 Election -0.4548 
 (0.3558) 
2016 Election -0.3023 
 (0.3296) 
Constant -9.0095*** 
 (0.9057) 
Observations 1,410 
Log likelihood 
McFadden's R2 
-321.10 
0.252 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
that includes year dummies is comparatively better than that of Table 4.3 with McFadden’s R2 of 
0.036 which was ran with only the control variables. Again, since all the models with the exception 
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of that which was ran with only the control variables, lie within the conservative 0.2 and 0.4 range 
of McFadden’s R2, it can be said that the model does well in modeling the relationship between 
the independent variables and split outcome (McFadden 1974, 1977).  
Table 4.6: Effect of Changing Variables from Their Minimum to Maximum Values on Probability 
of Ticket Splitting 
Variables Change in Probability of 
Splitting 
Disputed Primaries in Parliamentary Elections 0.300 
Volatility -0.008 
Effective number of parties 0.721 
SF-Ratio -0.025 
Deals 0.139 
Regional Effect 0.062 
Distance 0.021 
Ethnic fractionalization  -0.045 
Note: Estimates are derived from Table 4.5 holding all other variables constant at their medians  
 
A quick glance at the changes in probabilities in Table 4.7 below shows that consistently, 
a change of the independent variables (disputed primaries, effective number of parties, and deals) 
from their minimum to their maximum values is associated with an increased change in the 
probability to have split outcomes. The change in probability to split, however, is not uniform for 
each variable and this is explained by the level of significance and the values assigned to the 
variable from the regression (compare Tables 4.5 and 4.6). For instance, a change of effective 
number of parties from its minimum to its maximum is associated with about 0.72 change in the 
chance of split outcome while disputed primaries and deals are associated with about 0.3 and 0.14 
chances of split where they were changed from their minimum to maximum values. The rest are 
associated with lesser values. It is also significant to note that volatility, second to first loser ratio 
(SF-ratio), and ethnic fractionalization have negative signs. This means that when any of them is 
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changed from its minimum to maximum, we should expect a fall in the probability to realize a split 
outcome.         
Table 4.7: Percentage of Split Constituencies vs. Parliamentary Disputed Primaries 1996 - 2016 
Year Constituencies Disputed Primaries (%) Split Outcomes (%) 
1996 200 10.00 7.50 
2000 200 6.00 8.00 
2004 230 8.30 8.78 
2008 230 8.30 9.60 
2012 275 9.50 9.50 
2016 275                      13.50              10.50 
Source: Created by author using data from Election Passport and Ghana Electoral Commission  
As a prelude into the discussion section, it pays taking a quick glance at couple of 
illustrations both tabular and pictorial that substantiate the results from the logistic regression. 
First, Table 4.8 below created from extracts pulled out of the aggregate electoral data used to run 
the regression provide visual evidence showing that split outcomes have come to remain an 
enduring feature of the Ghanaian electoral “system.” Brunell & Grofman (2009) found that  
Table 4.8: Presidential and Parliamentary Winners and Runners-Up 1992 – 2016  
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Presidential 
Winner 
NDC 
58.4% 
NDC 
57.4% 
NPP  
48.2% 
NPP 
52.5% 
NPP 
49.32% 
NDC 
50.6% 
NPP 
53.7% 
Parliamentary 
Winner 
NDC  
94.5% 
NDC  
66.5% 
NPP  
50.0% 
NPP 
55.7% 
NDC 
50.4% 
NDC 
53.8% 
NPP 
61.5% 
Presidential 
Runner-up  
NPP 
30.3% 
NPP 
39.6% 
NDC 
44.5% 
NDC 
44.6% 
NDC 
47.8% 
NPP 
47.8% 
NDC 
44.5% 
Parliamentary 
Runner-up 
NCP 
4.0% 
NPP 
30.8% 
NDC 
46.0% 
NDC 
40.9% 
NPP 
46.5% 
NPP 
44.7% 
NDC 
38.5% 
Presidential Run-
off winner    
NPP  
56.9%  
NDC 
50.5%   
Presidential Run-
off second placed    
NDC 
43.1%  
NPP 
49.5%   
Source: Created by author using data from Election Passport and Ghana Electoral Commission 
 
between 1900 and 2004, a number of districts exhibited split outcomes for President and for 
representatives in U.S. House. The number of split districts during this period was between five 
percent and forty percent of all districts. The pictorials provided here, in the case of Ghana, also 
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show that between 1996 and 2016, the country recorded between 7.5% and 10.5% split outcomes. 
It is interesting to see the connection between disputed primaries in parliamentary elections and 
split outcomes in the case of Ghana where increase in disputed primaries is associated with an 
increase in split outcome.  
Figure 4.1: Percentage of Vote Share and Seat Share for Winning Party 1996 - 2016 
Source: Created by author using data from Election Passport and Ghana Electoral Commission 
 
It is significant to note that unlike other jurisdictions, such as the United States and Brazil 
where split outcomes occur with regular frequency and often create divided government, in Ghana, 
the phenomenon has not created divided government, at least for the period under review. As 
shown by Table 4.8 and Figure 4.1 above, between 1996 and 2016, the party that wins the 
presidential race also wins parliamentary majority. If we were to add the 1992 elections, the split 
outcome would have been bigger because in that year, the presidential election was held on 
November 3, 1992 and the parliamentary elections scheduled for December 8, 1992. When the 
presidential results were declared, all the major opposition parties raised allegations of vote rigging 
by the ruling military government that had ruled the country from January 1982 to 1992.  
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The military leader (Flt Lt. Jerry Rawlings) was contesting and at the same time 
“supervising the elections” (Ayee 1997, 1998; Boafo-Arthur 2006; Commonwealth Secretariat 
1992; Debrah 2011; Drah 1998; Gyimah-Boadi 2009; Oquaye 1998). As a result, all the opposition 
parties boycotted the parliamentary election. It was only parties allied to the ruling military 
government who contested the parliamentary election. In the Ashanti Region for instance, the 
opposition NPP had won 26 out of the 33 constituencies during the presidential race and had won 
a number of constituencies in other regions. However, because the opposition boycotted the 
parliamentary race, all the 33 seats of Ashanti were won by the NDC. Thus, in 1992 elections, 
there were so many split outcomes because the opposition boycotted parliamentary election and it 
is for this reason that many scholars do not add the 1992 elections when they consider Ghana. Of 
course, election passport does not have the 1992 result in its dataset. The major takeaway from 
this point is that, in Ghana, since the 1996 elections, though there is consistent split outcome, the 
party that wins the presidential race always wins the parliamentary majority.  
 4.4.2 Discussion  
 From the logistic regression output and the accompanying figures and tables, the 
coordination driven split outcome appears to have reasonable merit. First, the fact that split 
outcomes have become a recurrent phenomenon in Ghanaian electoral politics and always the party 
that wins the presidency also wins parliamentary majority buttresses the case of coordination-
oriented splitting. Table 4.8 shows that the party that commands parliamentary majority pulls not 
less than 50 percent of the legislative seats while the constitution requires the winner of the 
presidential race to have at least 50 percent plus one votes (Asamoah 2014; Ayee 1997, 1998, 
2002; Boafo-Arthur 2006; Frempong 2017). In fact, Ghana is a two-party state where the two 
major parties have consistently together pulled between 93 to 98 percent of the valid votes cast 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
139 
 
since 1992 when the country returned to democracy (Ayee 1997, 1998; Boafo-Arthur 2006; 
Daddieh 2011; Frempong 2017). It was only in 1992 where the opposition parties boycotted the 
parliamentary election that the NCP, one of the allies of the NDC, placed second and secured four 
percent of the parliamentary seats after the NDC had ceded some constituencies unopposed to the 
NCP to contest (Asamoah 2014; Frempong 2017). Otherwise, it has been straight contest between 
the NDC and the NPP. In the 2000 elections when there was presidential runoff between the Vice 
President of the ruling NDC and the candidate from the opposition NPP, all the opposition parties 
unanimously declared their support for the NPP candidate (Asamoah 2014; Frempong 2017; Smith 
2002b). Their reason was twofold; first to jointly wrestle power from the (P)NDC which had 
governed Ghana between 1982 and 1992 as military government and between 1993 and 2000 as a 
democratic government (Frempong 2017; Smith 2002b). Second, they rationalized that the NPP 
had won 50% of the parliamentary seats and leading the presidential contest by 48.2% while the 
NDC had only 46.0% of parliamentary seats and trailing behind the NPP in the presidential race 
by 44.5%. Therefore, supporting the NDC to win the presidential race will produce divided 
government that will make governance difficult in Ghana’s young democracy (Ayee 2002; Darkwa 
2019; Frempong 2017). Given the precedent of the 2000 presidential runoff, in 2008 when there 
was another presidential runoff between the NPP and the NDC, the other opposition parties went 
by similar argument that because the NDC had won parliamentary majority of 50.4% against the 
NPP’s 46.5%, the NDC should be supported in the presidential runoff though the NPP candidate 
was leading by 49.34% to 47.8%. At the end of the 2008 runoff, the NDC eventually wrestled 
power from the ruling NPP candidate by a close margin of 50.5% to 49.5%. Thus, elite 
coordination and or miscoordination can explain the phenomenon of split outcome. 
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Second, other narratives to support the statistical basis for the coordination driven split 
ticket and hence, split outcome are numerous, at least for Ghana. Going by the argument in support 
of the proponents of (mis)coordination ticket splitting, many instances of ticket splitting, and split 
outcomes can be traced to coordination problems. For instance, Smith (2002b) observed that in the 
2000 elections, the ruling NDC lost some safe seats in its strongholds either because of unfair 
competition, the decision not to hold primaries, or endorsing sitting MPs as consensus candidates 
(Asamoah 2014; Debrah 2014). In such circumstances, the NDC lost four of its seats to party 
members who were disappointed nomination seekers that contested the elections as independents 
(Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar 2010; Daddieh & Bob-Milliar 2014; Debrah 2014; Frempong 2017; 
Smith 2002a). There were other instances where some of the independent contestants had failed to 
win but they facilitated the victory of the opposition party because they divided the party’s votes 
(Daddieh & Bob-Milliar 2014; Debrah 2014; Frempong 2017). In respect of hypothesis two which 
touches on exceeding the district magnitude, most of the smaller parties such as the CPP, PNC, 
GCPP, PPP, DFP are all socialist that trace their origin to the Nkrumah’s CPP. They all contest as 
separate parties and receive an insignificant vote share. The coordination problem is not unique to 
the smaller parties but to the dominant NDC and NPP who have witnessed splinter groups and 
independent contestants facilitating the political pendulum that has enabled the three turnovers the 
country has witnessed between 2000 and 2016.  
Volatility has been a major source of party system change and stability (something that 
causes vote share of parties) in many jurisdictions. In established democracies, researchers have 
found voters to be responsible for that (Evans 2002; Pedersen 1979; Rose & Urwin 1970; 
Taagepera & Grofman 2003). In new democracies, however, scholars have found elites to be 
responsible (Birch 2003; Moser & Scheiner 2009; Tavits 2008) while scholars whose work center 
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on strategic coordination found both elites and voters to be responsible (Cox 1997; Kitschelt et al. 
1999; Rose & Munro 2003). This chapter, which is based on strategic coordination, has found both 
elite level variables (disputed primaries, ENP, and deals) to be significant as per the fitted logistic 
results and the changes in probability tables above. The chapter, however did not find support for 
voter level variables (volatility and SF-ratio). It could, therefore, be concluded that elite-level 
variables are largely responsible in producing split outcomes which has in most cases altered party 
vote share. In Ghana, deals have produced split results any time both or either of the contracting 
parties in electoral alliance involving deal win(s). This is because the nature of the deal often 
requires one party trading off its parliamentary race for support in the presidential race. Therefore, 
where one of the contracting parties wins or both win the constituency, in which such deal was 
arranged, there is split outcome. It was through such deals that minor parties like the NCP, PCP, 
CPP and EGLE have had parliamentary representation between 1993 and 2016 (Darkwa 2019; 
Frempong 2017). We know that where split outcomes occur, there is at least some split-ticket 
voting in that constituency. That is skirt and blouse outcome is a sign of skirt and blouse voting 
(Burden and Kimball 2009). 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, split outcomes as per the extant literature is the basis for divided government 
in many countries (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Ames et al 2009; Burden and Kimball 2009; 
Fiorina 1992, 1996). However, in Ghana, there is evidence of split outcomes but the reason why 
till now the country has not yet experienced divided government is due to elite coordination as 
explained above. This has made Ghana unique in the sense that in two instances (2000 and 2008) 
where there were opportunities for divided government, the political elite had argued against it and 
have coordinated to prevent its occurrence. Again, as shown by Table 4.8 and Figure 4.1 above, in 
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all instances, the party that won the presidential contest also won at least a 50% seat share in 
parliament. Thus, it could be argued that Ghanaian political elites do not advocate ticket splitting 
with the intent of causing divided government8 at least within the Fourth Republic between 1992 
- 2016. The results from the regression output to test the hypotheses in this chapter found 
statistically significant support for the coordination-induced split outcomes that confirms the 
theoretical expectations of this research. Certainly, differences in elite coordination within and 
across constituencies account for variations in ticket splitting and for that matter split outcome. In 
fact, the entire credit or blame could not be attributable to candidates and elites but to voters as 
well because, as we have seen both elite level hypotheses and voter level hypotheses are all 
confirmed by this study. As discussed above, the coordination rule which is the M+1 rule governs 
both strategic entry (for candidates and elites) and strategic voting (for voters). Thus, the nuances 
and complexity in split outcome is due to variations in elite and voter coordination within and 
between constituencies.  
An important clarification on why Ghana’s skirt and blouse voting has not produced 
divided government needs to be pointed out here. As extensively shown in this chapter and 
reiterated in the preceding paragraph, Ghanaian political elites, though often advocating skirt and 
blouse, have both in word and deed moved against divided government7. A segment of the media 
and civil society on the other hand, have supported divided government because they are of the 
view that divided government would act as checks and balances between the executive and 
legislative arms of government and lead to good governance. These contrasting views held by the 
political elites and a cross section of the media and civil society will be discussed in the next 
chapter that utilizes my fieldwork to examine elite level coordination of ticket splitting. 
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In fact, as proponents of divided government have a number of justifications for the 
concept, such as, it leads to policy moderation, checks and balances each arm of government and 
places each party in its ideal office – institutional matching (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989, 1995; 
Fiorina 1992, 1996; Jacobson 1990; Petrocik 1991), split outcomes have their strengths. First, it 
has been argued that ticket splitting and for that matter, split outcomes, promotes performance-
based voting such as economic voting (Debrah 2016; Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Helmke 2009). 
Thus, ticket splitters will cast their votes for politicians who have performed well as well as for 
competence instead of for partisanship. In Ghana for instance, it has been found that constituencies 
with split outcomes put political actors especially parliamentarians on their toes to offer responsive 
and accountable representation to their constituents while areas where voters vote straight ticket 
receive subpar representation (Asunka 2016, 2017; Fridy 2006; Lindberg & Morrison 2008; 
Weghorst & Lindberg 2013).  
Finally, elite coordination especially, and to some extent, voter coordination have helped 
nurture Ghana’s young democracy such that both coordination successes and failures have together 
shepherded the country to navigate the contours of democratization to the point of realizing three 
successive transfer of power from one party to the other. In critical instances where the country 
had to have presidential runoffs between a ruling government and the main opposition party, elites 
have coordinated to ensure that in both instances, the ruling party loses and hands over power 
peacefully. Thus, the concept of coordination is such a powerful phenomenon that requires the 
attention of political actors, electorates, policy makers and watchers of democracy.  
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4.7 Notes  
1. Ecological inference fallacy is the mistake associated with inferring individual level behavior 
from aggregate data. For instance, relying on aggregate electoral result to deduce individual-level 
attributes such as ticket splitting 
2. The mediating factors are institutional and social contexts that influence elite coordination. For 
instance, elite coordination in single member districts (SMDs) may differ from elite coordination 
in multimember districts (MMDs) (Guinjoan 2016; Herron and Nishikawa 2001, 2005; Ferrara 
2004). In Ghana for example, elite coordination in SMDs are such that, often, one party defers the 
parliamentary race for its ally for a corresponding support in the presidential race in that 
constituency.  
3. Part of this dissertation is expected to be published in London by Rowman and Littlefield 
International Limited. 
4. Given that most of the examples given about divided government relate to the United States due 
to its unique Constitution that provides separate roles for the various arms of government, I will 
discuss the theory of divided government as it pertains to the US. I will also discuss how it is in 
Brazil and Mexico.   
5. http://www.electionpassport.com/  
6. To compute ENP, the first step is to find each party’s vote or seat share (that is the percentage 
of votes or seats received). Second, square each party’s vote or seat share and add up the squares. 
Finally, find the reciprocal of the sum of squares.   
7. I got most of my data from Frempong’s (2017) Frempong, Alexander Kaakyire Duku. 2017. 
Elections in Ghana: 1951 – 2016. Digibooks Ghana Ltd. and just a few from Osei, Anja. 2012. 
Party-Voter Linkage in Africa: Ghana and Senegal in Comparative Perspective. Springer Science 
& Business Media. 
The data from Frempong’s (2017) Osei (2012)  were supplemented with journal publications and 
by media reports. Among them are: 
Bob-Milliar, George M. 2012. “Political party activism in Ghana: factors influencing the decision 
of the politically active to join a political party.” Democratization 19.4: 668-689. 
Bob-Milliar, George M., and Gloria K. Bob-Milliar. 2010. “The Economy and Intra-Party 
Competition: Presidential Primaries in the New Patriotic Party of Ghana." African Review of 
Economics and Finance 1.2: 51-71. 
Daddieh, Cyril K., and George M. Bob-Milliar. 2014. “Ghana: The African Exemplar of an 
Institutionalized Two-Party System?” Party systems and democracy in Africa. Palgrave 
Macmillan, London. 107-128. 
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Debrah, Emmanuel. 2014. “Intra-Party Democracy in Ghana’s Fourth Republic: The Case of the 
New Patriotic Party and National Democratic Congress.” Journal of Power, Politics & Governance 
2.3: 57-75. 
In respect to media reports I try as much as possible to confirm a single story with about two media 
houses. A media source for party members going independent for instance, that I worked with in 
respect to members going independent was carried by at least four media houses as “NDC sacks 
23 members for going independent”. The links to these are given below. 
http://citifmonline.com/2016/11/01/ndc-sacks-23-members-for-going-independent/ 
http://www.peacefmonline.com/pages/politics/politics/201611/296840.php?page=1 
HYPERLINK  
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NDC-sacks-23-for-going-
independent-482650  
https://www.pulse.com.gh/ece-frontpage/independent-candidates-ndc-sacks-23-parliamentary-
aspirants/hbb7z08 
8. Though Ghanaian political elites engage in acts that promote skirt and blouse voting, they have 
done their best to avoid divided government because Flt Lt. Jerry Rawlings’ second military coup 
in December 1981 came shortly after the Third Republican Parliament voted against the 
president’s budget). 
 
Appendix 4.1: Parliamentary Representation in Ghana’s Fourth Republic 
Party/Independent 
 
Date of investiture  
First  
Parliament 
Jan 7, 1993 
Second 
Parliament 
Jan 7, 1997 
Third 
Parliament 
Jan 7, 2001 
Fourth 
Parliament 
Jan 7, 2005 
Fifth 
Parliament 
Jan 7, 2009 
Sixth 
Parliament 
Jan 7, 2013 
Seventh 
Parliament 
Jan 7, 2017 
NDC 189 (94.5) 133 (66.5) 92 (46.0) 94 (46.5) 116 (50.4) 148 (53.8) 106 (38.5) 
NPP - 61 (30.5) 100 (50.0) 128 (55.7) 107 (46.5) 123 (44.7) 169 (61.5) 
NCP 8 (4.0) - - - - - - 
PNC - 1 (0.5) 3 (1.3) 4 (1.7) 2 (0.9) 1 (0.4)  
CPP - - 1 (0.5) 3 (1.3) 1 (0.4)   
EGLE 1 (0.5) - - - - - - 
PCP - 5 (2.5) - - - - - 
Independent  2 (1.0) - 4 (2.0) 1 (0.4) 4 (1.7) 3 (1.1) - 
TOTAL 200 (100) 200 (100) 230 (100) 230 (100) 230 (100) 275 (100) 275 (100) 
Source: Compilations from the Election Passport and Electoral Commission of Ghana Databases. 
Notes: Percentages in parentheses. The seat allocations are as per the general elections conducted 
prior to the inauguration of Parliament on January 7, and do not consider reallocations due to 
byelections.  
 
Appendix 4.2: Coding at the Aggregate Level of Analysis   
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Variable Measurement 
Split outcome 
(DV) 
The main DV is split outcome as such, constituencies with split outcomes were coded as 
“1”, otherwise coded as “0”. 
Parliamentary 
Disputed 
Primaries 
Since disputed primaries in parliamentary elections are likely to cause split outcome, 
every constituency with disputed primaries in parliamentary elections is coded as “1” 
otherwise coded as “0” 
Volatility I compute electoral volatility for each constituency from the legislative election results 
using a modified Pedersen Index which ranges between 0 and 1. I first totaled the change 
in each party’s vote share in the current and previous election. Second, I added up the 
absolute values of the changes in vote shares. Finally, I divided the sum of the absolute 
values by two. 
Effective 
number of 
parties (ENP) 
The ENP is computed from the legislative election results using the vote share of 
competing parties in a given constituency. First, I computed the vote share of all the 
contestants in a given constituency. Second, I squared each contestant’s vote share and 
summed up the values. Finally, I computed the reciprocal of sum of squares.  
S-F Ratio I generate the SF-Ratio from the legislative election results using the vote ratio between 
the second and third placed candidates in a given constituency. In other words, the SF-
Ratio measures the proportion of vote share between the second and first loser in a 
constituency. 
Deals I measured deal as a dichotomous variable: constituencies with deals are coded as “1”, 
otherwise coded as “0”. 
Regional Effect I control for regional effect, as contiguous constituencies are more likely to vote in 
identical way. To measure this, I computed the proportion of split outcome at time t-1 for 
each constituency. In this way each constituency in a region is given the same value.  
Distance To control for how legislators’ closeness to their constituents may affect split, I use the 
distance from the constituency capital in each constituency to the national legislative 
house as a measure.  
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
I computed ethnic fractionalization using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) by 
squaring each ethnic group’s population share in that constituency and then found the 
sum of those numbers. To obtain the proportion of each ethnic group’s population share, 
I used the ethnic profile of each constituency as per the appropriate GLSS report.  
The GLSS report is given at the regional level. To generate the constituency equivalence, 
I used the proportion between the presidential valid votes cast at the regional and 
constituency levels. 
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CHAPTER 5. ELITE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
5.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
“Ghana stands to gain, and parliament will produce results for the people through give and take negotiations and 
proper debates devoid of insults… if we vote wisely and vote skirt and blouse1 (Festus Lartey-Adjei, December 7, 
2012). 
As you go out to vote on Sunday, I am urging my friends and anyone who really cares about the growth of democracy 
in Ghana to vote “skirt and blouse”. I’d like to have a situation where the president is from ‘Party A’ but parliament 
is controlled by ‘Party B’ or ‘Party C’2 (Ato Kwamena Dadzie, December 5, 2008) 
Political parties usually have a strong incentive to encourage straight ticket voting so that 
voters support all their candidates on the ballot. In Ghana, split-ticket voting is so common that it 
has a special name, “skirt and blouse voting,” denoting a two-piece dress instead of one straight 
dress (Daddieh 2011). Not only do we see evidence of split-ticket voting in some constituencies, 
but we also see some evidence that parties strategically encourage split-ticket voting under certain 
conditions. Further, civil society and media may encourage split-ticket voting to achieve certain 
goals. The above two quotes are mere crumbs of what political party elites and other Ghanaians 
feed the electorates on in public and in private to shape their voting pattern. In fact, the first 
statement was attributed to Dr. Abu Sakara, the 2012 Presidential Candidate of the Convention 
People’s Party (CPP). In Chapter 4, the dissertation made a claim backed by data that elite support 
for skirt and blouse voting aims to achieve certain electoral outcome other than divided 
government. It is significant to note that both quotes at the beginning of the chapter support how 
the phenomenon is encouraged. The second quote does something more than merely encouraging 
skirt and blouse voting. It is actually asking for divided government: that is the presidency and 
parliament are controlled by different political parties. The quote is actually from someone from 
the media and civil society who thinks that divided government will create the necessary checks 
and balances for the executive and legislative arms of government to play a watchdog role which 
will strengthen Ghana’s democracy. Political elites, on the other hand, think otherwise. Though 
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they engage in acts that promote skirt and blouse voting, they do not support divided government 
because Flt Lt. Jerry Rawlings’ military coup in December 1981 came shortly after the Third 
Republican Parliament voted against the president’s budget.  
This chapter will explore the reasons Ghanaian political elites will generally support skirt 
and blouse voting or skirt and blouse outcome and thus, contribute to our understanding of split-
ticket voting, elite behavior, and Ghanaian electoral politics within Ghana’s Fourth Republic. It 
worth stressing that this chapter differs from Chapter 3 in the sense that whereas Chapter 3 focuses 
on individual voter, this chapter focuses on party elites by trying to address why a party elite or a 
party card bearing member will vote skirt and blouse. Why would party elites and supporters of a 
political party want either the party’s presidential or parliamentary candidate lose the election in a 
particular constituency? Why would a presidential and or parliamentary candidate of a political 
party advocate either overtly or covertly for split-ticket voting? Again, why would a supporter, a 
member or an official of a political party indeed vote to split the ballot, roll-off the ballot, or 
abstain? Finally, how has this problem shaped the current distribution of votes and seats share of 
parties in Ghana? Using fieldwork conducted in Ghana that sampled 303 party elites and few 
media, civil society leaders and academics in 2017, the chapter argues that political party 
officials/political actors tend to do what they feel will serves their best interests. In some cases, 
their “best interests” may involve a split-ticket outcome.  
Further, politicians will advocate for split-ticket voting in situations where coordination 
breaks down or will deliberately frustrate coordination where they find it to be the most expedient 
means of facilitating their political goal at a given time. This observation suggests that we can 
observe conventional coordination which is a harmonious interaction or relationship within a 
group or among groups of people working together and the reverse of that. I refer to both as 
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(mis)coordination to cater for coordination failure and coordination success (Cox 1999; Navia and 
Saldaña 2015). Thus, political actors are strategic in their choices; they make their choices in 
response to (in anticipation of) what other actors (competitors and voters) are doing (will do). 
Employing Cox’s (1997, 1999) coordination theory, the chapter further asserts that strategic 
coordination is a mechanism that political actors employ to communicate their intentions about 
the direction they expect the elections to go. The electorates are able to decode such cues where 
political actors employ strategic coordination as communication mechanism because they come 
with certain observable indicators3. It is instructive to note that strategic coordination is carried out 
within party (intraparty) and between party (interparty)4. This chapter will identify the observable 
indicators of intraparty and interparty coordination cues that party elites create as they engage in 
strategic coordination and generate testable hypotheses, test them and draw conclusion about how 
these promote ticket splitting. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section, section 5.2, presents findings from the 
fieldwork conducted in 2017 exclusively for this dissertation. Section 5.3 discusses the strategic 
coordination theory which is the dissertation’s contribution to the ticket splitting literature. The 
strategic coordination theory is a two-pronged theoretical model used to analyze the phenomenon 
of ticket splitting especially from elites’ perspectives as it relates to intraparty and interparty 
coordination problems they face in prosecuting their political agenda. Each of these sections will 
introduce and discuss the appropriate testable hypotheses that capture the observable indicators of 
intraparty and interparty coordination problems faced by party elites. Section 5.4 discusses 
alternative explanations with their associated hypotheses: Partisanship, the educational level of the 
respondents, and whether or not the parties/candidates that respondents identify with contest in a 
given constituency. Section 5.5 touches on the data and how it was collected, how relevant it is to 
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the questions and the theory, as well as how the variables are measured. The section discusses the 
dependent and independent variables as well as the control variables. The penultimate unit, section 
5.6 models the interparty and intraparty coordination theory and presents the results from the 
logistic regression. This will connect to the discussion segment of the chapter by buttressing the 
results with stories of coordination problems in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. Section 5.7, the final 
section, summarizes the discussions, points out the importance of the chapter and proposes 
suggestions and recommendations for future research in the subfield. 
5.2 DISCOVERIES FROM THE FIELDWORK 
The post-election fieldwork conducted in Ghana in 2017 just after the 2016 Ghanaian 
election offered my research team and I a unique opportunity to uncover several insightful 
experiences and thoughts from party elites, media persons, civil society and scholars on why skirt 
and blouse is pervasive in Ghana. These could be classified into: nomination problems, sabotage, 
local vs national issues, results of government policy, and the effects of interparty coordination on 
smaller parties vote share. These are briefly discussed under subsections 5.2.1 to 5.2.5 below. 
5.2.1 Nomination Problems 
Our interactions with our research subjects, especially with party elites who were either 
victims or advocates of skirt and blouse voting/outcome, gave us an opportunity to unearth how 
party nomination process becomes mechanism for promoting skirt and blouse outcome for several 
reasons. It came to light that the two major political parties, the NPP and the NDC, have rolled out 
what they referred to as “affirmative action”5 aimed at encouraging more female and disabled 
politicians to enter parliament. The “affirmative action” has two strands: reduction in the filing 
fees for beneficiaries and the designation of some constituencies as affirmative constituencies. The 
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way these measures create skirt and blouse outcome is that instances where female politicians and 
those with disability pay reduced filing fees, the level of intraparty competition in those 
constituencies is compromised at the parliamentary race. That is, because as female politicians and 
those with disability are made to pay reduced filing fees, their competitors see the action as 
skewing the system in favor of their opponents and not on the basis of merit. Often, the candidate 
selected is not able to match the competition from the opponents who may not have the same 
policy in that constituency. From my respondent’s perspective, the most detrimental kind of this 
policy is designation of a constituency as affirmative constituency. This kind of affirmative action 
is seen as another kind of imposition of a candidate where women are to be given consideration in 
a party’s stronghold, and it mostly creates problems for the party such that the party often ends up 
losing a safe seat to opponents. 
Other kinds of nomination problems unraveled by the team include instances where party 
heavy weights, especially those in national, regional, and constituency executive levels, use their 
positions to support a particular candidate. Similar to this is corruption on the part of party officials 
who organize the primaries by favoring certain candidates either because those candidates bribe 
them or because they have special relationship with the candidates. These acts create uneven 
electoral playing ground among contestants, and those who feel they are unfairly treated often 
advocate skirt and blouse voting. Often, aggrieved unsuccessful parliamentary nomination seekers 
who are victims of unfair treatment enter the elections as independent and thus create opportunity 
for skirt and blouse voting. Respondents 1 and 7 revealed in an interview that, victims of unfair 
nomination become easy targets to opponents who are prepared to use financial inducement to 
create skirt and blouse in their opponent’s strongholds with the view of making it possible for the 
financier’s party’s candidate to win those constituencies6. The financial inducement used by 
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opponents to create skirt and blouse voting in the recipient’s party referred to here as “financing 
of opposition election campaigns” is of two kinds. The first is where the financier targets some 
members or plant certain persons in opponent’s party for a period of time for those persons to 
become eligible for that party’s parliamentary nomination. As expected, such persons’ aim is to 
do whatever possible to mar the party’s nomination process and thus, break the bond of unity that 
holds the party together. The second type uncovered by this research is where the financier woos 
aggrieved nomination seekers of opponent parties and support them to contest the election as 
independents. When this happens, it increases the likelihood of skirt and blouse voting in the 
recipient’s party and a possible win for the financier’s legislative candidate because in most 
instance, party supporters will support their presidential candidate but divide their vote at the 
legislative race.  
5.2.2 Deliberate Sabotage 
Emanating from the above is the issue of calculated or deliberate sabotage often carried 
out by aggrieved nomination seekers or persons with presidential or parliamentary ambitions. It 
was found out that, aggrieved nomination seekers who feel unfairly treated by parties hold that the 
best way to hurt their party or receive attention is to advocate skirt and blouse voting. Again, 
persons with parliamentary or presidential ambitions also work against the current occupant of that 
seat. Such acts often break the party’s front, create disaffection among party members and fester 
intraparty conflicts which produce skirt and blouse voting when left unresolved. Key among 
persons who harbor parliamentary ambitions are political appointees, such as district or municipal 
chief executives (DCEs/MCEs), who represent the president and perform ceremonial and 
executive functions and are often custodians of development projects in those areas. The research 
found that there are two reasons why DCEs/MCEs would promote skirt and blouse to sabotage the 
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member of parliament (MP) in that constituency. First, the position of DCEs/MCEs and that of a 
minister do not have their tenure backed by the Constitution. Their continuous stay in office is at 
the discretion of the president who can hire and fire at any time. The MP’s tenure, on the other 
hand, is guaranteed by the Constitution and that is what most politicians prefer. Second, the MPs 
are often detached from the people by result of the location of their working place which is miles 
away at the national capital. In terms of presence and visibility, DCEs/MCEs are within the 
community and their work is often conspicuous to the electorates. Thus, DCEs/MCEs are often 
seen to “belong” to the constituent while an MP is seen to be too distant from the people. This 
perception worsens where the MP does not frequent the constituency. The result is that because 
DCEs/MCEs preferred to be MPs and given their visibility and presence, coupled with their role 
as the representatives of the president promoting development in the constituency against the MP 
who is seen to be distant, the DCEs/MCEs are easily able to sabotage the MPs. Again, because 
there is no term limit for MPs, an MP can be in parliament as long as the constituents are willing 
to renew the MP’s mandate. Consequently, MPs who have had three or more parliamentary terms 
become targets of sabotage. The result of this is skirt and blouse voting or outcome because the 
MPs also have some supporters in the constituencies who are likely to vote for the party’s 
presidential candidate and the MP. These calculated sabotages often do not involve the presidential 
candidates because they are limited to certain constituencies and involve the MP and in-party 
member(s) who want the MP’s seat.   
It also came to light that party foot-soldiers who do the leg work for the party at the 
grassroots to win elections are often promised jobs and positions. However, because most of them 
do not have the needed skills and qualifications, their parties often fail to honor promises made to 
them. These party foot-soldiers often register their protest by mobilizing against their parties as 
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they also register their dissatisfaction through skirt and blouse often against the candidates who 
failed to honor their promises. Party foot soldiers often well organize their protest in the 
constituencies with banners and placards communicating their intentions to their party leadership.  
5.2.3 Local Vs National Issues 
 Related to the above is how the phenomenon of skirt and blouse voting relates to party 
problems classified as local vs national. An interesting observation from the fieldwork is that in 
Ghana, skirt and blouse voting, in most cases, is directed towards parliamentary candidates and 
not the presidential candidates. That is, most of the time, it is the parliamentary candidate who 
suffers from skirt and blouse voting. The reasons here are multifaceted. First, some of the MPs, 
either before or after their parliamentary quest, might have involved themselves in local problems 
such as chieftaincy conflicts. This is a local problem and, as such, it is the local politician (MP), 
not the national politician (president), who suffers for it. It must be pointed out, however, that the 
local politician can also benefit from skirt and blouse voting; especially where the local politician 
promotes development projects in that constituency. Furthermore, candidates who do not connect 
well with their constituents as well as those who do not conduct themselves well attract skirt and 
blouse voting. Thus, the issue of responsiveness is at the heart of skirt and blouse voting. For 
instance, a person who promotes development in an area can benefit from skirt and blouse voting. 
Second, the nomination problems discussed above in section 5.3.1, and its associated sabotage 
discussed in the preceding section, are largely local problems and thus make voters split from the 
local politician. These aside, it was found that when there are conflicts in the party at the national 
level and disciplinary measures are carried out at that level, it unites the party at the grassroots. 
However, where there are conflicts at the local level and national leadership prescribes disciplinary 
measures at the local level, it creates confusion and breaks the ranks of the party. These 
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observations are context dependent, but they tell us that parties differentiate local and national 
issues and when they are conflated, create skirt and blouse voting. One of my respondents said this 
in support of local vs national issues: 
“In the 2016, NPP was more divided at the top where their national executives such as Paul 
Afoko (the National Chairman), Kwabena Agyei Agyepong (General Secretary) and 
Sammy Crabbe (the Second Vice Chairman) were all suspended. Ironically, this united the 
party’s grassroots especially given that the party has been in opposition for eight years and 
wanted to come back into power. Again, given that the governing NDC was also having 
internal division at the grassroots but the president (NDC candidate) and his executives 
were using NPP’s internal division as a campaign issue galvanized the opposition to unite 
at the grassroots and delivered a sound victory to their party”7.  
Thus, the takeaway from these points is that local problems often create skirt and blouse that the 
local politician suffers for. 
It is also interesting to note that the local vs national divide can take a twist where the 
presidential candidate rather than the parliamentary candidate suffers for it. It was found that where 
there is a disconnect between the party structures and the presidential candidate’s campaign team, 
it incurs the displeasure of the locals who vote against their presidential candidate but for the 
party’s parliamentary candidate. For instance, some of my respondents said the NDC presidential 
candidate, who was also the incumbent, created a lot of disaffection at the grassroots for using 
celebrities (movie and music stars) instead of the local executives8. Most of these people do not 
understand the local language, the customs and traditions of the people. These aside, they do not 
even know the boundaries of constituencies in the country and this angered the locals (regional 
and national executives) to vote against the president, making him the first to lose his reelection 
bid. It was also found that most of the logistics of the incumbent president, such as T-shirt 
distribution, mounting of billboards, were done by the president’s team from the national capital. 
These acts covertly communicated to the local executives that they were not needed and as such 
most of the campaigns led by celebrities were mere fanfare that did not attract any serious votes.     
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5.2.4 Results of Government Policy 
My interactions with respondents showed how a government policy can cause skirt and 
blouse voting. The central government had withdrawn allowances from teacher training and 
nursing training colleges9. This and other government policies placed financial burden on all 
citizens. However, some smart MPs in the president’s party clandestinely distanced themselves 
and rolled out some scholarship funds for their constituents. This reflected in the votes received 
by these MPs against those of the incumbent president. Thus, the pursuit of certain policies by a 
government can make its own supporters decide to vote against the party, but if an MP or 
prospective MP of that party strategically distances himself/herself from that policy, there will be 
likely ticket splitting. Conversely, skirt and blouse can also be used to reward the president for 
pursuing certain policies that the electorates approve. On the other hand, they punish the MP for 
not being responsive to the needs of the constituency. 
5.2.5 The Effects of Interparty Coordination on Smaller Parties’ Vote Share 
Analysis of fieldwork showed that though interparty alliance (coordination) between the 
smaller and the major parties had helped the former to have parliamentary representation between 
1992 and 2012, it has weakened the former and the effect is that they have ceded their strongholds 
to the latter through that coordination. For instance, in the 1992 presidential election, the People’s 
National Convention garnered (PNC) 6.70%, the National Independence Party (NIP) got 2.86% 
and the People’s Heritage Party received 1.76% of the total valid votes cast. However, now, all the 
smaller parties put together are not able to pull 2% of the votes because the bigger parties have 
taken over their support base. One of my respondents had this to say: 
“The bigger parties when entering alliance with smaller parties do not do favors to the 
smaller parties because they do not negotiate on areas they know they will win. Rather, they 
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negotiate on areas they will lose. For instance, a bigger party will expect you to concede your 
presidential slot in your stronghold so that it does not contest the parliamentary seat in that 
constituency. That aside, you both must endorse each other’s candidate and get your supporters to 
campaign and vote. With that, both of you will help each other to win the presidential seat for the 
bigger party and the parliamentary seat for the smaller party”10.  
Respondents 5 and 6 said that, the bigger parties often poach the most qualified candidates 
of the smaller parties they form alliance with by giving them ministerial appointments11. This, to 
them, has resulted in the abysmal performance of the smaller parties. It could be argued, however, 
that contrary to this, the adoption of a pure SMD system without a majority runoff rule coupled 
with elite coordination largely account for the displacement of the minor parties in Ghana (Cox 
1997; Duverger 1954). Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below show the vote share and seat share of contesting 
parties in the presidential and legislative elections between 1996 and 2016. A quick glance at them 
shows a trend of decline in the support for the smaller parties and sustained growth of the two main 
parties; the NPP and the NDC.    
5.1 Presidential Election Results 1996 – 2016  
Year Party Votes Percentage (%)  
1996 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 4,101,674 57.40 
 New Patriotic Party (NPP) 2,829,726 39.60 
 People’s National Convention (PNC)    214,373   3.00 
    
2000 (1st Round) New Patriotic Party (NPP) 3,131,739       48.17  
 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 2,895,575       44.54  
 People’s National Convention (PNC) 189,659         2.92  
 Convention People’s Party (CPP) 115,641         1.78  
 National Reform Party (NRP) 78,629         1.21  
 Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP) 67,504         1.04  
 United Ghana Movement (UGM) 22,123         0.34  
    
2000 (2nd Round) New Patriotic Party (NPP) 3,631,263 56.90 
 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 2,750,124 43.10 
    
2004 New Patriotic Party (NPP) 4,524,074 52.45 
 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 3,850,368 44.64 
 People’s National Convention (PNC) 165,375 1.92 
 Convention People’s Party (CPP) 85,968 1.00 
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2008 (1st Round) New Patriotic Party (NPP) 4,204,073 49.32 
 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 4,070,889 47.76 
 Convention People’s Party (CPP) 112,673 1.32 
 People’s National Convention (PNC) 73,618 0.86 
 Democratic Freedom Party (DFP) 28,471 0.33 
 Independent Candidate 19,178 0.22 
 Democratic People's Party (DPP) 8,367 0.10 
 Reformed Patriotic Democrats (RPD) 6,443 0.08 
    
2008 (2nd Round)  National Democratic Congress (NDC) 4,527,909 50.47 
 New Patriotic Party (NPP) 4,443,654 49.53 
    
2012 New Patriotic Party (NPP) 5,573,572 50.63 
 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 5,263,286 47.81 
 Progressive People's Party (PPP) 64,267 0.58 
 Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP) 38,250 0.35 
 People’s National Convention (PNC) 24,621 0.22 
 Convention People’s Party (CPP) 20,109 0.18 
 Independent Candidate  15,156 0.14 
 United Front Party (UFP) 8,909 0.08 
    
2016 New Patriotic Party (NPP) 5,755,758 53.72 
 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 4,771,188 44.53 
 Progressive People's Party (PPP) 106,092 0.99 
 Convention People’s Party (CPP) 25,552 0.24 
 People’s National Convention (PNC) 22,298 0.21 
 National Democratic Party (NDP) 16,935 0.16 
 Independent Candidate  15,911 0.15 
 
5.2 Parliamentary Election Results 1996 – 2016  
Year Party Seats Won Percentage (%)  
1996 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 133 66.5 
 New Patriotic Party (NPP)   61 30.5 
 People’s Convention Party (PCP)    5 2.5 
 People’s National Convention (PNC)    1 0.5 
    
2000 New Patriotic Party (NPP) 100 50.00 
 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 92 46.00 
 Independent Candidates 4 2.00 
 People’s National Convention (PNC) 3 1.50 
 Convention People’s Party (CPP) 1 0.50 
    
2004 New Patriotic Party (NPP) 128 55.65 
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 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 94 40.87 
 People’s National Convention (PNC) 4 1.74 
 Convention People’s Party (CPP) 3 1.30 
 Independent Candidates 1 0.43 
    
2008 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 116 50.43 
 New Patriotic Party (NPP) 107 46.52 
 Independent Candidates 4 1.74 
 People’s National Convention (PNC) 2 0.87 
 People’s Convention Party (PCP) 1 0.43 
    
2012 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 148 53.82 
 New Patriotic Party (NPP) 123 44.73 
 Independent Candidates 3 1.09 
 People’s National Convention (PNC) 1 0.36 
    
2016 New Patriotic Party (NPP) 169 61.45 
 National Democratic Congress (NDC) 106 38.55 
 
5.3 STRATEGIC COORDINATION THEORY  
To address the questions raised above, I explore Cox’s (1997, 1999) coordination theory 
to analyze splitting in the Ghanaian general elections between 1996 and 2016. Cox (1997, 1999) 
developed a general theory of electoral coordination (especially elite-level coordination) which 
aimed at ensuring coordination within a single party (intraparty coordination) and coordination 
between and among parties (interparty coordination). Cox observed that electoral systems of any 
kind determine how votes are translated into seats and are replete with coordination problems for 
electoral competitors. Such problems emerge because there are more potential competitors than 
the available seats. Thus, within a single political party, there may be several contestants and within 
an ideological bloc, such as social democratic parties, there could be several capable candidates 
prepared and determined to enter the election fray in pursuit of fewer seats. This situation poses a 
coordination problem especially to the political parties involved in the sense that they will need to 
limit the number of competitors. Cox contends that this could be done by “either limiting the 
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number of actual competitors (e.g. via joint lists or fusion candidacies), limiting the number of 
competitors for whom voters actually vote (strategic voting), or both. The process of limiting either 
entry or vote dispersion entails coordinating the actions of more than one person” (Cox 1999, 145-
146). The central thrust of Cox’s general theory of electoral coordination goes as: 
Electoral systems affect the coordination of political forces at two main levels: (a) within 
individual electoral districts when candidates and lists enter the electoral fray and voters 
distribute their votes among them; and (b) across these districts (within the nation as a 
whole) as potentially autonomous candidates and lists from different districts ally with one 
another to form regional or national parties. A third and final stage of coordination is less 
directly affected by electoral rules, namely the forming and sustaining of governments… 
district-level electoral coordination problems for the simplest electoral systems…two 
different M+1 rules apply. First, the number of candidates or lists entering a given race 
tends to be no more than M+1; second, when more than M+1 candidates or lists do enter a 
race, votes tend to concentrate on at most M +1 of them (Cox 1999, 160). 
 From the long quote above, Cox is making three important points. First, he meant that an 
electoral system puts a ceiling on the viable number of competitors in an electoral district given 
by the M+1 rule. The M denotes the district magnitude which tells us that if a constituency elects 
only one MP/candidate, then there is a tendency to have only two viable competitors in that 
constituency (M+1) especially when a plurality formula is used to determine the outcome. If more 
than two candidates are contesting in such a constituency, then voters who want their votes to 
count, will concentrate their votes on the two most viable ones (vote strategically). How strategic 
voting may translate into ticket splitting is where a voter’s choices in the different races are not for 
candidates from the same political party. Cox therefore, advices politicians to do their homework 
by way of coordinating on only M+1 candidates, so that voters will not have to vote strategically. 
The second form of elite coordination; political interaction across districts (constituencies), is what 
Cox refers to as linkage decisions among political actors (candidates and political parties 
contesting the election in different constituencies). It deals with the interaction between a 
presidential and a parliamentary candidates’ joint efforts in executing an electoral campaign with 
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the view that their supporters vote equally to both. The third phase of elite coordination has to do 
with political interaction for setting up and maintaining governments. Thus, it focuses on the 
distribution of offices (legislative and executive) to public officials. In sum, the first two phases 
are associated with elections and are directly affected by electoral rules whilst the third deals with 
formation and maintenance of governments.  
In applying how the coordination problems identified by Cox can explain split-ticket 
voting, I will restrict the theory to the first two levels of coordination (but especially to the second 
level which deals with elite interactions) and use the third as a bargaining chip that top political 
actors can use to facilitate how they overcome the coordination problems they face. As political 
actors are interested in votes, policy, and office (Golder 2006, Kadima and Uteem 2006) it is easier 
for them to employ Cox’s third-level of coordination (office and government formation) as a 
negotiation chip to address/overcome their coordination problems.  
It worth pointing out that coordination problems faced by party elites and candidates are at 
times problems they deliberately create as they interact with other players in the pursuit of their 
political agenda. These problems are associated with certain identifiable indicators which are 
observed by Cox (1999), Benoit (2001), and Golder (2006). For the sake of clarity, I classify them 
into intraparty and interparty coordination successes and failures as doing so will give a clear gauge 
to assess how party elites (candidates and parties) behave in respect to the coordination problem 
they face. Coordination is necessary for party elites who are goal oriented and working together as 
a team in meeting those goals. Since they depend on one another to pursue a common goal, they 
will need to do things in a way that a single person pursuing similar goals will not normally do. 
Malone aptly captured this when he defined coordination as, “the additional information 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
169 
 
processing performed when multiple, connected actors pursue goals that a single actor pursuing 
the same goals would not perform” (Malone 1988, 5). 
5.3.1 Intraparty Coordination 
Intraparty coordination deals with how party elites negotiate their interdependent relations 
within a given political party. According to scholars such as Cox (1999), Benoit (2001), and Golder 
(2006), intraparty coordination has its associated observable indicators as shown in Table 5.3 
below. When successful, the first observable indication is that political parties limit nomination or 
they coordinate on a single candidate (nominee). This is what Cox (1999) refers to as nomination 
control. He argues that nomination control could be done through primary elections or any internal 
party procedures that are transparent and democratic. Second, the consequence of nomination 
control is that the party runs fewer candidates. Where there is nomination control or fewer 
candidates are presented on a party’s ticket, it is highly probable that some aspirants might 
withdraw their decision to contest or might lose to an in-party competitor.  
Therefore, the third observable indication of a successful intraparty coordination is the 
ability of party elites to prevent losing or disappointed nomination seekers from entering the 
general election as independent candidates. This could be done by negotiating policy concessions 
and/or office positions with disappointed nomination seekers in exchange for their support prior 
to the elections. The promise of government position to losing in-party contestants may be enough 
to secure their support for the election. This is where Cox’s third-level of coordination 
(government formation) becomes relevant in this chapter. The view is that government formation 
predates electoral victory and that it acts as a catalyst for inducing internal party cohesion for 
electoral success. The fourth observable indication of a successful intraparty coordination deals 
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with linkage decisions among political actors from different districts within the same political 
party. This involves the creation of common or joint electoral platform between the presidential 
and legislative candidates of a given party. This may include the use of marketing strategies such 
as billboards and sponsoring joint adverts meant to make electoral impact. The presence of these 
in a party points to intraparty coordination success. Where there are intraparty coordination 
successes all things being equal, there will be straight-ticket voting, so we do not expect splitting.  
Table 5.3: Observable Indicators of Intraparty Coordination Success and Failure 
Intraparty Coordination Success Intraparty Coordination Failure 
Limiting nomination Over nomination  
Running fewer candidates Contentious primaries (independent contestants)  
Ability to prevent independents Existence of splinter groups 
Creation of a joint platform No policy linkage between candidates 
Sources: Authors’ own compilation from Benoit (2001), Cox (1999), and Golder (2006)  
Contrary to the above are the indications of intraparty coordination failures as shown at the 
right quadrant of Table 5.3 above. The first signal of intraparty coordination failure is over 
nomination which happens where there exist factions, especially competitive and degenerative 
types (Boucek 2009, 479). Cox (1999) observed that Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) often 
had over nomination due to the existence of factions. In Ghana, the tendency of having about five 
independent parties from the Nkrumahist tradition contesting the election is a perfect example of 
intraparty coordination failure since their main ideological difference is a show of who is a true 
Nkrumahist (Jonah 1998, Osei 2012).  
The second sign of unsuccessful intraparty coordination is undemocratic ways of 
conducting party’s nomination process. Third, emanating from this is the inability of party elites 
to persuade disappointed nomination seekers from contesting the election as independent 
candidates. Normally, internal party competition is required for the bigger contest – the national 
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or constituency contests (Crutzen et al.2009; Cox 1999) but when it leads to degenerative type 
referred to as race to the bottom (Boucek 2009; Crutzen et al.2009; Volden 2002), then mobilizing 
support for the bigger elections is bound to suffer. The fourth sign of intraparty coordination failure 
flows directly from the third, and it is the existence of splinter groups and defections from the party 
either to join another party or to create a new one. Analogous to this is fighting for supremacy 
among leading members of the party. The fifth failure is where there is a disconnect between the 
presidential and legislative candidates of a given party. Thus, the existence of parallel structures 
within a political party that produce duplication of campaigning of candidates, or the existence of 
animosity between the presidential and legislative candidates, are indications of intraparty 
coordination failures. Intraparty coordination failures are likely to produce ticket splitting, all 
things being equal. Based on these observations, I expect the following hypotheses as markers of 
intraparty coordination failures. 
Where a party’s nomination process is democratic, all things being equal, I expect both 
losers and winners to be gracious to each other and see the result as a victory to democracy and to 
the party. This is expected to unite the party towards the general elections and therefore, likely to 
reduce splitting. However, where a party’s nomination process is tinted with accusations and 
counter accusations because the process is undemocratic, or someone chose to make it so, then I 
expect the aggrieved contestants to express their displeasure. If their concerns are not satisfactorily 
resolved, then ticket splitting is highly probable. These observations lead to the first hypothesis:  
H1A: the more successful a party’s nomination process is, the lower the likelihood of ticket 
splitting especially from party supporters. 
Thus, higher incidence of successful party primaries is likely to be associated with lower levels of 
ticket splitting and vice versa. Consequently, all things being equal, I expect successful primaries 
and ticket splitting to be negatively related. When the party primaries become contentious, but 
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party elites are able to resolve the issues, all things being equal, I expect the aggrieved nomination 
seekers to remain in the party and at best offer their support to the success of the party. However, 
where party elites are not able to resolve the concerns of aggrieved persons, such persons are more 
likely to threaten to leave the party or actually leave the party. Where aggrieved persons threaten 
to leave the party, all things being equal, it will affect party cohesion and if not properly handled, 
it is likely to produce ticket splitting. Thus,  
H1B: the more unsuccessful party nomination seekers threaten to leave the party, the higher the 
chances of split-ticket voting.  
Where aggrieved primary candidates’ threats to leave the party are likely to induce ticket splitting 
if not handled well. The outcome may also depend on whether the threat to leave the party is 
credible or not. The status of such persons in the party will also affect how party elites respond to 
such threats. Hence, unresolved credible threats to leave the party which are not handled well are 
likely to produce splitting with the direction being positive while those that are handled well are 
expected to be negative all things being equal. Suffice it to say here that a threat to leave the party 
could be considered credible, if the person has the capacity to leave and draw others along or where 
the person actually leaves to contest as independent.  
In fact, unresolved in-party conflicts from acrimonious parliamentary primaries are likely 
to produce skirt and blouse voting, especially where the aggrieved person(s) leave to contest as 
independent. Thus, where the party becomes fragmented because some aggrieved members are 
defecting to contest the elections as independent candidates, all things being equal, there will be 
high likelihood of ticket splitting. This leads to:  
H1C: ticket splitting is likely to increase where unsuccessful nomination seekers in a party contest 
the elections as independent candidates.  
Samuel K. Darkwa   
173 
 
This often happens where in a particular constituency the aggrieved unsuccessful primary 
seekers decide to contest the parliamentary race as independent candidates. In such instances, 
persons who defect or contest the election as independents will advocate for ticket splitting and 
will like the party’s candidate to lose even if that will mean another party’s candidate winning the 
elections. Thus, the direction and the magnitude of a party member contesting the parliamentary 
election as independent candidate will be positively related to ticket splitting.   
Finally, where there exist proper party linkages such that there is cordial rapport between 
the presidential and parliamentary candidates’ campaign at the constituency level, especially 
where they rely on the party structures, ticket splitting is likely to be low. However, in instances 
where the presidential and parliamentary candidates’ campaigns are disconnected, or they abandon 
the party structures in their campaigns, I expect to see more split-ticket voting. Hence,  
H1D: the more harmonious the interaction between a presidential and legislative candidate of a 
party is, the lower the likelihood of ticket splitting.  
Thus, where the candidates adopt common pool and conduct their campaigns in a harmonious 
manner, split-ticket voting is likely to reduce. I expect negative relationship between split-ticket 
voting and harmonious party relations such as the adoption of a joint platform between candidates.  
 5.3.2 Interparty Coordination  
Interparty coordination (pre-electoral coalitions or electoral alliances) is any attempt by 
two or more political parties to harmonize their efforts jointly at the polls to maximize their mutual 
electoral benefits (Golder 2006). Interparty coordination is easier where two different parties with 
similar political ideologies forge electoral alliance (Golder 2006). However, unlike intraparty 
coordination that must be forged by political parties with same/similar ideology, interparty 
coordination could be forged by parties with different ideologies with the view of eliminating or 
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defeating an “undesirable” party. Just like intraparty coordination success, interparty coordination 
success is marked by observable signals. Benoit (2001) observed that party elites through their 
coordination sent cues to voters who rightly responded to such signals. The first observable signal 
of a successful interparty coordination is that the parties involved do not contest the elections 
independently. This is done using joint nomination, running of joint lists, or fusing of candidates. 
The goal is to present fewer candidates and they do this by way of coordination. Second, related 
to the above, is strategic withdrawal of candidates. In some instances, parties that enter alliance 
negotiate on which candidates should step back. Benoit (20001) saw this as the strength of the 
Hungarian politicians in electoral coalition. Thus, the ability of parties to negotiate on step back 
arrangements points to signals of successful interparty coordination.  
Third, parties in interparty alliances can negotiate and overcome the commitment problems 
faced by coalitions. Golder (2006) observed that due to the repeated interactions among pre-
electoral partners, the commitment problem in practice is very easy to resolve. In South Korea for 
instance, due to term limits, presidential pre-electoral alliances are easy to form. Fourth, partners 
in interparty alliances coordinate on their campaigns and ensure that they do run joint campaigns 
and coordinate all their marketing strategies. Fifth, the ability of coalition partners to secure the 
support of their members is key to successful interparty coordination (Benoit 2001; Cox 1999).  
Interparty coordination failures are first characterized by over nomination. Cox (1999) 
argues that there will be coordination failure if an ideological bloc enters the electoral fray with all 
possible competent candidates contesting. Second, related to the preceding point is what Golder 
(2006) refers to as fight for supremacy. She observed that in France, members of the leadership 
group in the rightist party were fighting for leadership supremacy instead of fighting to defeat the 
leftist party. Third, conflict over policy, ideological differences and distributional problems are 
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clear signs of interparty coordination failure. Golder (2006) found that distributional problems 
such as indivisibility of office impede pre-electoral coalitions in presidential systems especially in 
France. Although parties fail to form alliances due to policy and ideological divergence, Golder 
(2006) found that in France following the end of the Cold War, the center-left and center right 
parties do no longer have radical ideological differences as such they do not care much who wins. 
Thus, center-left parties for instance, run many candidates and do not make compromises such that 
in the 2002 presidential elections there were nine candidates representing the Left. The fourth sign 
of interparty coordination failure is the inability of coalition parties to secure the support of their 
members or support base (Benoit 20001; Golder 2006). Securing the support of coalition partners 
is crucial to the success of the coalition and this requires efficient and effective coordination. In 
fact, it is not enough to sign documents to enter electoral agreement to ensure the success of 
coalitions but rather the support of those whose votes are needed. 
Table 5.4: Observable Indicators of Interparty Coordination Success and Failure 
Interparty Coordination Success Interparty Coordination Failure 
Joint nomination/campaigns Fight for supremacy 
Strategic withdrawal Over nomination 
Effective negotiations Conflict over policy/ideology 
Ability to secure members’ support Inability to secure members’ support 
Sources: Authors’ own compilation from Benoit (2001), Cox (1997, 1999), and Golder (2006)  
Flowing from the above discussions on interparty coordination, the chapter tests two 
hypotheses to falsify the credibility and reliability of the interparty coordination among coalition 
partners as far as Ghana is concerned. First, I expect that coalition partners will do their best to 
limit nomination by whatever best means they can which are anchored on transparent and 
democratic principles to ensure they put their best foot forward. That is, they coordinate on the 
most viable candidate(s) that can secure them the needed electoral victory or lead them in making 
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electoral impact for future victory. Where the parties are able to coordinate on a single or required 
number of candidates, they need to endorse the coalition candidates and secure the support of their 
members. Thus, for a successful interparty coordination, party elites in alliance are expected to 
endorse coalition partners even those from another party who have been accepted as coalition 
candidates. Hence  
H2A: the more party elites endorse candidates of other parties, the higher the likelihood of ticket 
splitting.  
Thus, ticket splitting is expected to increase in such circumstances where parties do not necessarily 
contest the election as a coalition but agree to support other parties in areas and in races they do 
not contest. The direction of endorsement splitting is expected to be positive all things being equal. 
That is, the more party elites endorse other party’s candidates, the higher the likelihood of splitting.  
Emanating from the preceding paragraph is the issue of strategic withdrawal of candidates 
to facilitate the performance of another candidate or party’s performance. As stated earlier, Cox 
(1999) argues that electoral coordination is necessary because there are more potential contestants 
than the available number of seats. Parties that do well are those that are able to coordinate on the 
most viable candidates. To be efficient in that requires some form of modality of agreeing on a 
viable or suitable candidate as discussed above. However, in the event that parties had already 
agreed on their candidates before the coalition or electoral arrangement, there will be the need for 
some parties to withdraw their candidates in certain constituencies or voting districts where their 
chances of winning are comparatively weak for those with better chances of winning to have even 
more promising chances. In fact, Benoit (2001) observed that in Hungary coordination also took 
the form of strategic withdrawal of candidates known as “stepping back” ostensibly to facilitate 
the chances of the contesting candidate. Consequently, the more such arrangements are done, the 
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higher the likelihood of split-ticket voting given that party elites are able to secure the backing of 
their supporters. Therefore,  
H2B: the more the widespread of strategic withdrawal of candidates, the higher the likelihood of 
ticket splitting.  
Thus, I expect strategic withdrawal and ticket splitting to be positively related; that is the higher 
the instances of strategic withdrawal, the higher the likelihood of split-ticket voting and vice versa. 
5.4 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS   
Aside from the theory of strategic coordination and the accompanying hypotheses 
introduced above that evaluate my main argument about coordination induced ticket splitting, the 
chapter considers several alternate explanations used in the literature as they pertain to split-ticket 
voting. These include candidate quality, partisanship, restricted menu of choice, and education to 
ensure that alternative explanation to ticket splitting is not overlooked. Among these alternative 
explanatory variables, I expect candidate quality to be more connected to coordination because the 
essence of coordination is to settle on the most viable candidate or harmonizing a party’s material 
and human resources to make the most of the current or future election.    
5.4.1 Candidate Quality 
The literature on candidate-level factors of ticket splitting has identified variables such as 
incumbency, campaign spending, and issue positioning as responsible for the phenomenon. In the 
United States, incumbents are said to often face unmatched contestants (Box-Steffensmeier 1996). 
As a result, party supporters whose preferred Congressional candidate is weak will vote for their 
presidential candidate and either roll-off or vote for a more experienced candidate who is often the 
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incumbent (Born 1994; Burden and Kimball 2009). This is the case because incumbency is 
frequently associated with candidate quality (Benoit et al. 2006; Burden 2009; Scheiner, 2005).  
Conversely, it has also been found that incumbency can also be a liability instead of being 
an asset (Burden 2009; Roscoe 2003; Scheiner 2005). Incumbents at times lose their party’s 
primaries to in-party challengers and others lose the main contest to “unpopular” competitors. It 
has also been argued that the main cause of ticket splitting is campaign spending (Burden and 
Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003). Thus, in the U.S. for instance, a candidate who is able to spend 
beyond $200,000 has a greater chance of getting the attention of the electorate and therefore can 
cause ticket splitting (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003). It is also a common 
knowledge that some candidates often spend less than some incumbents and yet they win 
(Frempong 2017; Roscoe 2003). Given that incumbents do not always win, and high spending 
candidates lose to less spending competitors suggests that candidate quality works best with 
coordination.   
The final candidate-level variable identified to be responsible for ticket splitting is issue 
positions. Proponents of issue positions argue that candidates can create ticket splitting by moving 
closer to their opponent’s issue position or moving away from their party’s position (Frymer 1994; 
Petrocik 1991; Petrocik and Doherty 1996). The line of this argument is elucidated by Key (1966) 
who argues that when there is a clear difference between the parties or candidates contesting the 
elections, voters can make distinct choices but where the contestants look alike on ideological 
grounds and issue positions, voters do not have unique choice, therefore, they will split their votes. 
Burden and Kimball (2009) found strong statistical association between candidate’s issue position 
and ticket splitting. In a nutshell, the fundamental argument of proponents of candidate quality to 
ticket splitting is that, variations of candidate quality among contesting parties and or candidates 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
179 
 
can cause ticket splitting. This is where high-quality candidates in the different races are not from 
the same political party. Therefore, I expect higher variations in candidate quality among 
contesting parties to be associated with ticket splitting, all things being equal. Consequently,  
H3: where the most qualified (visible) candidates in the different races belong to different parties, 
the greater the likelihood of ticket-splitting  
It worth pointing out however that, a party’s ability to attract and field the most viable 
candidate boils down to the issue of coordination because where coordination fails, a party may 
fail to nominate the most qualified candidate or can have the most qualified candidate, but most 
splitters will likely split away from that candidate. However, with effective coordination, candidate 
quality is expected to be associated with positive splitting towards the most qualified candidate.  
5.4.2 Partisanship 
It has been found that, partisanship intensity is inversely related to split-ticket voting (Beck 
et al. 1992; Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell and Miller 1957). The argument made in support of 
partisanship and splitting is that persons who identify with parties will vote for their political 
parties irrespective of the candidate quality of their parties. These are often the core support base 
of a party. In contrast, Maddox and Nimmo (1981) found that all partisans split their ballots 
however, weak partisan do split more than other partisans. Thus, the position of Maddox and 
Nimmo (1981) gives clues that there are certain instances that even strong partisans may split their 
ticket. This chapter believes that one such context is where coordination problems faced by 
candidates and parties are not well handled. However, the conventional wisdom is that, weaker 
partisans are more likely to split their tickets. Consequently, I expect weak partisanship to be 
positively correlated with ticket splitting, all things being equal. Thus,  
H4: the weaker the partisan leaning of the electorates (in this case, party elites/card bearing 
members), the higher the chances of ticket splitting.  
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It must be stressed however, that voter level factors for ticket splitting are different from 
elite level factors since normally elites will support and vote for all their candidates but will split 
their tickets when coordination breaks down.  
5.4.3 Restricted Choice 
Candidate availability has been identified as one of the candidate level factors of ticket 
splitting. It has been argued that two voters with diametrically opposing characteristics may have 
different choices. However, if for instance, no Republican (NPP or NDC in the case of Ghana) is 
running they cannot be able to vote for or against a Republican (NPP or NDC) candidate (Roscoe 
2002). Benoit, Giannetti, and Laver (2006) refer to this situation as restricted choice menu. In their 
study of ticket-splitting in the Italian mixed member system, Benoit, Giannetti and Laver (2006) 
observed that though in mixed-member electoral systems voters are required to cast ballots 
simultaneously in single-member districts and multimember PR districts, yet because some parties 
do not have candidates in both constituencies, their supporters have to vote for different parties. 
They describe these voters as frustrated because they are forced to split their votes between their 
most preferred parties and others. This similar situation confronts the members and supporters of 
the smaller parties in Ghana who do not have candidates contesting all races in all constituencies. 
In my field work in Ghana where I surveyed party officials and members, about 26% out of 303 
respondents cited the inability of their parties to have candidates in all constituencies as the 
motivation for voting skirt and blouse. If party officials who are supposed to think and act in party 
terms give such reasons as their motivation for voting skirt and blouse, then the electorates would 
not act differently when it comes to the effect of restricted choice menu on split ticket voting. Thus,  
H5: as the proportion of constituency nominations covered by political parties decreases, the 
higher the likelihood of ticket-splitting.  
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I expect a positive relationship between restricted choice and split-ticket voting, especially 
from the core supporters of smaller parties in instances where their parties contest in just one race 
in a concurrent presidential-legislative race. 
5.4.4 Education  
As discussed above, research has found correlation between education and ticket splitting 
(Beck et al., 1992; Dalton 2013; DeVries and Tarrance 1972). Some scholars have found positive 
association between education and ticket splitting; meaning higher educated voters are more likely 
to split their ticket than their lesser educated counterparts (De Vries & Tarrance 1972). On the 
contrary, Campbell and Miller (1957) assert that lower level of education is associated with ticket 
splitting. As latter scholars have confirmed the positive relationship between higher levels of 
education and ticket splitting (Beck 1997; Beck et al., 1992; Dalton 2013), the chapter will expect 
positive correlation between education and ticket splitting. Therefore,  
H6: the higher the level of education of the electorate, the higher the likelihood of ticket splitting. 
 Thus, the higher educated the respondent/voter is, the higher the likelihood of ticket 
splitting and vice versa. It worth stressing that often, where individual level factors are inferred 
from aggregate data it has a potential for ecological inference problems (Burden 2009; Burden and 
Kimball 2009; King 2013; King et al 2004; Roscoe 2003). However, such problems are not 
expected here because the data employed here is elite-level data used for elite-level analysis, thus, 
the chapter is not disaggregating elite voter behavior into individual voter behavior.  
To sum up, based on the strategic coordination theory and the literature related to split-
ticket voting reviewed above, I expect the following: contentious primaries are most likely to be 
positively related to ticket splitting while successful primaries will be negatively associated to 
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splitting. Instances where disappointed nomination seekers do threaten to leave the party or contest 
the election as independent candidates are likely to lead to ticket splitting. Therefore, situations 
where aggrieved members leave the party to contest as independents are likely to trigger ticket 
splitting. I also expect strategic withdrawals and endorsements to be positively related to splitting, 
especially in instances where parties and candidates who do the endorsement or the strategic 
withdrawal do not contest the election on the same party label/ticket but do so to facilitate the 
performance of one another. Additionally, weak partisanship and higher level of education are 
expected to be positively related to splitting. On the contrary, where there is harmony between the 
presidential and parliamentary candidates, I expect a negative relationship with ticket splitting.   
5.5 DATA AND MEASUREMENT  
The data for this chapter was based on fieldwork carried out in Ghana in 2017. The 
fieldwork sampled seven constituencies. In selecting the cases, the chapter considered how 
electoral scholars and analysts have divided the country based on the parties’ strengths and the 
volatility of voter behavior in Ghana. The Ghanaian political terrain is dominated by the NPP and 
the NDC whose electoral performance together account for over 90% of the votes since 1992 
(Agyeman-Duah 2005, Frempong 2012, 2017, Lindberg 2013 Osei 2012). In the 2016 elections, 
for instance, there were six political parties and one independent candidate contesting the 
presidential slot. The outcome indicated that the NPP and NDC polled 98.3% against 1.7% for the 
rest of the contestants. Also, the 275 parliamentary seats were all won by the two major political 
parties (EC Ghana 2016; Frempong 2017).  
Administratively, Ghana is divided into ten regions (six new regions were created in 2019 
bringing the total number regions in the country to sixteen). These regions are further classified 
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into Southern Ghana, Northern Ghana and the Middle Belt. Since the two major parties dominate 
the electoral landscape, electoral students and analysts have divided the ten administrative regions 
into how they relate to the two major parties. Four regions, Brong Ahafo, Central, Greater Accra, 
and the Western region are referred to as swing regions (Agyeman-Duah 2005; Frempong 2012, 
2017, Lindberg 2013). The Ashanti in the middle belt and Eastern Region are the stronghold of 
the NPP while the three Northern Regions (Northern, Upper East and Upper West) as well as Volta 
Region are the stronghold of the NDC (Agyeman-Duah 2005; Frempong 2012, 2017).  
With this background, to avoid the problem of selecting on the dependent variable, the 
selection of cases was based on the following criteria: 1) Constituencies that have and those that 
have not witnessed skirt and blouse outcomes; 2) Constituencies that experienced interparty 
electoral alliances; 3) Constituencies that are cosmopolitan; 4) Swing constituencies10; 5) Party 
strongholds; 6) Large population size (having more than 60,000 registered voters6); and 7) 
Constituencies won by a formerly party affiliated candidate who protested by going independent. 
These criteria were used to ensure that consideration is given to swing regions, party strongholds, 
north-south-middle belt concerns, as well as demographic and other peculiarities. Thus, the seven 
selected constituencies were identified based on how they fit into the criteria above. Listed in 
alphabetical order, they are Ablekuma South, Bantama, Ellembelle, Evalue Ajomoro Gwira, Ketu 
South, Klottey Korle7, and Wulensi. Out of the seven constituencies selected, four were from the 
Greater Accra and the Western Regions (that is two constituencies were selected from each of 
these two regions). In each case, the two constituencies selected from the Greater Accra and the 
Western Regions were contiguous. The selection was deliberately done to facilitate data collection 
and to save cost given that the selected constituencies satisfy all the criteria listed above.    
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Alphabetically, the first constituency, Ablekuma South is in the Greater Accra Region (one 
of the swing regions). This constituency fits the criteria in many ways: first, it is a swing 
constituency, urban and cosmopolitan, and has large population density as shown by Table 5.5 
below. Again, as shown by Table 5.6 below, in 1996 and 2008 the constituency witnessed skirt 
and blouse outcomes. In the 1996 general elections, the NDC won the presidential vote while the 
NPP won the parliamentary seat. Again, in 2008, the constituency witnessed skirt and blouse 
outcomes, but the two parties switched places in the sense that the NPP won the presidential race 
while the NDC took the parliamentary seat. The second constituency is Bantama in the Ashanti 
Region which is the stronghold of the NPP. Bantama is significant for its population density, 
unique voting pattern (voting about 80% straight-ticket), and ethnic dominance. It has never 
experienced a skirt and blouse outcome. Also, in the 2016 general elections, the incumbent 
parliamentary candidate of the NPP who had lost the party’s primary filed to contest as 
independent candidate, but the party was able to dissuade him, and he withdrew from contesting 
as independent candidate. The third constituency is Ellembelle in the Western Region which has 
experienced three skirt and blouse outcomes (1996, 2000, and 2004). It is a constituency where 
the NPP never contested the parliamentary elections between 1996 and 2008 but supported the  
Table 5.5: Cases (constituencies) and their Fitness to the Selection Criteria  
Constituency 
Skirt & 
blouse 
outcome 
Experienced 
Interparty 
alliance 
Cosmopolitan  Swing 
constituency 
Party 
stronghold 
Huge 
population 
size 
+60,000 
votes 
Won by 
Independent 
Protester 
Sample 
size 
Ablekuma 
South  
Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 37 
Bantama  No No Yes No Yes Yes No 51 
Ellembelle Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 39 
Evalue A. 
Gwira 
Yes Yes No Yes No No No 39 
Ketu South No No No No Yes Yes No 46 
Klottey Korle  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 38 
Wulensi Yes No No Yes No No  Yes  46 
Others         7 
        303 
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CPP candidate to win the election for the three consecutive times. Interestingly, the CPP member 
for Ellembelle, Mr. Freddie Blay has left his party to join the NPP and is now the National 
Chairman of the NPP. Thus, Ellembelle constituency satisfies four out of the seven criteria as 
illustrated by Table 5.5 above. 
The fourth constituency is Evalue Ajomoro Gwira also from the Western Region that 
adjoins the Ellembelle constituency. This constituency has witnessed a total of four skirt and 
blouse outcomes out of the six elections considered under this project. In general, Evalue Ajomoro 
Gwira has witnessed the highest number of skirt and blouse outcomes between 1996 and 2016. It 
fits the selection criteria in many ways. Though, with a smaller population size, the constituency 
has produced skirt and blouse outcomes between the two major parties (NPP-NDC) and has also 
produced a CPP/PCP (a smaller party) member of parliament through alliance with the NPP. The 
fifth constituency, Ketu South in the Volta Region, is a stronghold of the NDC often referred to as 
the NDC “world bank” (Agyeman-Duah 2005; Ayee 2014; Frempong 2012, 2017). Like Bantama, 
Ketu South is significant for its huge population density, unique voting pattern (voting about 90% 
for the NDC) and ethnic dominance. It has also never observed a skirt and blouse outcome. Albert 
Kwasi Zigah who was the NDC legislator for two terms between 2005 and 2012 lost his third term 
bid and contested the 2012 and 2016 elections as independent but lost in both attempts. Aside from 
Albert Kwasi Zigah, another NDC member and parliamentary aspirant, Mr. Jim Yao Morti, who 
was disqualified in the party’s legislative primary in the constituency contested the election as 
independent in the 2016 election. Thus, two members of the NDC who were not nominated by the 
party ran as independents against NDC nominee in the 2016 election, but they both lost to the 
party’s nominee. This shows how strong the party is at the constituency. The sixth constituency is 
Klottey Korle Constituency in the Greater Accra Region. This constituency has witnessed only 
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one skirt and blouse outcome which occurred in the 2016 elections due to a protest from an NPP 
candidate who lost the party’s primaries and decided to go independent. Per Table 5.5 above, the 
Klottey Korle Constituency satisfies four out of the seven criteria; it is a swing constituency 
(alternating between NPP and NDC. Also, the winner of this constituency wins the presidential 
slot), and a cosmopolitan with large population density. 
Finally, Wulensi, the seventh constituency in the Northern Region is a swing constituency 
that has also witnessed three split outcomes (1996, 2004, and 2008). This constituency has voted 
for the ruling government, the opposition and independent candidates to get to parliament. It has 
also produced outcomes where the winning presidential candidates were from different parties at 
different times. Finally, it also marked an instance where a candidate who could not get the party’s 
nomination in 2008 went independent and won the parliamentary seat. 
Table 5.6: Selected Constituencies: Winning Candidates and Parties between 1996 and 2016  
Constituencies Region 
2016 2012 2008 2004 2000 1996 
Freq 
Pres Parl Pres Parl Pres Parl Pres Parl Pres Parl Pres Parl 
Ablekuma 
South  
Greater 
Accra 
 
NDC 
 
NDC NDC  NDC NPP NDC  NPP NPP  NPP NPP NDC NPP 2 
Bantama  Ashanti NPP NPP NPP NPP NPP NPP NPP NPP NPP NPP NPP NPP 0 
Ellembelle Western NDC NDC NDC NDC NDC NDC NPP CPP NPP CPP NDC CPP 3 
Evalue A. 
Gwira Western NDC NPP NDC NDC NPP NPP NPP CPP NPP NDC NPP CPP 4 
Ketu South Volta NDC NDC NDC NDC NDC NDC NDC NDC NDC NDC NDC NDC 0 
Klottey Korle  Greater 
Accra NPP NDC NDC NDC NDC NDC NPP NPP NPP NPP NDC NDC 1 
Wulensi Northern NPP NPP NDC NDC NPP IND NDC NPP NDC NDC NDC NPP 3 
Source: Author’s compilation from Electoral Commission 1996-2016 (Skirt & blouse outcomes 
colored; green represents two different parties while yellow represents a party and independent) 
In respect of administering the surveys, I did part of the field work by myself and others 
were done by trained persons (professionals) whom I briefed on the goals of the research as well 
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as the sampling frame. The research targeted the following: party chairs (either national, regional, 
district, or zonal), secretaries, women’s organizers, youth leadership, campaign coordinators, 
treasurers, directors of elections, grassroots/cadres, research team members, results analysts, 
polling agents, and communication team members. Also sampled were eight MPs whose 
constituencies experienced split outcomes or were threatened with skirt and blouse voting. Further, 
15 candidates defeated in their parties’ primaries (of whom eight did not defect, one defector who 
was later dissuaded by his party to come back and six who contested the election as independent 
candidates) were interviewed. Also interviewed were five leaders of civil society organizations, 
one Deputy Chairman (Operations) of the National Commission for Civic Education, three faculty 
members at the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana8 and nine media 
practitioners. In all, 303 respondents were surveyed through administered questionnaires (230 
participants) and face-to-face interviews (73 participants) in March 2017. This was done to ensure 
that respondents fit the research questions. Details of the survey respondents and all the survey 
questions are in Chapter 3 Appendix 3.1. The coding of the variables is in Appendix 5.1,  
5.5.1 Dependent variable 
 What this research sought to address is why a party elite or a card bearing member of a 
political party will vote skirt and blouse (split ticket). To establish this, respondents were asked in 
the survey question 26, “Have you ever voted skirt and blouse (that is to vote for presidential and 
parliamentary candidates in the same election from different political parties) before?” Thus, the 
dependent variable is skirt and blouse voting which is a dichotomous variable (a respondent voted 
skirt and blouse or not). I generated the dependent variable by coding respondents who answered 
“Yes” as “1” and “No” responses were coded as “0”. 
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5.5.2 Independent Variables 
 The focus of this chapter is to empirically ascertain why Ghanaian party elites and party 
card bearing members will vote skirt and blouse or advocate for skirt and blouse voting (split-
ticket voting) a phenomenon which is uncommon in political science discourse/literature. This 
seems to show that Ghanaian voters behave in a manner inconsistent with ticket splitters in other 
parts of the world. I estimated logit model and discuss my coding rules below with summary 
provided at Appendix 5.1 below. 
 Successful Primaries: I compute successful primaries using Q5, “Please select the 
statement that most closely matches your view. In general, the recent parliamentary primaries of 
your political party were successful. “Strongly agree” and “moderately agree” were coded as “1” 
“Strongly disagree” and “moderately disagree” coded as “0”. “Neutral/don’t know” responses 
were treated as missing. I expect successful primaries to be negatively related to splitting. 
 Threaten to Leave Party: I measured the variable “Threaten to Leave Party” using Q6, “Did 
any defeated candidate of your party threaten to leave the political party?” “Yes” were coded as 
“1”, “No” coded as “0” and “don’t know” treated as missing. There were no “neutral” responses.   
Go Independent: I generated the variable, “Go Independent” using Q9, “Did some losing 
parliamentary contestants go independent?” Respondents who answered “Yes” were coded as “1”, 
“No” coded as “0” and “Don't Know” treated as missing. There were no “neutral” responses.   
Common Pool: The variable “Common Pool” was measured using Q17, “Leading to the 
elections did your party maintain a common pool of resources for both presidential and 
parliamentary campaigns?” Those who selected “Yes” were coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0”. 
There were no “don’t know/neutral” responses.   
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Endorsement: The variable “Endorsement” was generated using Q21, “Did your party 
endorse another candidate for either the presidential or parliamentary slot?” Respondents who 
answered “Yes” were coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0” and “Don’t Know” treated as missing. 
There were no “neutral” responses. 
Candidate Quality: The variable “Candidate Quality” was generated using Q27 in respect 
of reasons given by respondents’ decision for voting skirt and blouse. Respondents who chose 
candidate quality (which was the most popular response) were coded as “1” otherwise, coded as 
“0”. There were no “don’t know/neutral” responses. 
5.5.3 Control Variables 
Restricted Choice: I control for “Restricted Choice” using Q24 “Did your party contest in 
both presidential and parliamentary seats in all constituencies?” Respondents who selected “Yes” 
were coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0” and “Don't Know” treated as missing. There were no 
“neutral” responses. 
Party ID: The control variable, “Party Identification” variable (Party ID) was generated 
using Q3 “If you answered Yes, on Question 2, which political party is that?” Respondent’s party 
affiliation was coded as per their responses; CPP 41, NDC 87, NPP 86, PNC 38, and PPP 44. 
 Education: I generated the education variable using the educational qualifications of 
respondents. In both models, education is on a seven rater-scale from “0” to “6” ranging from 
“Some Primary Schooling” to “University completed and beyond”. Respondents who selected “I 
don’t know” were treated as missing.  
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5.6 MODELING INTRAPARTY/INTERPARTY COORDINATION THEORY 
 To understand the behavior of Ghanaian politicians and party elites in respect of their role 
in the facilitation of skirt and blouse voting, two factors need to be taken in to account. The first is 
the instances where the parties’ nomination process is characterized by irregularities, especially, 
within the two dominant ones, NDC and NPP. The political parties in Ghana have ensured that as 
much as possible, they promote free, fair, and transparent internal competition. Against this 
backdrop, the NDC and the NPP have allowed the nations’ Electoral Commission (EC) to 
supervise the elections of officials and candidates of their parties at all levels (Daddieh and Bob-
Milliar 2012; Debrah 2014). Additionally, the parties have done their best to come out with single 
winners to contest the election on their respective party’s ticket. They have also ensured that there 
is proper linkage between the presidential and the parliamentary candidates by resorting to the use 
of the party structures to conduct their campaigns (Debrah 2014; Osei 2012). The NDC and the 
NPP have always ensured that as much as possible, they prevent disappointed nomination seekers 
from contesting the elections as independent candidates even after acrimonious party primaries 
(Daddieh and Bob-Milliar 2012; Osei 2012). In most cases, these acts of intraparty coordination 
successes often ensure that the party wins both seats in a constituency. This notwithstanding, the 
parties have experienced serious setbacks in their intraparty coordination which is characterized 
by defections and inability of party elites to persuade some disappointed nomination seekers from 
entering the elections as independent candidates (Boafo-Arthur 2006, 2008; Daddieh and Bob-
Milliar 2012; Debrah 2014; Frempong 2017; Osei 2012). Good examples of how disappointed 
nomination seekers going independent can cause split-ticket voting and consequently split 
outcome is the 2000 elections. In the 2000 general elections, there were four independent winners 
all of which unseated incumbent MPs who were seeking third term in the NDC. Each of the 
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independent winners (Boniface Abubakar Saddique of Salaga constituency, Joseph Akudibillah of 
Garu -Tempane constituency, Rashid Bawa of Akan constituency, and James Victor Gbeho of 
Anlo, constituency) contested the election as independent candidates after unsuccessful primaries 
(Ayee 2002; Frempong 2017). Aside from the four independent winners, other candidates who 
went independent indeed caused the defeat of the NDC in six constituencies (Abetifi, Akropong, 
Akwatia, Ashaiman, Asutifi North, and Techiman South) (Ayee 2002; Frempong 2017). 
 The second factor is what I will refer to as the acts of “revisionist politicians” who will like 
to alter the political status quo in their parties by rocking the political boat or stirring controversy 
within the party or take advantage of a controversy and amidst the controversy leave the party to 
contest as independents (Ichino and Nathan 2013, 2017). The revisionist politicians are those who 
harbor presidential and parliamentary ambitions but know that if they were to play by the rules as 
prescribed by the status quo, they may not achieve their goals and therefore, must adopt 
unconventional strategies. Unlike a president who has a two-term limit, there is no term limit for 
a parliamentary candidate. So, an in-party competitor who wants to get to parliament but has a 
senior colleague in the same constituency who has been in parliament for more than two terms will 
begin to work against that member of parliament by either disputing the parliamentary primaries 
(Ichino and Nathan 2013, 2017) as undemocratic or advocate for skirt and blouse voting. The 
reason is that if the MP from his party loses, it will create an opportunity for him to achieve his 
goal (field interview March 2017)9. Again, those who harbor presidential ambitions also often use 
the party’s structures to sabotage their presidential candidate (field interview March 2017). Though 
the president has a two-term limit, apart from former Presidents Rawlings and Mahama, all the 
other Presidents in Ghana’s Fourth Republic made three attempts before winning. When they win 
they can seek reelection giving an individual about 20 years (three attempts at the presidency plus 
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two possible terms making five multiplied by four years), in such cases, in-party competitors who 
cannot wait will advocate skirt and blouse voting and at times openly campaign against their party 
members which their out-party opponents will use against them (their party). 
 Between 1992 and 2008, it was not very likely for Ghanaian political parties to win the 
elections by counting on their individual strengths. For instance, in the 1992 elections, the NDC 
and other two political parties formed an alliance and made Mr. Rawlings, the NDC candidate 
their presidential candidate. Mr. K.N. Arkaah of NCP, a junior partner, was made the running mate 
while the alliance supported the parliamentary candidates of the other parties. In 1996, again, the 
NDC and two other parties formed the Progressive Alliance and helped the parliamentary slots of 
its junior partners. The NPP and PCP also formed the Great Alliance and made the PCP candidate 
its running mate and deferred some of the parliamentary seats for its alliance partner. In all 
instances, the junior parties deferred their presidential race to their senior partners, got the running 
mate and had their senior partners defer some of the parliamentary contests to them. Thus, the 
relationship between and among Ghanaian parties in alliance is such that the junior parties defer 
the presidential race to their senior partners and endorse their senior partners’ presidential 
candidates and in return, their senior partners defer some of the parliamentary races, endorse and 
support their junior partners. Therefore, the interparty relations between and among Ghanaian 
parties in alliance is shaped to produce certain type of voting behavior among their supporters. It 
worth pointing out, however, that not all the party supporters were in favor of the kind of 
arrangements that their parties entered into with their alliance partners (Frempong 2017) because 
such arrangements required strategic withdrawals that denied their members the opportunity to 
contest in certain constituencies. Such persons in opposition to their party’s arrangement with 
another at times call on their supporters to boycott the elections or vote against their parties.  
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Therefore, understanding the nuances and intricacies of Ghanaian ticket splitting requires 
unraveling the contextual peculiarities and hurdles that the Ghanaian political elites and candidates 
faced within their parties and in negotiating with other parties for electoral purposes. Internally, 
the politician is faced with an in-party competitor whose presidential career requires a prospective 
presidential candidate a wait time of about twenty years while a parliamentary hopeful must wait 
in “perpetuity.” The best possible means to overcome such hurdles is for the prospective candidate 
to adopt a revisionist approach by disputing the nomination process or calling on his supporters to 
vote skirt and blouse. When it comes to relations between and among parties in alliance, some 
candidates will have to withdraw and endorse their candidature of their alliance partners. In such 
instances some people must abandon their political dreams of winning elections at least for a 
period. In all these instances, aggrieved members who are unable to control their emotions or do 
not receive an assurance as an appropriate payoff for what they will have to forgo, will trigger 
certain indications of intraparty and interparty coordination failures which are likely to facilitate 
ticket splitting and eventual defeat of their in-party competitors. The intuition behind voter choice 
of party elites and aggrieved members under the strategic coordination theory operates on the 
assumption that they (the aggrieved members) will themselves vote against their parties and 
persuade their supporters to vote against at least one office of their party in a given constituency if 
the party fails to negotiate acceptable payoff. This payoff is often a promise of position in the new 
government if the party wins power.  
5.6.1 Results  
The chapter used the fieldwork datasets to run logit regression to examine the relationship 
between skirt and blouse voting and elite coordination. To confirm that the results are not 
compromised by missing data, multiple imputation techniques were employed to deal with missing 
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data (StataCorp 2017). It appears most of the coefficients were not that significant as per Table 5.7 
below. The results however, provide some empirical evidence in support of the strategic 
coordination induced ticket splitting especially in respect to conducting a successful primaries and 
elite endorsement. For instance, interparty coordination variable endorsement, (H2A) was 
significant and in the expected direction. The other interparty coordination variable, strategic 
withdrawal (H2B), however, was not significant. Among the intraparty coordination variables, 
successful primaries (H1A) and candidate quality (H3) were significant with the signs in the 
expected direction. Interestingly, the other intraparty coordination variables; threaten to leave party 
(H1B) and common pool (H1D) were not significant. Interestingly, the control variables party ID, 
restricted, and education were not that significant as per Model 1 in Table 5.7 below.  
To ensure that missing data were not responsible for the results, multiple imputation 
techniques were employed to replace missing data, and the same binary logit regression used 
initially for Model 1 was used to run Model 2. The missing data per the coding above and in 
Appendix 5.1 below are made up of respondents who did not answer the questions used for the 
variables, as well as neutral, and “don’t know” responses. The regression results from multiple 
imputation techniques displayed in Model 2 are essentially not different from those from Model 1 
shown side by side in Table 5.7. In fact, endorsement (H2A) was equally significant as before and 
the sign in the expected direction. Successful primaries (H1A) too maintained its level of 
significance and in the expected direction. Candidate quality (H3) was also significant in both 
models. Interestingly party ID (H4) became the only significant control variable in the model after 
missing values were replaced through multiple imputation techniques. Finally, the McFadden’s R2 
of 0.608 computed from the model using fistat, lies above the conservative 0.2 and 0.4 range of 
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McFadden’s R2, it can be said with certainty that the model does well (McFadden 1974, 1977). 
That is, about 61 percent of the variance is explained by the model.  
 Table 5.7: Logit Analysis of ‘Ticket-Splitting’ using Survey Data 
 With Missing Data With Imputation 
VARIABLES (Model 1) (Model 2) 
Successful Primaries (H1A) -1.1983** -1.5818*** 
 (0.5447) (0.3820) 
Threaten to Leave Party (H1B) 0.5336 0.0536 
 (0.5767) (0.4360) 
Go Independent (H1C) -0.3447 0.0144 
 (0.5696) (0.4733) 
Common Pool (H1D) 0.0699 0.3393 
 (0.5884) (0.4326) 
Endorsement (H2A) 1.9797*** 0.1439*** 
 (0.6796) (0.4313) 
Strategic Withdrawal (H2B) 0.4999 0.3674 
 (0.6910) (0.5970) 
Restricted Choice (H5) 0.1105 -0.0127 
 (0.5628) (0.4430) 
Party ID (H4) 0.2902 0.2587** 
 (0.2038) (0.3726) 
Candidate Quality (H3) -4.3758*** -3.2781*** 
 (0.5769) (0.5769) 
Education (H6) -0.1561 -0.1105 
 (0.1061) (0.0750) 
Constant -2.7129 -2.1422** 
 (1.8338) (1.1217) 
Observations 249 303 
McFadden’s R2 0.608 Note 18 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
I then computed changes in the probabilities of splitting by changing variables from their 
minimum to their maximum values and displayed the results in Table 5.8 below. The results show 
that when candidate quality was changed from its minimum to its maximum, the probability of 
splitting reduced by (0.446). This shows that ticket splitting can be induced by party elites when 
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elite coordination results in situation where the most visible candidates are from different political 
parties. That is, the higher the disparities in candidate quality among the contesting parties, the 
higher the likelihood of splitting. It also shows that when party elites are able to field high quality 
candidates, they can reduce the chances of splitting by (.0446). When the variable endorsement 
was changed from its minimum to its maximum, the probability to split increased by (.070) 
meaning party elites can influence ticket splitting when they endorse candidates of other parties 
which is a common practice among parties that enter into electoral deals. In chapter 4, the variable 
was significant in four out of the six years under review. Finally, when the variable, successful 
primaries, was changed from its minimum to its maximum value, the probability of splitting 
reduced by (.023) meaning parties can reduce the likelihood of splitting when they conduct 
successful primaries.  
Table 5.8: Effect of Changing Variables from Their Minimum to Maximum Values on 
Probability of Ticket Splitting  
Variables Probability 
of Splitting 
Successful Primaries (H1A) -0.023 
Threaten to Leave Party (H1B) 0.007 
Go Independent (H1C) -0.003 
Common Pool (H1D) 0.001 
Endorsement (H2A) 0.070 
Strategic Withdrawal (H2B) 0.007 
Restricted Choice (H5) 0.001 
Party ID (H4) 0.013 
Candidate Quality (H3) -0.446 
Education (H6) -0.017 
Note: Estimates are derived from Model 1 holding all other variables constant at their medians 
 
5.6.2 Discussion 
Per the results from the fitted logit regression above, coordination variables such as 
conducting successful primaries, endorsing candidates from another party and fielding candidates 
of high quality affect the chances of splitting in many significant ways. These are consistent with 
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the theoretical expectation of the chapter. A couple of the variables, however, differed from 
expectations. In fact, research on coordination and voter behavior has found that coordination can 
be elite-driven through strategic entry (Arriola & Arriola 2013; Benoit 2001; Cox 1999) or voter-
driven through strategic voting (Conroy-Krutz 2013; Cox 1999). Therefore, coordination variables 
that were significant, such as conducting successful primaries and endorsement which were elite 
driven are not surprising. For instance, as of 1999, Cox had found that the decline in vote share 
suffered by Japan LDP’s was the result of its inability to overcome coordination problems 
confronted it in the 1960s (Cox 1999). Similarly, Golder (2006) found that the French center-left 
parties were having as much as nine candidates contesting the 2002 presidential elections due to 
coordination problems. The fate of the Japan LDP and the French center-left parties are not 
different from those of the many smaller parties in Ghana that align with the first President of 
Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah who are not able to overcome their coordination problems that have 
led their parties reduced to a pale shadow of the original CPP which had won all the elections in 
Ghana between 1950s up to the mid-1960s. Sure, apart from parties that belong to the CPP who 
have been swept with the currents of coordination, in Ghana, the low and high tides of coordination 
can be seen when one considers the performance of the three main party traditions in the country 
today; the Nkrumahists (represented by the many fragmented parties that trace their origin to 
Nkrumah’s principles) Danquah-Busia-Domo tradition (represented by the NPP) and the 
Akatamansonia (represented by the NDC) (Amponsah 2006; Apter 1966; Jonah 1998; Osei 2012).  
 The significance level of the endorsement variable is supported by both published work on 
Ghana and my fieldwork. Together, they explain how elite endorsement has influenced skirt and 
blouse voting and hence, skirt and blouse outcome in Ghana. In the early 1990s, though Mr. 
Rawlings was very popular, the NDC’s alliance with its coalition members helped secure the two 
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successive electoral victories for the party and facilitated the winning of several parliamentary 
seats of its alliance members. Due to how the alliance was shaped, it led to ticket splitting because 
of how the NDC endorsed and supported the parliamentary candidates of its junior partners (in the 
same constituency, an NDC member was likely to vote NDC at the presidential race and for its 
alliance partner at the parliamentary race). The same was the case with the NPP and its alliance 
members. In fact, in the 1996 elections, the NPP and People’s Convention Party (PCP) entered 
alliance and the PCP deferred its presidential slot to the NPP, endorsed and supported the NPP 
presidential candidate and in return, the NPP deferred some of the parliamentary races to the PCP. 
In the end, all the five seats the PCP won were in constituencies that the NPP deferred to, endorsed 
and supported the PCP (Agyeman-Duah 2005, Frempong 2017, Osei 2012). The NPP also could 
not have gotten the same presidential vote share without the PCP’s support. In these instances, the 
results were all skirt and blouse outcome (split outcome) which is a strong indication that there 
were significant skirt and blouse voting. Again, in these instances, party elites and candidates 
openly encouraged skirt and blouse voting.  
In fact, elites do it overtly and covertly but if you ask them, they will rather tell you their 
expected outcome of the election. It means that the focus is not on the means (skirt and blouse), 
but on the end (expected electoral outcome) and therefore, “the end justifies the means”. One of 
my respondents said this about their alliance with the NPP,  
“The Great Alliance (GA) was formed as an alliance between the NPP and the CPP/PCP 
to defeat the NDC. We had to forfeit our presidential race by making our flagbearer the 
running mate of the GA and endorse the NPP presidential candidate for the NPP to cede 
some parliamentary constituencies for the CPP/PCP. We further endorsed the NPP 
parliamentary candidates in constituencies we did not have candidates. The result of that 
alliance might be construed as skirt and blouse, but it was rather a mark of the success of 
the Great Alliance”10. 
Endorsement, which is an interparty coordination mechanism, often takes place when there is an 
alliance and obviously, there will be compromises for the alliance to be successful. However, in 
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Ghana, how the alliances have often been made normally produces split outcome because in the 
parliamentary race, the parties retain their original name and party labels (Ayee 1998; Frempong 
2017; Ninsin 1998). Even in the presidential race, when the alliance adopts a different name, the 
government that is formed is considered the government of the major party that produced the 
presidential candidate (Ayee 1998; Frempong 2017; Ninsin 1998). For instance, in the 1992 
election the NDC and two other parties formed alliance to win the election and the government 
was called the NDC government. Again, in 1996, the NDC and two other parties formed the 
Progressive alliance and that government was called the NDC government as well (Ayee 1998; 
Frempong 2017; Ninsin 1998). Thus, irrespective of the name of the alliance, official reports from 
the Electoral Commission and Parliamentary Hansard had always showed the registered names of 
the political parties (Electoral Commission 1992-2016; Ephson 2008, 2009, 2012, 2016). This also 
shows that the parties do not register the alliance names, neither do they contest with those names. 
They are instruments elites use to achieve their electoral objectives.   
Though the interparty coordination has been successful as discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, it has been a sort of quagmire that has adversely affected parties in alliance and this 
could explain why the strategic withdrawal variable was not significant. There are published works 
to show this and it is supported by my fieldwork. One of my respondents revealed that alliance 
formation takes time, especially when you just come out from one that you got your fingers burnt. 
So, negotiations did not end before parliamentary candidates were elected and deciding on who 
should give up their nomination created conflict within the party and between members of the 
alliance. Below is the quote of respondent 5 on the subject:  
“In 1992, we had just seven months to prepare for the election between the time the ban on 
political parties was lifted and the elections. Therefore, we rushed into an alliance with the 
NDC but before the next election, we had to leave that alliance and enter another. With the 
hindsight of the NDC experience, in 1996 we couldn’t just rush into another one. It took 
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time and we couldn’t agree on the terms of the alliance before candidates were elected. Of 
course, that can’t hold us from electing candidates. We operate by party constitution. So, 
withdrawal of candidates after the alliance became problematic and created conflicts within 
the individual parties and between the alliance parties”10.  
Scholars such as Ayee (1997) and Frempong (2017) have substantiated how the inability to 
strategically withdraw candidates by the NPP-PCP alliance created problem for the parties. These 
scholars observed that in 1996 the Great Alliance (GA) between NPP and the PCP witnessed 
coordination problems where alliance candidates openly campaigned against each other. In some 
constituencies, for instance, the parties could not negotiate to withdraw some candidates because 
the NPP and PCP had already elected their candidates who had started campaigning. Consequently, 
in constituencies such as Ablekuma South, Awutu-Senya, Ayawaso Central, Okaikoi North, and 
Okaikoi South, candidates of the GA campaigned against each other (Ayee 1997, 425, Frempong 
2017). These could explain why the strategic withdrawal variable was not significant in both 
models.  
At the intraparty sphere, coordination problems, such as nomination problems discussed in 
section 5.2.1 above under discoveries from the fieldwork, could explain why the successful 
primaries variable was significant. From the fieldwork, it came to light among other things that 
some financiers support certain members of their rival parties to divide the votes in the recipient’s 
party for the candidate of the financier’s party to win. Furthermore, party elites who have 
presidential and parliamentary ambitions can sabotage the present holder of that position even if 
that person is from the ambitious contender’s party. In certain instances, it could be a person in a 
position higher than the legislator who would undercut the legislator to lose the election for the 
superior authority to introduce his/her favorite. The result often creates skirt and blouse voting or 
skirt and blouse outcome. Respondent 4 said this about sabotage: 
“…At times, if those at the top do not like you they will deliberately sabotage you. If for 
instance, they should give you materials they will give you lesser quantity or different type 
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of materials which they know you cannot work with. This will go on till you lose the 
elections.17  
Certainly, legislators do not work with “materials”, but the message is obvious. That is, sabotage 
aims at undercutting the target person to fail at the end. Thus, the use of the word material in the 
analogy above should be read in context to mean the mechanism of sabotaging a target person.  
Finally, unsuccessful primaries have robbed the two major parties, the NDC and the NPP, 
to lose the election in even their strongholds. The conflictual relationship that creates successful 
primaries often ensues between an incumbent MP and the challenger. In most cases either of them 
anticipates foul play from officials either due to sabotage or favoritism shown to either the 
incumbent or the challenger. When it happens, it is difficult to resolve because often the aggrieved 
person(s) does not trust the party officials. What follows is the aggrieved person contends the 
election as independent. Below is a quote from respondent:  
“In 2012, the former NDC MP, Dr. Ato Quarshie, who had held the seat for three terms 
(1992, 1996 and 2000) staged a comeback to contest the parliamentary primaries of the 
NDC but lost the primaries by just 12 votes to the incumbent, Dr. Joseph Samuel Annan. 
Dr. Ato Quarshie was not happy with the results from the primaries but the party could not 
mediate the conflict between Dr. Joseph Samuel Annan and Dr. Ato Quarshie. At the end, 
Dr. Ato Quarshie contested as an independent and by so doing, divided the party’s votes 
for the NPP’s candidate, Stephen Nana Ato Arthur to win the seat with merely 38.17% of 
the votes whereas at the presidential slot, the NDC had won with 55.57%.7” 
These evidence from the fieldwork aside, there are published documents that have shown how 
unresolved successful primaries have influenced aggrieved nomination seekers to contest the 
election as independents and either win or cause the defeat of their parties. In the 2000 election 
alone, the NDC lost four of its safe seats to aggrieved nomination seekers who contested as 
independents and defeated the incumbents seeking third term. Aside these four, others who went 
independents caused the defeat of six NDC incumbents (Boafo-Arthur 2008; Daddieh and Bob-
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Milliar 2012; Debrah 2014; Frempong 2017; Osei 2012). In all these instances, the results were 
skirt and blouse outcome pointing to significant skirt and blouse voting.  
The above are some instances that Ghanaian political elites and candidates will openly 
advocate ticket splitting. Political elites’ penchant of advocating ticket splitting is not unique to 
Ghana. In the U.S. for instance, during the 1996 elections, it was said that some Republican 
congressional candidates campaigned to be elected alongside President Clinton so that they could 
check him (Burden and Kimball 2009). Again, Senator Joseph Anthony Manchin (Joe Manchin) 
who has represented West Virginia since 2010 as Democrat is known for his liberal views and 
voting with Republicans on many policy issues. In fact, most people here on West Virginia 
University campus and within the United States that I discuss my research with had mentioned 
Senator Joe Manchin as a good example for skirt and blouse voting in the United States. During 
my fieldwork in Ghana, some of my respondents jokingly wanted to know if I received funding 
from Senator Joe Manchin when they found out I am schooling in West Virginia. Thus, political 
elites advocating for ticket splitting/skirt and blouse voting is something not entirely peculiar to 
Ghanaian elites and, therefore, research into such a phenomenon is in place.  
5.7 CONCLUSION 
 In sum, this chapter attempts to address an unusual question in split-ticket voting by trying 
to find out why party elites’ coordination/interaction will influence ticket splitting or which 
candidates will split their ballot instead of the conventional question, “why some voters would 
split the ballot and others would not”? Again, it has also tried to make us understand how this elite 
behavior has affected the current distribution of votes and seats share of parties in Ghana. In 
addressing these questions, I carried out elite survey in Ghana in 2017 sampling 303 respondents 
comprising party elites and card bearing members of five Ghanaian political parties, members 
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drawn from academia, the media and civil society. Though the sample was not randomly selected, 
it was selected to have a true representative of party officials from constituencies that have 
experienced skirt and blouse outcome and those that have not. It also sampled persons at the center 
of skirt and blouse voting (party officials advocating ticket splitting or threatened with it) and those 
who were not. I also needed to be circumspect in my interpretation because of the sample selection 
strategy. However, it is worth stressing that the regression results, the insights from the fieldwork, 
and published works by others on the subject support my interpretation and conclusions.  
As evidenced by the results from the fitted binary logit regressions, the interparty 
coordination variable endorsement was significant in the models. Also significant was the core 
intraparty coordination variable, successful primaries which was significant in both models and 
having the signs in the expected direction. Candidate quality was also significant in both models. 
The significance of successful primaries, for instance, makes us aware that party elites are likely 
to split their ticket and advocate same where the party’s nomination process is undemocratic. That 
is, in normal times, as long as the party’s nomination process is transparent and democratic, we do 
not expect Ghanaian politicians and party elite to engage in ticket  splitting or advocate that. 
However, in non-normal times where a politician calculates and finds that adhering to the status 
quo would mean that they wait in “perpetuity”, they would like to accuse others of irregularities 
in the nomination process (Ichino and Nathan 2013, 2017) and use that excuse to get party officials 
to take decisions in their favor or leave with other supporters to contest as independent. Others 
who have parliamentary and presidential ambitions can sabotage their party candidates to lose the 
elections so that they can in future win a candidate that had lost on the party’s ticket (Frempong 
2017). In all these instances, these persons advocate skirt and blouse voting. In fact, leaving one’s 
party and contesting as independent is not peculiar to Ghana10. In 2000 U.S. elections, former 
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Republican Senator, James Jeffords of Vermont defected and contested as independent (Burden 
and Kimball 2009). It is likely that his defection will cause ticket splitting. It will be interesting to 
find out how he and his family and friends voted especially where after his defection he started 
fraternizing with Democrats.  
 At the interparty level, opinions are divided about the effects of coordination between 
bigger and smaller parties in Ghana which invariably have contributed to ticket splitting as in most 
instances, the smaller parties support the bigger parties in the presidential race and the bigger ones 
defer some parliamentary seats to the smaller parties. In fact, some respondents are of the view 
that it was largely because of interparty coordination that the smaller parties could pick the few 
seats in parliament in the past. However, in situations where the members of big parties have 
refused to coordinate with the smaller parties has led to what Mr. Kwesi Jonah refers to as “the 
withering away of the smaller parties” (field Interview March 13, 2017). To him, the country has 
lost the voice of the smaller parties. In a sharp contrast to this view, Dr. Ofori Mensah is of the 
view that the smaller parties have not articulated their own view since the inception of the 4th 
Republican Parliament. To him, the smaller parties have always supported the bigger parties who 
supported them and as such have not presented their own platform (field Interview March 24, 
2017). Thus, others think that though skirt and blouse voting and subsequently, skirt and blouse 
outcomes have helped the smaller parties to have representation in parliament because in few 
occasions that the smaller parties have gone into parliament it was due to interparty coordination, 
the relationship worked against the smaller parties. The reality is that in many instances, the bigger 
parties poach the viable candidates of the smaller parties and independent candidates by giving 
them ministerial appointments and other governmental appointments. These candidates have 
supported the policies of the government of the day and have not had their own voice. The 
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observation by Yobo and Gyampo (2015) that the electoral performance of the minor parties within 
the Fourth Republic has dwindled and have been reduced to supporting the victory of the major 
ones is a worrying one. These parties need to augment their coordination game by coming together 
far ahead of time to give Ghana a viable alternative between the NDC and the NPP. 
In sum, it is critical to carry out empirical research on how coordination problems affect 
parties, elites, and candidates. Such research will help party elites to identify and guard against 
intraparty coordination problems such as linkage problems which happen where there is no 
harmony between the parliamentary and presidential candidates’ campaigns. Again, such research 
will help political parties to take steps to improve internal democracy if they know that imposition 
of a candidate on a constituency for instance, will cause skirt and blouse voting. We will also know 
that young politicians who have legislative ambition but are not able to realize such goal because 
their seniors already on the legislature have no term limit will make them adopt strategic 
coordination that may hurt their own parties. My field research shows that though politicians do 
not often overtly advocate ticket splitting, many do so when they see it to be in their interest and 
do so more at the grassroots. In fact, the nomination problems and deliberate sabotage discussed 
in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 respectively show how politicians like DCEs/MCEs, party elites with 
presidential and parliamentary ambitions will undercut their own party members through skirt and 
blouse voting. Such conducts take place largely due to coordination problems that parties are 
unable to identify in the first place and address. Such a revelation will help politicians and crafters 
of constitutions to have a second look at ways of reviewing existing laws and policies to limit 
internal conflicts.   
Ghana currently does not have a viable, major third party. The Nkrumahists who won 
independence for Ghana and formed the governments under the First and Third Republican 
Samuel K. Darkwa   
206 
 
Constitutions have now run out of steam due to the existence of several splinter groups which 
together attract less than two percent vote share. In fact, the 2016 elections results show that the 
two leading political parties pulled about 98 percent of the presidential votes cast and 100 percent 
of the legislative seats as per Table 5.1 and 5.2 (also see EC-Ghana 2016, Frempong 2017). This 
is due to coordination problems faced by the Nkrumahists elites. By such research, they can 
identify their coordination problems and craft proactive solutions for their coordination problems 
and workout pre-election coalition ahead of the 2020 elections. They can also figure out how to 
position themselves given that the Akatamansonia and the Danquah-Busia-Domo traditions 
occupy center-left and center-right respectively, the Nkrumahist who are the original leftist party 
can draw some votes from the left when they come together. Their coordination problem is not 
affecting that tradition alone, but Ghana’s democracy given that there is policy vacuum at the far 
left and far right.  
This chapter will suggest that further research into ticket splitting should also consider 
instances where party elites will strategically encourage split-ticket voting. Thus, questions such 
as why would parties, elites, and candidates encourage ticket splitting can advance our knowledge 
of the phenomenon. Another thing I chanced upon during my fieldwork, discussed under section 
5.2.1, was how the financing of opposition election campaigns contributes to skirt and blouse 
voting. It was alleged that some politicians finance the campaigns of their opponents with the view 
that the recipients of such funds will find faults with their party’s nomination process create 
confusion that will trigger observable indicators intraparty coordination failures discussed above. 
Such acts often divide the votes of the opponent’s party and consequently, enhances the chances 
of the financier or his/her candidate to win the election. This invariably promotes ticket splitting 
in the recipient’s part. It would therefore, be great to research into such acts in future.  
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5.9 NOTES  
1. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Be-Bold-vote-skirt-and-blouse-
Sakara-258747 
2. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Let-s-vote-skirt-and-blouse-154036 
3. Largely, political actors send cues to guide voter choice. In most cases, they want them to 
behave as we would often expect (coordination/straight tickets). However, voters do not always 
behave as politicians expect them to. 
4. I use the term ‘interparty coordination’ to characterize any form of pre-electoral interactions 
and/or arrangement between parties, candidates and individual deals between them capable of 
affecting their electoral performance. It also encompasses their negotiations for policy and office 
prior to the elections. 
5. Interview with a Policy Analyst of the main opposition NDC and with the Achimota Zonal 
Chairperson of the ruling NPP on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 by author. 
6. Interview with NDC parliamentary candidate who was a victim of skirt and blouse advocacy at 
the Parliament House on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 by author and with NPP Western Regional 
Chairperson on Tuesday, March 14, 2017 by enumerator. 
7. Interview with a faculty at the Political Science Department at the University of Ghana (Legon) 
on Wednesday, March 15, 2017 by author. 
8. Interview with the Deputy Director of Operations, National Commission for Civic Education 
(NCCE) Ghana and with an NDC parliamentary candidate who was a victim of skirt and blouse 
advocacy, at the Parliament House on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 by author. 
9. Interview with the Deputy Director of Operations, National Commission for Civic Education 
(NCCE) Ghana on Wednesday, March 8, 2017 and with the Director of Research to the main 
opposition NDC on Wednesday, March 15, 2017 by author. 
10. Interview with the Second National Chairperson of the Convention People’s Party on Friday, 
March 10, 2017 by author. 
11. Interview with the Second National Chairperson of the Convention People’s Party on Friday, 
March 10, 2017 and with a National Civic Society leader on Monday, March 13, 2017 by author. 
12. The swing constituencies are erratic in their voting patterns and any political party that wins 
the swing regions wins the national elections since 1992. 
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13. Constituency with more than 60,000 registered voters is considered large because it exceeds 
the national average of about 56,000 registered voters and about 39,000 valid votes cast as per the 
2016 electoral statistics. 
14. Klottey Korle constituency is at times written Korle Klottey or Osu Klottey. 
15. One of the faculty from the Department of Political Science in the University of Ghana 
interviewed is the author of Elections in Ghana 1951 – 2016 whom I quoted copiously in this 
chapter. The next has also written extensively on elections. He was a former head of the department 
and has headed the governance centers of two think tanks. He is currently the head of the 
governance center of The Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) in Ghana. The third wanted 
to remain anonymous. I also received a great deal of support from the immediate past head of the 
political science department who is now the Deputy Commissioner at the EC. He introduced me 
to the president of the Political Science Students Association at the University of Ghana. 
16. This situation is not unique to Ghana however, it has become an issue such that if an MP spends 
more than two terms in parliament, that member becomes a target within his/her party. In fact, one 
of the MPs I interviewed during my fieldwork (Hon. Alhassan Fuseini Inusah), who had been 
threatened with skirt and blouse voting in the 2016 election on his fourth attempt hinted he was 
not going to stand for reelection. I am not surprised he has confirmed that decision (retrieved on 
January 8, 2019, from https://www.myjoyonline.com/politics/2018/July-3rd/inusah-fuseini-bows-
out-of-2020-parliamentary-race.php) 
17. Interview with a cadre of the opposition National Democratic Congress on Thursday, March 
9, 2019 in Accra.  
18. Standard measure of fit cannot be calculated for multiple imputation technique model. Per 
Stata Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual Release 15, standard measure of fit does not work 
with models estimated using multiple-Imputation technique. 
  
Appendix 5.1: Coding at the Elite Level of Analysis   
Variable Description of the Variable (questions in 2017 
field Survey) 
Coding Rule 
Split (DV) To measure the DV, respondents were asked in Q26, 
“Have you ever voted skirt and blouse (that is to vote 
for presidential and parliamentary candidates in the 
same election from different political parties) 
before?”  
Respondents who answered “Yes” 
were coded as “1” and “No” coded as 
“0” 
Successful 
Primaries 
I compute successful primaries using Q 5, “Please 
select the statement that most closely matches your 
view. In general, the recent parliamentary primaries 
of your political party were successful”.  
“Strongly agree” and “moderately 
agree” coded as “1”, “strongly 
disagree” and “moderately disagree” 
coded as “0”, “neutral /don’t know” 
treated as missing.  
Threaten to 
Leave Party 
Threaten to Leave Party was measured using Q6, 
“Did any defeated candidate of your party threaten to 
leave the political party?”.  
“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0” 
and “don’t know” treated as missing. 
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Go 
Independent 
I generated the variable, ‘Go Independent’ using Q9, 
“Did some losing parliamentary contestants go 
independent?”  
 
“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0” 
and “don’t know” treated as missing. 
Common 
Pool 
The variable “Common Pool” was measured using 
Q17, “Leading to the elections did your party 
maintain a common pool of resources for both 
presidential and parliamentary campaigns?”  
“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as 
“0”. 
Endorsement The variable “Endorsement” was generated using 
Q21, “Did your party endorse another candidate for 
either the presidential or parliamentary slot?”  
“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0” 
and “don’t know” treated as missing. 
Strategic 
Withdrawal 
I generate the variable, “Strategic Withdrawal” using 
Q23, “Did your party decide to leave out any 
constituency or withdraw a candidate from a 
particular constituency to help another party win that 
seat?”  
“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0” 
and “don’t know” treated as missing. 
Restricted 
Choice 
The variable “Contest both Offices” was generated 
using Q24 “Did your party contest in both 
presidential and parliamentary seats in all 
constituencies?”  
“Yes” coded as “1”, “No” coded as “0” 
and “don’t know” treated as missing. 
Party ID It was generated using Q3 “If you answered Yes, on 
Question 2, which political party is that?”  
Respondent’s party affiliation was 
coded as per their responses; CPP 41, 
NDC 87, NPP 86, PNC 38, and PPP 
44.   
Candidate 
Quality 
The variable “Candidate Quality” was generated 
using Q27 Why? which was a follow-up to Q26 
“Have you ever voted skirt and blouse (that is to vote 
for presidential and parliamentary candidates in the 
same election from different political parties) 
before?”  
Respondents who chose candidate 
quality (which was the most popular 
response) were coded as “1” otherwise, 
coded as “0”.   
Education I control for education using the educational 
qualification of respondents.  
Education is on a seven rater-scale 
from “0” to “6” (some primary 
schooling to “university completed & 
beyond). Respondents who selected “I 
don’t know” were treated as missing 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
6.1 FINDINGS FROM THE RESEARCH 
 In this dissertation, I have attempted to examine how voter-level and elite-level factors can 
enhance our knowledge of ticket splitting in an emerging democracy like Ghana. In doing so, the 
dissertation employed Cox’s (1997, 1999) strategic coordination which posits that strategic voting 
by the electorate is due to unresolved elite coordination problems. That is, voters in pure SMDs 
for instance, will coordinate their votes on the top two candidates when elites fail to coordinate 
their entry on only two viable candidates. This can translate into splitting when elite coordination 
creates incentives for voters to vote strategically and the candidates a voter selects in different 
races are not from the same party. The analysis carried out here has been approached at three 
levels. These are: individual-level, constituency-level, and elite-level using different datasets 
appropriate for each level to examine the phenomenon. This approach has helped to improve our 
knowledge on ticket splitting, elite behavior, and Ghanaian electoral politics.  
 First, analysis at the individual level considered the characteristics of voters alongside 
variables indicative of voter and elite coordination. I conducted this evaluation to determine which 
variables best explain split-ticket voting. Interestingly, the individual level variables perform 
poorly. In fact, the demographic and socioeconomic variables were weak and inconsistent as in 
other findings (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Bybee et al. 1981; Campbell and Miller 1957; 
Roscoe 2003). It was only income that was partly significant just in one out of the six models run 
in chapter 3. By contrast, the political information variables: radio, television and newspaper 
present interesting findings. First, radio exposure for instance, is negatively related to splitting, 
indicating that voters might be listening to radio networks that match their political inclinations as 
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found by scholars such as (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Roscoe 2003). Newspaper and 
television were partly significant. Put together, the effects of political information are largely 
inconsistent as found by many scholars (Atwood and Sanders 1975; Beck et al. 1992; Burden and 
Kimball 1998, 2009; Bybee et al. 1981; Campbell and Miller 1957; Roscoe 2003). Their 
inconsistency with splitting is indicative of the fact that they can be tools for whipping voter 
decision in certain direction during elections (Chandra 2007, 2009; Mclaughlin 2008). 
 Elite coordination variables such as party positioning and parliamentary split were highly 
significant when used alongside the voter level variables discussed in the preceding paragraph. In 
chapters three and five, I showed that when party elites distance themselves from their party’s 
policy or position themselves closer to their opponent’s policies, they create ticket splitting. This 
explains why perceived party similarities (candidate positioning) variable was significant. Again, 
some party supporters and elites often withdraw from their PCs due to coordination problems and 
that is a huge cause of skirt and blouse voting in Ghana. It was not surprising that the parliamentary 
split variable was highly significant in all the models in Chapter 3 and the signs in the expected 
direction. Certainly, comparing the performance of elite level factors against voter level factors 
from the regression results demonstrates that differences in ticket splitting are better explained by 
variation in the degree of elite coordination than by variation in characteristics of individual voters 
such as political sophistication, demographic and socioeconomic variables. In fact, ticket splitting 
has largely been influenced by changes in elite coordination. The relationship between elite 
coordination and ticket splitting is depicted by Figure 6.1 below (constructed from Table 4.7 in 
chapter 4), which shows the relation between disputed constituencies in parliamentary elections 
and split outcomes in Ghana between 1996 and 2016. Disputed primaries in parliamentary 
elections which is a major elite coordination pitfall discussed in chapter 4, to greater extent, seems 
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to be an important contributor to split outcomes because almost every constituency that had 
disputed primaries in parliamentary elections experienced split outcomes. 
Figure 6.1: Percentage of Split Constituencies vs. Parliamentary Disputed Primaries 1996–
2016 
 
Source: Created by author using data from Election Passport and Ghana Electoral Commission 
  Second, the aggregate level analysis examines how voter level factors such as volatility 
and SF-ratio and elite level factors such as disputed primaries in parliamentary elections, 
deals/alliances, and effective number of political parties affect split outcomes especially in the 
parliamentary race. Using the constituency-level electoral dataset (1996-2016) alongside 
published works that show constituencies with disputed primaries in parliamentary elections as 
well as deals entered into by political parties, the dissertation demonstrates how coordination 
influences split outcomes. The model controlled for three variables: regional effects, ethnicity, and 
distance to accommodate alternative explanation. Interestingly, the control variables were not all 
that significant. Each of the elite coordination variables: disputed primaries in parliamentary 
elections, deals, and effective number of political parties were highly significant with the signs in 
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the expected direction. The voter level coordination factors: volatility and SF-ratio were not 
supported by the model. Furthermore, the signs of the voter-level factors were not in the expected 
direction indicating that voter-level factors by themselves are not very effective and will need some 
sort of influence from the political environment to influence splitting. This sort of influence from 
the political environment comes from elite coordination which is in tandem with the strategic 
coordination model that this dissertation advocates (Cox 1997 2006; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Rose & 
Munro 2003).  
The third level of analysis was at the elite level where the variables of interest were 
intraparty coordination, interparty coordination, and candidate quality using fieldwork carried out 
in 2017 sampling 303 respondents made up of party elites and card bearing members of five 
Ghanaian political parties. Also sampled were members drawn from academia, the media and civil 
society. Given the target group, the sample was not randomly selected but purposively selected to 
cover all of these important groups, especially party officials from constituencies that have 
experienced skirt and blouse outcome and those that have not. Again, persons at the center of skirt 
and blouse voting (party officials advocating ticket splitting or threatened with it) and those who 
were not were sampled. To accommodate alternative explanations, the model controlled for 
education, party ID and restricted choice menu to make sure that alternative factors that influence 
splitting are considered. Successful primaries which is intraparty coordination variable was 
statistically significant in all the models with the signs in the expected direction. Again, 
endorsement was highly significant in all the models. These findings are consistent with the 
political realities in the Ghanaian political scene where elite coordination successes and failures 
have shaped party support and have caused significant shifts in parties’ vote share since 1992 
(Graham et al. 2017; Kumah-Abiwu 2017; Lindberg 2007, 2013; Weghorst & Lindberg 2013).  
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6.2 CONTRIBUTION TO THE SPLIT-TICKET VOTING LITERATURE  
 The contribution of this dissertation to the existing literature can be classified into four. 
First, the dissertation shows how in-party and cross-party elite coordination explain ticket splitting 
and consequently split outcome and by extension the composition of the executive and the 
legislature. It shows how cross-party interaction of party elites can create cohesion even among 
disunited elites. This kind of elite cohesion has the potential of creating consensually united elites 
who see politics as bargaining based on the principle of give to get which partly explains Ghana’s 
democratic success. Many people have wondered why Ghana’s democracy is seeing progress with 
repeated peaceful transfers of power even in the wake of closely contested elections (Frempong 
2007; Obama 2009; Osei 2015; Whitfield 2009). This dissertation is of the view that this has been 
possible because the Ghanaian political elites are moving towards the zone of consensually united 
elites.  
Second, ticket splitting affects democratic representation and accountability. In respect to 
democratic representation, electorates who want their votes to count do not vote based on partisan 
identification but based on candidate quality. In this way, elections give voters the opportunity to 
select the most viable candidates in the different races which can potentially create ticket splitting 
in situation where the most viable candidates in the different races are not from the same political 
party. The study also shows that ticket splitting better ensures political accountability in the sense 
that it sends a clear message to political actors that voters expect competence and that it (ticket 
splitting) has a way of promoting individual accountability by punishing incompetence and 
rewarding competence.  
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Third, the dissertation has reclassified Ghana’s skirt and blouse voting which has two 
different meanings and therefore creates conceptual ambiguity into skirt and blouse voting and 
skirt and blouse outcome. This reclassification harmonizes Ghana’s skirt and blouse voting with 
split-ticket voting on one hand and skirt and blouse outcome (split district outcome) on the other. 
In this way, the dissertation has made it possible to compare Ghana’s ticket splitting with ticket 
splitting in other settings.  
Finally, it makes the case that, though ticket splitting is seen as voter level phenomenon, it 
could be studied from elite perspective as well. This is because, politics is largely elite driven; “if 
elites choose to practice liberal democratic politics, then liberal democratic politics will be 
practiced” (Higley and Burton 2006, 3). Since political elites are critical in the determination of 
democratic success and elite interaction affects the available choice set in elections, it is important 
to study how elite coordination affects ticket splitting and democratic success.  
6.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH  
In spite of the significant contribution made by this dissertation to the Ghanaian skirt and 
blouse voting and hence the split-ticket voting literature, the dissertation is saddled with two major 
limitations all related to the dataset used for the analysis. First, the Afrobarometer dataset 
employed for the individual level analysis in chapter 3 presented three major challenges: 
differences of objective of the Afrobarometer and my dissertation, timing of data collection, and 
respondents’ decision not to answer some questions leading to significant number of missing data. 
In fact, because ticket splitting was not the goal of the Afrobarometer in its data collection, the 
survey questions did not directly assess behavior or voting intentions that will cause ticket splitting. 
As a result, I resorted to the use of proxies to obtain my dependent variable – split-ticket voting. 
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Again, the Afrobarometer survey was not carried out immediately before or after elections to 
survey voter intentions and their actual voting decisions. It would have been great to explore how 
voter coordination can even lead to reduction in ticket splitting but the data did not allow me to 
analyze this fact. For instance, a voter’s preferred choice may be party ‘A’ for president and party 
‘B’ for legislature, but this voter may end up choosing party ‘A’ for both president and legislature 
because party ‘B’s legislative candidate is subpar. Due to the absence of this critical factor, my 
assessments of likely voter behavior may understate or overstate skirt and blouse likelihood. 
Furthermore, a significant number of respondents did not identify with a party when asked in the 
interview, as well as failed to answer some of the questions. This increased the number of missing 
data in almost every variable used by the dissertation. I had to resort to the use of multiple 
imputation technique to handle missing data. Aside from these, the dataset did not allow me to 
find out which parties and candidates failed to coordinate.  
The second major limitation has to do with the measurement of disputed primaries in 
parliamentary elections, a major elite level independent variable used in chapter 4. As shown in 
that chapter, in Ghana, elites coordination problem like disputed primary involving nomination 
mainly occurs due to lack of internal party democracy. Where this happens, and elites are unable 
to resolve the dispute, in most instances, the aggrieved nomination seekers rally their supports to 
contest the election as independent candidates. This often divides the party’s votes and if the 
party’s main opponent commands similar vote share, then electorates who will like their votes to 
count are likely to vote for their next preferred candidate. If the party that voter selects in the other 
race is from a different party, that will cause ticket splitting. To measure disputed primaries in 
parliamentary elections, the dissertation relied on published works and media reports that have 
recorded constituencies with disputed party primaries. After compiling all constituencies with 
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parliamentary disputed primaries from the reports, the dissertation was unable to distinguish 
constituencies where just one party had a disputed primary and where more than one party had 
disputed primaries in parliamentary elections to measure the variable (disputed primaries) in 
percentages. Consequently, I had to measure disputed primaries in parliamentary elections as 
dichotomous variable instead of in percentage which is a preferred measure. This measure could 
cause false negatives, especially in instances where I may incorrectly indicate the absence of 
disputed primary in some constituencies. It worth pointing out, however, that it is a better evil to 
under report the presence of a disputed primary than to over report it.  
The final limitation, though minor, is the choice of Ghana as the laboratory to examine the 
relationship between elite coordination and split-ticket voting. This is because the findings from 
Ghana may not be generalizable to the rest of Africa and emerging democracies. This nonetheless, 
the choice of Ghana allows the dissertation to go more in depth into how elite coordination 
influences ticket splitting. This could be replicated elsewhere in single country case and in multiple 
case research. In fact, I hope to expand this research to cover other West African countries as well 
as other democracies in Sub-Saharan and Northern Africa. 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH IN THE SUBFIELD 
From the afore going discussions, it is clear that, examining ticket splitting from the prism 
of strategic coordination has expanded our knowledge on how elite- and voter-level factors interact 
to influence the phenomenon. Notwithstanding the contribution the dissertation has made to the 
split-ticket voting literature, the chapter will suggest few things that future research into ticket 
splitting should also consider. First, it will be great to ask questions aimed at investigating why 
party elites will strategically encourage split-ticket voting. Also important are questions that will 
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seek to explore how elite coordination successes and failures facilitate ticket splitting. Such 
questions will help advance the work of scholars who have found individual level factors to be 
inadequate in explaining why ticket splitting occurs (Burden and Kimball 1998, 2009; Bybee et 
al. 1981; Campbell and Miller 1957; Roscoe 2003). 
A second area worth considering is how ticket splitting and for that matter, split outcomes 
promotes performance-based voting such as economic voting (Debrah 2016; Downs 1957; Fiorina 
1981; Helmke 2009). Performance voting has received much research attention from students and 
scholars of electoral studies (Anderson 2007; Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Hellwig and Samuels 
2008; Helmke 2009; Kayser and Wlezien 2011; Moehler and Lindberg 2009). However, 
comparative study on how split and non-split constituencies may receive differentiated responsive 
and accountable representation that may produce variations in socioeconomic and human 
development is lacking (Asunka 2016, 2017; Fridy 2006; Lindberg & Morrison 2008; Weghorst 
& Lindberg 2013). Future research examining such differences is likely to enhance our knowledge 
on the instrumental role of ticket splitting (split outcomes). 
Third, in my fieldwork in Ghana, I uncovered how the financing of opposition election 
campaigns contributes to the phenomenon of skirt and blouse voting (skirt and blouse outcomes). 
It was alleged that some politicians sponsor the campaign costs of their opponents with the view 
that the recipients of such funds will find faults with their party’s nomination process. When this 
happens, the party whose member plays the ‘traitor’ role rallies support and contests the election 
as independent candidate. Such acts often divide the votes of the traitor’s party and consequently, 
enhance the chances of the financier’s party to win the election. This invariably promotes ticket 
splitting in the recipient’s party. Future research into how such acts facilitate splitting will help 
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party elites, policy makers and watchers of democracy craft solutions designed to salvage 
emerging democracies from certain vices that impede responsive and accountable representation.   
Fourth, where individual level factors explaining ticket splitting were considered, political 
information variables such as radio, newspaper and television presented inconsistent relationship 
with ticket splitting. This shows that the political information variables could be tools to 
disseminate public opinion in vogue at the time of an election to influence voter choice in certain 
direction (Chandra 2007, 2009; Mclaughlin 2008). It will therefore, be interesting to investigate 
how politicians employ political information variables to influence ticket splitting. At start, it will 
be important to determine the relationship between split-ticket voting and political information in 
respect to its direction. A negative direction will mean political information does not influence 
ticket splitting while positive relationship will indicate that political information impacts splitting.  
Finally, this dissertation holds that, though ticket splitting was definitely not one of the 
objectives of the Afrobarometer in its data collection, collecting data on it will help advance the 
comparative study of African politics because other barometers do that. Thus, data collection on 
voter intentions that can help determine whether voters will split their ticket would be helpful. This 
may not require much space nor costs because already there is a question line that requires voters 
to indicate the party they will vote for in the presidential race if elections were held tomorrow. 
Additional questions that will find out which party the voter will vote for in the parliamentary race 
will help figure out split-ticket voters. The next question worth looking into is who the voter voted 
for in the parliamentary and presidential races in the previous election. This question will help 
determine voters’ consistency of ticket splitting.  
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